The TIbetan Plateau Blog

Introduction to the Petroleum and Mineral Deposits of the Tibetan Plateau Preliminary Database and Map

2011-11-11T18:37:00.000-08:00

Tibetan Plateau blog published a preliminary map and database of petroleum and mineral deposits of the Tibetan Plateau. The map and the database seek to provide an overview of publically available information regarding petroleum and mineral deposits on the Tibetan Plateau. We hope to be able to produce future versions of increasing completeness and accuracy. As improvements are completed they will be made available on the Internet for the public to view and download without charge. Our approach has sought to avoid excessive technicalities while giving sufficient information that the lay public can better assess the actually and potential economic, human rights, and environmental effects of resource exploration, extraction and processing on the Tibetan Plateau. For those that want more detailed information on the deposits or the geology of the region a list of academic references is provided. While we have attempted to include names of the companies working on the various deposits, detailed information about the governmental and/or corporate organizations will have to be obtained elsewhere.

The Tibetan Plateau
The Tibetan Plateau in the PRC consists of the high altitude (generally over 3500 m.) region predominantly Tibetan culturally and historically. It consists of Tibet Autonomous region (Xizang), Qinghai, parts of Gansu, western Sichuan, and the northwest corner of Yunnan. Traditional Tibetan names for these areas being U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham. Outside China the Tibetan Plateau extends into Ladakh, Spiti, Sikkim and Northeast India, as well as Mustang in Nepal. These are not considered in this map.

The following two maps created by the Environment and Development Desk of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala indicate the prefectures and counties of the Tibetan Plateau. The names given are those recognized by the Central Tibetan Administration.

The Databases
There are three databases in three Excel (.xls) spreadsheets: mineral deposits, salt lake and playa deposits, and petroleum deposits. The three databases have similar formats but have been separated as these different types of deposits are discovered and exploited differently.

Mineral deposits often require expensive exploration techniques, such as widespread stream, earth, and bedrock sampling, exploratory shafts, and diamond drilling. Both trenching and diamond drilling often leave surface modifications visible in Google Earth. Mines are either underground or open pit. They often can be recognized by the (blue roofed) buildings, evidence of exploration, a pit, and a tailings pond (an enclosed area where the waste material goes after processing the ore). Placer mining also often leaves visible traces such as pits and other damage to a river bed.

Salt lakes and playas (a deposit where the ancient salt lake has disappeared) are relatively easy to find and exploit. Tibetans have been exploiting salt lakes for salt, for trade and their own use, for hundreds of years. Basically all one needed to do is show up with a shovel and a means of getting the salt to the market. The relatively recent discovery that some salt lakes also include other valuable minerals like Lithium has added to the lakes' value. These additional minerals can be difficult to extract and could turn a simple, relatively clean operation into an environmental mess without proper application of environmental protection laws and technology. Officials are so often swayed by the opportunity to personally profit from a mining operation that it is unlikely that these will be applied. The Qiadam Basin in Qinghai contains a number of large salt lakes and playas, which have been exploited by the CCP since soon after the revolution.

Petroleum exploration is expensive, requiring large geological and geophysical surveys, and drilling at likely sites. It is carried by large organizations with deep pockets and close connections with the CCP, such as PetroChina. So far, on the Tibetan Plateau, the oil and gas have been found and extracted since the 1950's from the Qiadam Basin in Qinghai, but oil shale exploration is going on in TAR and China is currently looking forward to exploiting these deposits when oil prices get high enough to make it worthwhile.

"Opening Up the West"
Similar to the 19th century U.S. experience of occupying and assimilating the western region of North America through military intervention, subjection of the indigenous peoples, and immigration, in the late 1990s the PRC began a program of "Opening Up the West". This program included plans to build railways, roads, and airports in the western regions of China, the exploration and exploitation of mineral and petroleum resources, development of hydropower projects, and increased, mainly Chinese, tourism. These are supported on the plateau by a program to settle all nomads, forcing them to sell their stock and reside in villages built by the government, and immigration of Chinese workers to work at the mines, hydropower projects, and other construction projects. A thoroughgoing program of propaganda of suppressing outside observers, "patriotic reeducation", etc. while a presenting a "green" agenda and poverty aleviation as the motives to the world and the Chinese public is ongoing.

The plans have advanced considerable since the turn of the century. A railway from Golmud to Lhasa has been constructed, and other railways are in the works. Zangmu Hydropower Project, and many others are under construction throughout the plateau. The earlier small mines in Gyama have been consolidated into one large mine, and is presented as a model project, though it appears that considerable corruption of senior officials was involved. Many small mines operating, and mineral exploration projects are in progress on the plateau. Many of these are visible in Google Earth, or reported on in the media or Internet, even if there is no detailed written description of them available to the public. Primarily Chinese workers are employed on these projects. The local Tibetan population is poorly compensated for their loss of homes, pastures, farmland, or livestock. This type of behaviour is common in China, where CCP officials and their wealthy friends regularly push through mutually profitable projects at the expense of the people.

Hydropower and mining are intimately connected in the process of development. Electrical power is needed to operate mines, ore processing plants, smelters, and to provide some measure of comfort to attract immigrant workers. Mines provide the economic base to finance the hydropower projects, which are subsidized by Beijing.

The Contents of the Database
The database of deposits is in three .xls files, one for each of mineral deposits, salt lake and playa deposits, and petroleum deposits. The mineral deposit database is the real focus, but the others are important too. The minerals .xls file will be described.

The first column "Mapped?" simply indicates whether the deposit is on the map or not ("Y" or "N").

The second, third and fourth columns give the Name, Products, and Status of the deposit. There may be more than one Name given (e.g. "Deerni (Durngoi)").The Products are given in abbreviated form ("Au" rather than "Gold"). Status is one of ("Prospect", "Deposit", "Mine"). A Prospect is a deposit we are unsure about. A Deposit has known reserves for which there is good evidence. Either of these could be a mine but we don't know that at the time of publishing. A Mine is a deposit for which there is good evidence that it is being exploited. It may be small or large.

The next column, "Size", is a more complex measure of a deposit's significance. In general, we are treating Size as the amount of product the deposit contains (e.g. Cu 1.5 Mt), but more properly Size should take into account the Grade or the ore as well as how many tonnes have been proven (1% Cu X 50 Mt ore = 0.5 Mt Cu). The higher the Grade the cheaper the deposit is to exploit. The product is also important. For example, Gold is worth a lot more than Copper. 5 tonnes of gold is a Mine. 5 tonnes of copper is an Occurrence. Further, to give some indication of size where we don't have this information, the terms "Small", "Medium", and "Large" are used. The Geological Survey of Japan, along with their map of mineral deposits of Eastern Asia, has published a list of definitions for "Small, "Medium", and "Large" for different products. It classifies some deposits as Large that a practicing exploration geologist would consider small. For example, the Porphyry Copper deposits shown on the map, though Large by GSJ standards, are small by international mining standards (* PORPHYRY DEPOSITS, W.D. SINCLAIR, Geological Survey of Canada, 601 Booth Street, Ottawa)

The next three columns give the Province, Prefecture, and County of each deposit. Though inexact these give important location information. For example, we can tell who the local officials and administrators are, where the population lives relative to the deposit, what their source of incomes is, how many people there are, etc.. If coordinates are not currently available then this information also tells us where to look. Often Google Earth will reveal exploration or a mine once an approximate location is found. If nearby Chinese town/village names are also available then the Google Maps can help to give an even more precise location.

The following three columns give Latitude, Longitude, and Validity, a measure of the given location's accuracy: "GE", "vicinity", "estimated", and blank. A blank indicates we cannot give any supporting evidence that the location is correct, and currently are accepting a knowledgeable opinion. "Estimated" indicates the location is estimated from a map or other imprecise source, such as a Chinese academic article. These are rarely very precise as to deposit locations. "Vicinity" indicates the coordinates were given by a more or less reliable source of information, such as a journal article in the Western academic literature. "GE" indicates that in our opinion the given coordinates are exact (locates a point somewhere on the deposit), and if input to Google Earth will reveal the named deposit. The visible evidence may consist of a mine or signs of mineral exploration. Some cases are more certain than others. The coordinates are presented "as is". Corrections are welcome.

Some examples are:

The Yulong Mine showing the pit and blue roofed processing buildings. Coordinates are at the bottom left and the date of the image on the bottom right.

The Deerni Mine is an example of a much smaller operation than Yulong. Smaller mines are not difficult to find in Google Earth. Two photos showing the tailings pond and the processing plant were also found.

Qulong is a large (by Chinese standards), low grade Prophyry Copper-Gold deposit just east of Lhasa. The network of roads indicate the pattern of diamond drilling used to confirm the extent of the deposit.

The Chongjiang Porphyry Copper deposit is another example where in Google Earth the location of a deposit can be identified by the characteristic pattern of roads used for diamond drilling.

This map is from the 2003 Honglu Chinese website. Honglu was the Chinese company behind getting Continental Minerals involved in Xietongmen. It was also involved in arranging the Jiama Mine deal. The properties indicated were all listed several times with both Canadian and American securities regulators. Where we have no other information on the locations of the deposits these are examples of estimated locations.

The USGS has several large databases of mineral deposits around the world in the form of Google Earth kmz and kml files. Theseare several years old and do not use the latest available data. Where Google Earth has recent images available (obtained within the last few years), the coordinates given by the USGS, with a few exceptions, are found to be incorrect, but most likely in the vicinity of the named deposit. This claim is based on the experience of often being able to find in Google Earth a plausible deposit location in the vicinity of the USGS coordinates. The USGS kml and kmz databases may also fail sometimes by giving different coordinates for one deposit in different databases. In this case searching GE to locate the most plausible alternative is a necessity. Though the USGS website provides a site to send questions and requests for information, our experience is that when questions about accuracy of coordinates and inconsistency of kml databases about deposits on the Tibetan Plateau were made their China Specialist had no interest in correcting the errors in the USGS mineral deposit database. Though useful in a general way, the Geological Survey of Canada's kml database is sufficiently inaccurate with respect to coordinates that we stopped referring to it. A xls file can be downloaded from the Geological Survey of Japan. Though of interest, and doubtlessly the best data at the time, it wasn't particularly useful as well. Amateur deposit databases, such as that at mindat.org fared better, but like the USGS, GSC, GSJ databases are mainly based on coordinates given in academic articles, and are consequently only approximate. Despite this limitation, the USGS mineral deposit databases are invaluable. When used with Google Earth coordinates often can be corrected. Google Earth is constantly updating its database of satellite images and we believe in time every deposit of significance will be revealed by it.

Two examples of using Google Earth to investigate current issues.
1) Recent reports of extensive pollution from the area near Kumbum Gompa south of Xining in Qinghai were supported by GE images locating the large industrial area, a cement plant, and an open pit mine, all of which intersected the rivers on which the local population depended on and complained were being poisoned. The Google Earth views provide significant evidence of damage to the natural waterways.

2) In northern Yushu Prefecture, Qinghai, a large area called the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve, has been set aside, it is said, to protect the grasslands and the sources of the Yellow, Yangtze and Mekong Rivers. Nomads of the region have been forced to settle and sell their herds. A Canadian company Inter-Citic, in a Joint Venture with the Qinghai Geological Survey Institute, is carrying out exploration for gold on the northwest edge of this reserve, and they report having discovered a large deposit just outside the reserve. In Google Earth we can see their camp, and the damage they have done to the grasslands as the result of mineral exploration. There is a stream next to their camp, and if you follow it enters the reserve and, eventually, the Yellow River. The evidence given by GE images suggests that Inter-Citic is polluting the sources of the Yellow River. The area they are in should be in the reserve, if a reserve is necessary at all. Going 50 km to the east, in the heart of the reserve, exploration trenches are visible in GE, very similar to the trenches Inter-Citic has made to expose the bedrock for sampling. This raises the questions as to who is doing this exploration and why is it being permitted.

The next three columns give references. In those cases where they are not particularly solid, think of them as a thread that may lead somewhere useful.

Finally, where we could, owners of the deposit are given. We were not always able to do this in the time we had available, but these columns indicate the direction we are heading. Once a company is identified the people behind it can be identified, then the relations between them. Forbes recently published an article stating 90% of the 1000 richest people in China are either in the CCP or are very closely connected with it. This fact, along with well known high level of corruption of Chinese officials, may explain more than politics or culture.

Areas of Interest
There are several regions which standout with respect to certain types of deposits.
The Qiadam Basin in Haixi prefecture of Qinghai is noted for its numerous large salt lakes and its petroleum deposits. These have been exploited by the PRC since the 1950s.

Just to the north of the Qiadam Basin is a gold belt, the best known mine being Tanjianshan which a Joint Venture between Eldorado Gold Corp of Vancouver, Canada, Qinghai Number One Geological Brigade and Dachaidan Gold Mine (Qinghai).

To the south in Yushu Prefecture of Qinghai is the Songpan - Ganze Mobile Belt, which is associated with gold deposits. The belt extends across Qinghai from the Xoh Nature Reserve, into the Tibetan areas of Sichuan. The noted deposit in this region is the Dachang gold deposit which is owned by Inter-Citic (Canada) and the Qinghai Geological Survey Institute. Inter-Citic reports about 40 tonnes of reserves proven and inferred. Xinhua reports it has 195 tonnes confirmed and "will have proven reserves of 300 tonnes by 2015” ("China says Tibetan gold mine amongst largest in Asia", Phayul, August 30, 2011). While the quantities are exaggerated, and the logic sloppy, what this (Xinhua publishing a promotional article of this sort) does suggest is that the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve (SNNR) will be mined for gold at the very headwaters of the Yellow River. Similar gold deposits are expected to be found in the region. For example, 50 km. to the east, well within the SNNR, exploration trenches can be clearly seen.

A map published by Inter-Citic showing the locations of the Songpan-Ganze gold belt and the Dachang deposit.

In TAR several areas stand out with respect to particular minerals. Two of them, the Gangdese Porphyry Copper Belt extending east-west just north of the Yarlung Tsangpo in the region of Lhasa and the Yulong Porphyry Copper Belt extending north-south parallel to the Drichu from south Qinghai, through Qamdo into Yunnan, are clearly visible on the map. An additional Porphyry Copper belt may also exist in the Changtang.

A Lead-Zinc belt also follows the Nujiang. Chromium is found south the Yarlung Tsangpo in Shannon. There are a number of salt lakes in TAR but only Zabuye seems the only one to have been exploited profitably on any scale.

Information regarding Uranium deposits is a state secret in China. Two we know about are Zonglongde in Riwoche, Chamdo Prefecture, accidentally revealed in a China NetTV SEC filing, and No. 792 Uranium Mine in Thewo County, Gansu, reported in the media due to protests regarding its illegal reopening and resulting pollution. As well as Zonglongde, a number of other deposits in Chamdo mentioned in the China NetTV report are suspected to also be Uranium deposits: Yuqu, Panong, Qinong, and Gexiong. They were claimed to be deposits of minerals which are never extracted except as secondary products.

Internet Sources

ChinaMining

Hunter Dickinson (Continental Minerals, Shetongmon, Shigatse, TAR)

Eldorado (Tanjianshan, Haixi, Qinghai)

Geological Survey of Canada, World and Canadian Mineral Deposits

Geological Survey of Japan, Mineral Resources of East Asia

Google Earth Download

Inter-Citic (Dachang, Yushu, Qinghai)

Beijing Headman Mining Evaluation Firm

Huatailong, the company that operates the Gyama Mine
Mandarin Tools

mindat.org, mineralogical database

Phayul

Radio Free Asia

China Digital Times

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Corporate Filings Search

Canadian SEDAR

USGS Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS)

USGS Mineral Resources On-Line Spatial Data

References
ACADEMIC ARTICLE LIST

If an article concerns a particular deposit, or collection of deposits, the primary name the deposit will follow the names of the authors and year. For example for the Jiama Mine it would look like (author, year, Jiama)

A

(An Yin and T. Mark Harrison, 2000, Himalayan Tibetan Orogen)
An Yin and T. Mark Harrison
GEOLOGIC EVOLUTION OF THE HIMALAYAN TIBETAN OROGEN
Annu. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci. 2000. 28:211–80

B

(Bauer, K.; Childs, G., 2008)
Kenneth Bauer, Geoff Childs;
Demographics, Development, and the Environment in Tibetan Areas; 2008 - 04

C

(Chen Yongqing et al, 2008, Pulang)
Chen Yongqing, Huang Jingning, Liang Zhen
Geochemical Characteristics and Zonation of Primary Halos of Pulang Porphyry Copper Deposit, Northwestern Yunnan Province, Southwestern China
Journal of China University of Geosciences, Vol. 19, No. 4, p.371–377, August 2008

(Chengyou Feng et al, 2009, Tuolugou)
Chengyou Feng, Wenjun Qu, Dequan Zhang, Xingyan Dang, Andao Du, Daxin Li a, Hongquan She
Re–Os dating of pyrite from the Tuolugou stratabound Co(Au) deposit, eastern Kunlun Orogenic Belt, northwestern China
Ore Geology Reviews 36 (2009) 213–220

G

(X.X. Gu et al, 2002 et al, NW Sichuan Au)
X.X. Gu, J.M. Liub, O. Schulzc, F. Vavtarc, M.H. Zheng
Syngenetic origin for the sediment-hosted disseminated gold
deposits in NW Sichuan, China: ore fabric evidence
Ore Geology Reviews 22 (2002) 91– 116

(Guangming LI et al, 2006, Skarn Cu-Au±Mo Deposits)
Guangming LI, Kezhang QIN, Kuishou DING, Tiebing LIU, Jinxiang LI, Shaohuai WANG, Shanyuan JIANG and Xingchun ZHANG
Geology, Ar-Ar Age and Mineral Assemblage of Eocene Skarn Cu-Au±Mo Deposits in the Southeastern Gangdese Arc, Southern Tibet: Implications for Deep Exploration
RESOURCE GEOLOGY, vol. 56, no. 3, 315–336, 2006

(GUO Zu-jun et al, 2008, Qiangtang Petroleum)
GUO Zu-jun, LI Yong-tie, NAN Zheng-bing, YE He-fei
Relationship between deformation structure and petroleum accumulation and preservation, Qiangtang Basin, Tibet
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT Volume 35, Issue 5, October 2008

H

(HE Shuye et al, 2009, Yazigou)
HE Shuyue，LI Dongsheng，LI Lianglin，QI Lanying and HE Shoufu
Re—Os Age of Molybdenite from the Yazigou Copper(Molybdenum) Mineralized Area in Eastern Kunlun of Qinghai Province，and Its Geological Significance
Geotectonica et Metallogenia V. 33, No. 2, 236-242, May 2009

(Hou Zengqian et al, 2003, Dongqinnong)
Hou Zengqian, Wang Liquan, Khin Zaw, Mo Xuanxue, Wang Mingjie, Li Dingmou, and Pan Guitang;
Post-collisional crustal extension setting and VHMS mineralization in the Jinshajiang orogenic belt, southwestern China. Ore Geology Reviews 22, 177-199; 2003

(Hou Zengqian et al, 2003, Yulong etc.)
HOU ZENGQIAN, MA HONGWEN, KHIN ZAW, ZHANG YUQUAN, WANG MINGJIE, WANG ZENG, PAN GUITANG, TANG RENLI;
The Himalayan Yulong Porphyry Copper Belt: Product of Large-Scale Strike-Slip
Faulting in Eastern Tibet; 2003

(Hou Zengqian et al, 2003, Yulong belt)
Hou Zengqian, Ma Hongwen, Khin Zaw, Zhang Yuquan, Wang Mingje, Wang Zeng, Pan Guitang, Tang Renli
The Himalayan Yulong Porphyry Copper Belt: Product of Large-Scale Strike-Slip Faulting in Eastern Tibet
Economic Geology Vol. 98, 2003, pp. 125–145

(Z.Q. Hou et al, 2004, Adakitic intrusives S Tibet)
Z.Q. Hou, Y.F. Gao, X.M. Qu, Z.Y. Rui, X.X. Mo
Origin of adakitic intrusives generated during mid-Miocene east-west extension in southern Tibet
Earth and Planetary Science Letters 220 (2004) 139-155

(Zengqian Hou et al, 2007, Sanjiang metallogenesis)
Zengqian Hou, Khin Zaw, Guitang Pan, Xuanxue Mo, Qiang Xu, Yunzhong Hu, Xingzhen Li
Sanjiang Tethyan metallogenesis in S.W. China: Tectonic setting, metallogenic epochs and deposit types
Ore Geology Reviews 31 (2007) 48–87

(Hou Zengqian, 2007, Yulong)
Hou Zengqian, Xie Yuling, Xu Wenyi, Li Yinqing, Zhu Xlangkun, Khin Zaw, G, Beaudoin, Rui Zongyao, HUang Wei, Luobu Ciren
Yulong Deposit, Eastern Tibet: A High-Sulfidation Cu-Au Porphyry Copper Deposit in the Eastern Indo-Asian Collision Zone
International Geology Review, Vol. 49, 2007, p. 235–258.

(HOU Zeng-qian et al, 2006, Tibetan Plateau Metallogeneses)
HOU Zeng-qian, MO Xuan-xu, YANG Zhi-ming, WANG An-jian, PAN Gui-tang, QU Xiao-ming, NIE Feng-un
Metallogeneses in the collisional orogen of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau：Tectonic
setting, tempo-spatial distribution and ore deposit types
GEOLOGY IN CHINA Vol．33．No．2, Apr，2006

(Zengqian Hou et al, 2007, Sanjiang Metallogenesis)
Zengqian Hou, Khin Zaw, Guitang Pan, Xuanxue Mo, Qiang Xu, Yunzhong Hu, Xingzhen Li;
Sanjiang Tethyan metallogenesis in S.W. China: Tectonic setting, metallogenic epochs and deposit types; 2007

(Zengqian Hou et al, 2008, Gangdese porphyry copper belt)
Zengqian Hou, Zhiming Yang, Xiaoming Qu, Xiangjin Meng, Zhenqing Li, G. Beaudoin, Zongyao Rui, Yongfeng Gao, Khin Zaw;
The Miocene Gangdese porphyry copper belt generated during post-collisional extension in the Tibetan Orogen; 2008

(Zengqian Hou et al, 2009, REE Belt)
Zengqian Hou, Shihong Tian, Yuling Xie, Zhusen Yang, Zhongxin Yuan, Shuping Yin,
Longsheng Yi, Hongcai Fei, Tianren Zou, Ge Bai, Xiaoyu Li
The Himalayan Mianning–Dechang REE belt associated with carbonatite–alkaline
complexes, eastern Indo-Asian collision zone, SW China
Ore Geology Reviews 36 (2009) 65–89

(Zengqian Hou & Nigel Cook, 2009, Tibet Metallogenesis)
Zengqian Hou, Nigel J. Cook
Metallogenesis of the Tibetan collisional orogen: A review and introduction
to the special issue
Ore Geology Reviews 36 (2009) 2–24

(Hu Rui-Zhong, 2002, Carlin Au)
Hu Rui-Zhong, Su Wen-Chao, Bi Xian-Wu, Tu Guang-Zhi, Albert H. Hofstra
Geology and geochemistry of Carlin-type gold deposits in China
Mineralium Deposita (2002) 37: 378–392

J

(Jiajun Liu, 2002, Sichuan Au Deposits)
Jiajun Liu, Minghua Zheng, Jianming Liu, Xuexiang Gua,
Yufeng Zhou, Caixia Feng
Mechanical transport of metallogenic materials in endogenic hydrothermal solutions: evidence from the microspherules in micro-disseminated gold deposits, northwestern Sichuan, China
Ore Geology Reviews 22 (2002) 1 –16

(Jiankang Li et al, 2006, Jiajika)
Jiankang Li, Denghong Wang, Dehui Zhang, and Xiaofang Fu;
The Source of ore-forming Fluid in Jiajika Pegmatite Type Lithium Polymetallic Deposit, Sichuan Province. Acta Petrologica et Mineralogica [Yanshikuang Wuxue Zazhi] 25(1), 45-52; (2006)

(Jingwen Mao et al, 2002, Zhebo)
Jingwen Mao, Yumin Qiu, Goldfarb, R.J., Zhaochong Zhang, Garwin, S., and Ren Fengshou ;
Geology, distribution, and classification of gold deposits in the western Qinling belt, central China. Mineralium Deposita 37(3/4), (2002)

(Jinxiang Li et al, 2011, Duolong Bangongco)
Jinxiang Li, Kezhang Qin, Guangming Li, Bo Xiao, Junxing Zhao, Lei Chen
Magmatic-hydrothermal evolution of the Cretaceous Duolong gold-rich
porphyry copper deposit in the Bangongco metallogenic belt, Tibet: Evidence
from U-Pb and 40Ar/39Ar geochronology
Journal of Asian Earth Sciences 41 (2011) 525–536

K

(Khin Zaw et al, 2007, Deposit types of S. China)
Khin Zaw, Stephen G. Peters, Paul Cromie, Clive Burrett, Zengqian Hou
Nature, diversity of deposit types and metallogenic relations of South China
Ore Geology Reviews 31 (2007) 3–47

L

(Lafitte, G, 2007)
Gabriel Lafitte;
Current State of Mining in Tibet; 2007

(LI Guangming et al, 2005 ,Gangdese belt dating)
LI Guangming, RUI Zongyao, WANG Gaoming, LIN Fangcheng, LIU Bo, SHE Hongquan, FENG Chengyou, QU Wenjun
Molybdenite Re-Os dating of Jiama and Zhibula polymetallic copper deposits in Gangdese metallogenic belt of Tibet and its significance
MINERAL DEPOSITS May 2005

(LI Jian-kang et al, 2006, Jiajika)
LI Jian-kang, WANG Den-hong, ZHANG De-hui and FU Xiao-fang
The source of ore-forming fluid in Jiajika pegmatite type lithium polymetallic deposit，Sichuan Province
ACTA PETROLOGICA ET MINERALOGICA, Vol 25, No 1, Jan．2006

M

(MA Hui—ying, 2009. Xiaowolong)
MA Hui—ying，LIU Ji-shun，YIN Li—jun，LIU De-li，YANG Li—gon
Geological feature and exploration sign of Xiaowolong tin-iron—tungsten polymeallic deposit in Dulanxian in Qinghai province
MINERAL RESOURCES AND GEOLOGY V01．23，NO．4 Aug．2009

(Steffen Mischke, 2010, Qaidam Basin)
Steffen Mischke, Zhencheng Sun, Ulrike Herzschuh, Zizhen Qiao, Naida Sun
An ostracod-inferred large Middle Pleistocene freshwater lake in the presently
hyper-arid Qaidam Basin (NW China)
Quaternary International 218 (2010) 74–85

P

Stephen G. Peters, Warren J. Nokleberg, Jeff L. Doebrich, Walter J. Bawiec, Greta Orris, David M. Sutphin, and David R. Wilburn
Geology and Nonfuel Mineral Deposits of Asia and the Pacific
Open-File Report 2005 –1294C, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey

(Stephen G. Peters et al, 2005, USGS Mineral Deposits of Asia)

(SHE Hongquan et al, 2005, Gangdese skarn)
SHE Hongquan, FENG Chengyou, ZHANG Dequan, PAN Guitang, LI Guangming
Characteristics and metallogenic potential of skarn copper-lead-zinc polymetallic deposits in central eastern Gangdese
MINERAL DEPOSITS May 2005

Q

(Qu Xiaoming et al, 2007, Gangdese Porphyry Genesis)
Qu Xiaoming, Zengqian Hou, Khin Zaw, Li Youguo
Characteristics and genesis of Gangdese porphyry copper deposits in the southern Tibetan Plateau: Preliminary geochemical and geochronological results
Ore Geology Reviews 31 (2007) 205–223

R

S

(SHE Hong—quan et al, 2007, Ulan Uzhur)
Geological characteristics and genesis of the Ulan Uzhur porphyry copper deposit in Qinghai
SHE Hong—quan, ZHANG De—quan, JING xiang—yan, GUAN Jun,
ZHU Hua—pin, FENG cheng—you, LI Da一xin
GEOLOGY IN CHINA V01．34．No．2 Apr., 2007

(Shen Yongsheng et al, 2009, Hongshuihe)
SHEN Yong—sheng，WANG Xu—chun，ZHANG Yu·jie
Study on genesis and geological characteristics of Hongshuihe iron deposit in Qinghai province
MINERAL RESOURCES AND GEOLOGY V01．23，No．4 Aug．，2009

Shenghao Yan et al, 2003, Meiduo)
mindat

(SHE Hong—quan et al, 2007, Ulan Uzhur)
Geological characteristics and genesis of the Ulan Uzhur porphyry copper deposit in Qinghai
SHE Hong—quan，ZHANG De—quan，JING xiang—yan，GUAN Jun，
ZHU Hua—pin，FENG cheng—you，LI Da一xin
GEOLOGY IN CHINA V01．34．No．2 Apr．，2007

(Sihong Jiang et al, 2009, Mayum)
Sihong Jiang, Fengjun Nie, Peng Hu, Xinrong Lai, Yifei Liu
Mayum: an orogenic gold deposit in Tibet, China
Ore Geology Reviews 36 (2009) 160–173

(Singer, D.A. et al, 2008, Porphyry Cu Deposits)
Singer, D.A., Berger, V.I., and Moring, B.C.:
Porphyry copper deposits of the world: Database and grade and tonnage models, 2008. US Geological Survey Open-File Report 2008-1155; (2008)

T

(Taihe Zhou et al, 2002, Gold deposit in China)
Taihe Zhou, Richard J. Goldfarb, G. Neil Phillips
Tectonics and distribution of gold deposits in China – an overview
Mineralium Deposita (2002) 37: 249–282

(TANG Gao-lin et al., 2006, Liwu)
TANG Gao-lin,WANG Fa-qing,QOU Lin-lin;
Geological Characteristics and Prospecting Perspective of the Liwu Copper Deposit in Sichuan,WS China; 2006 - 04

V

(A. Vengosh, 1995, Qaidam Basin)
A. Vengosh, A.R. Chivas, A. Starinskyb, Y. Kolodnyb, Zhang Baozhenc, Zhang Pengxi
Chemical and boron isotope compositions of non-marine brines from the Qaidam Basin, Qinghai, China
ChemicalGeology 120 (1995) 135-154

W

(R.L. Wang, 2002, Zabuye)
R.L. Wang, S.C. Scarpitta, S.C. Zhang, M.P. Zheng
Later Pleistocene/Holocene climate conditions of Qinghai-Xizhang Plateau (Tibet) based on carbon and oxygen stable isotopes of Zabuye Lake sediments
Earth and Planetary Science Letters 203 (2002) 461-477

(WANG Gui-hong et al, 2008, N Qaidam Basin)
WANG Gui-hong, MA Da-de, ZHANG Qi-quan, LI Jun
Basin-mountain tectonic pattern and hydrocarbon exploration domain in north margin of Qaidam Basin
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT Volume 35, Issue 6, December 2008

(Wang Jun, Zhang Jun, 2001, Mazhala)
Wang Jun, Zhang Jun
Metallogenic character and prospecting direction of the Mazhala gold-antimony deposit, southern Tibet
Gold Geology Vol. 7, No. 3, Sep. 2001

(WEI Lejun, 2002, Dongco)
WE1 Lejun, ZHENG Mianping, LIU Xifang, CAI Keqin, NIE Ben
Discovery of Borax-bearing Mirabilite Beds in Dong Co, Northern Tibet, and Its Palaeoclimatic Significance
Vol. 76 No. 3 ACTA GEOLOGICA SINICA Sept. 2002

(Wenxin Xu et al, 2000, Tongyugou)
Wenxin Xu, Minyang Chen, Chunyong Pang, and Heng Li : Pb Isotope Study of Some Nonferrous Metallic Deposits in China. Acta Geologica Sinica 74(2), 316-320; (2000)

(Weiguang Zhu et al, 2001, Xiacun)
Weiguang Zhu, Chaoyang Li, and Hailin Deng;
Sulfur and lead isotope geochemistry of the Xiacun silver-polymetallic ore deposit in Sichuan Province. Acta Mineralogica Sinica 21(2), 219-224; (2001)

(WU Xiaoxia et al, 2007, Galinge)
WU Xiaoxia, BAO Guangying, YI Youchang, ZHANG Fenying
The Study on the Genesis and Geological Characteristics of Galinge High - Grade Iron Deposit of Qinghai Province
Gold Science and Technology V. 15, No. 4, Aug. 2007

(Wenyi Xu et al, 2009, Xiongcun)
Wenyi Xu, Fengchu Pan, Xiaoming Qu, Zengqian Hou, Zhusen Yang, Weishi Chen,
Dan Yang, Yanhe Cui
Xiongcun, Tibet: A telescoped system of veinlet-disseminated Cu (Au) mineralization and late vein-style Au (Ag)-polymetallic mineralization in a continental collision zone
Ore Geology Reviews 36, 174–193; (2009)

X

(Xiang Huang et al, 2010, Jiama)
Xiang Huang, Mika Sillanp, Egil T. Gjessing, Sirpa Peräniemi, Rolf D. Vogt;
Environmental impact of mining activities on the surface water quality in Tibet:
Gyama valley; 2010 - 05

(Xiangjin Meng et al, 2007, Luobadui)
Xiangjin Meng, Zengqian Hou, Peisheng Ye, Zhushen Yang, Zhenqing Li, and Yongfeng Gao;
Characteristics and ore potentiality of Gangdese silver-polymetallic mineralization belt in Tibet. Mineral Deposits 26(2), 153-162; (2007)
(Xiaoliang Feng et al, 2007, Liwu)

(Xiaofeng Li, 2007, Daduhe Au)
Xiaofeng Li, Jingwen Mao, Chunzeng Wang, Yasushi Watanabe
The Daduhe gold field at the eastern margin of the Tibetan Plateau: He, Ar, S, O, and H isotopic data and their metallogenic implications
Ore Geology Reviews 30 (2007) 244–256

Xiaoliang Feng, Mingjie Wang, Chengmin Wen, and Huihua Zhang;
The Preliminary Study of the Exploration Potential of the Liwu Copper Deposit and Its Surrounding Areas, Western Sichuan. Sedimentary Geology and Tethyan Geology [Chenji Yu Tetisi Dizhi] 28(1), 9-13; (2007)

(Xiaoming Qu, 2006, Hongbo Xin, Gaerqiong)
Xiaoming Qu and Hongbo Xin ;
Ages and tectonic environment of the Bangong Co porphyry copper belt in western Tibet, China. Geological Bulletin of China 25(7), 792-799; 2006

(Xinyou Zhu et al, 2006, Xitieshan)
Xinyou Zhu, Jiniu Deng, Jingbin Wang, Longjun Lin, and Junchang Fan;
Study of two types of ore bodies in Xitieshan lead-zinc SEDEX deposit, Qinghai Province. Mineral Deposits 25(3), 252-262.(2006)

(Xiugen Fu et al, 2009, Shengli Oil Shale)
Xiugen Fu, Jian Wang, Yuhong Zeng, Fuwen Tan, Jianglin He
Concentrations and modes of occurrence of platinum group elements in the
Shengli River oil shale, northern Tibet, China
Fuel 89 (2010) 3623–3629

(Xiugen Fu et al, 2010, Changshe Oil Shale)
Xiugen Fu, Jian Wang, Yuhong Zeng, Fuwen Tan, Xinglei Feng
REE geochemistry of marine oil shale from the Changshe Mountain area, northern Tibet, China
International Journal of Coal Geology 81 (2010) 191–199

(Xiugen Fua, 2011, Shengli Oil Shale)
Xiugen Fua, Jian Wanga, Yuhong Zengb, Fuwen Tana, Jianglin Hea
Geochemistry and origin of rare earth elements(REEs) in the Shengli River oil shale, northern Tibet, China
Chemie der Erde71( 2011) 21–30

Y

Yang Jingsui, Shi Rendeng, Wu Cailai, Wang Xibin
Dur'ngoi Ophiolite in East Kunlun, Northeast Tibetan Plateau: Evidence for Paleo-Tethyan Suture in Northwest China
Journal of Earth Science, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 303–331, April 2009

(Yang Jingsui, 2009, Dur'ngoi Ophiolite)

(Wenbo Yang et al, 1995, Dabusun)
Wenbo Yang, Ronald J. Spencer, H. Roy Krouse, Tim K. Lowenstein, E. Casas
Stable isotopes of lake and fluid inclusion brines, Dabusun Lake,
Qaidam Basin, western China: Hydrology and paleoclimatology
in arid environments
Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology 117 (1995) 279-290

(Yanjing Chen, 2007, Kendekeke)
Yanjing Chen, Huayong Chen, Khin Zaw, Pirajno, F., and Zengjie Zhang;
Geodynamic settings and tectonic model of skarn gold deposits in China: An overview. Ore Geology Reviews 31, 139-169; (2007)

(YAO Peng et al, 2002, Jiama Qulong)
YAO Peng ,WANG Quan-hai,LI Jin-gao;
Ore and ore resource prospects of the Jiama-Qulong ore concentration area,Tibet; 2002 - 02

(Yuwang Wang, 2000, Deerni)
Yuwang Wang, Kezhang Qin, Yanggeng Tan, and Zenqian Hou;
The Derni Cu-Co Massive Sulfide Deposit, Qinghai Province, China: Ultramafic Volcanic-hosted Submarine-exhalative Mineralization. Exploration and Mining Geology 9(3/4), 253-264; (2000)

(Yuqi Dang et al, 2008, Qaidam Gas)
Yuqi Dang, Wenzhi Zhao, Aiguo Su, Shuichang Zhang_, Maowen Li, Ziqiang Guan, Dade Ma, Xinling Chen, Yanhua Shuai, Huitong Wang, Yanhu Tan, Ziyuan Xu
Biogenic gas systems in eastern Qaidam Basin
Marine and Petroleum Geology 25 (2008) 344–356

(YU Pu—sheng et al, 2007, N. Plateau Mineral Belts)
YU Pu—sheng，LI Rong—she，JI Wen—hua，YANG Yong—cheng，MENG Yong，ZHAO Zhen—ming，CHEN Shou—jian
Division of Metallogenic Belts in the Northern Qinghai—Tibet Plateau
NORTHWESTERN GEOLOGY V01．40 No．4 2007

Z

(Zhang Lin et al, 2009, Gaerqiong)
ZHANG Lin，XIAO Yuan-fu，HU Tao
Geological Characteristics and Analysis of Ore-forming Conditions for Copper Deposits of Gaer-qiong in Tibet
Sichuan Nonferrous Metals October 2009

(ZHANG Chun-lin et al, 2008, Gas Hure)
ZHANG Chun-lin, GAO Xian-zhi, LI Yan-fei, MA Da-de
Petroleum migration in the Gas Hure Oilfield, Qaidam Basin, NW China
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT Volume 35, Issue 3, June 2008

(Zhang Dequan et al, 2009, Tanjianshan)
Zhang Dequan, She Hongquan, Feng Chengyou, Li Daxin, Li Jinwen;
Geology, age, and fluid inclusions of the Tanjianshan gold deposit, western China:
Two orogenies and two gold mineralizing events; 2009 - 06

(Zhang Xiaobao et al, 2003, Qaidam Oil & Gas)
ZHANG Xiaobao, HU Yong, DUAN Yi, MA Liyuan, MENG Zifang, HE Peng,
ZHOU Shixin and PENG Dehua
Geochemical Characteristics and Origin of Natural Gases in the Qaidam Basin, China
Vol. 77 No. 1, ACTA GEOLOGICA SINICA ,March 2003

(Zhang Ying et al, 2009, E. Qaidam Gas)
Zhang Ying, Li Zhisheng, Wang Dongliang, Wang Xiaobo
Geochemical characteristics and play targets of gas in eastern Qaidam Basin, NW China
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT Volume 36, Issue 6, December 2009 Online English edition of the Chinese language

(ZHENG YouYe et al, 2007, Zhunuo)
ZHENG YouYe, ZHANG GangYang, XU RongKe,GAO ShunBao, PANG YingChun, CAO Liang, DU AnDao & SHI YuRuo
Geochronologic constraints on magmatic intrusions and mineralization of the Zhunuo porphyry copper deposit in Gangdese, Tibet
Chinese Science Bulletin, November 2007, vol. 52, no. 22, 3139-3147

(Zhiming Yang et al, 2009, Qulong)
Zhiming Yang, Zengqian Hou, Noel C. White, Zhaoshan Chang, Zhenqing Li, Yucai Song;
Geology of the post-collisional porphyry copper–molybdenum deposit at Qulong, Tibet; 2009 - 03

(Zhusen Yang et al, 2009, TAR Sb)
Zhusen Yang, Zengqian Hou, Xiangjin Meng, Yingchao Liu, Hongcai Fei, Shihong Tian,
Zhenqing Li, Wei Gao
Post-collisional Sb and Au mineralization related to the South Tibetan detachment
system, Himalayan orogen
Ore Geology Reviews 36 (2009) 194–212

(Zigui Yan, 2006, Gala)
Zigui Yan ;
Geological Characteristics of Gold Deposits in Ganzi-Litang Fault Zone and Preliminary Discussion on Their Ore-Control Factors. Contributions to Geology and Mineral Resources Research [Dizhi Zhaokuang Luncong] 21(s), (2006)

"Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau"

2011-10-23T22:42:00.000-07:00

The University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research is publishing a series of four memos on water security, policies, and practices related to the Tibetan Plateau. This special series of Asia Pacific Memos titled Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau is guest edited edited by Tashi Tsering and Prof. Jack Hayes of Norwich University. Contributors, other than the two guest editors, include Prof. Kelly Alley of Auburn University and Prof. Darrin Magee of Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Discourse on the implications of China's plans to divert Tibet's waters tends to portray a strategic issue of concern for downstream countries and/or the local Tibetans. The first memo on the series, which was published last week, China’s Plans to Divert Water on the Tibetan Plateau, makes a different argument: it is the Chinese people who will be adversely affected.

You can read this and the forthcoming memos on the series Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau here.

Sharing data on mining in Tibet

2011-07-12T10:39:00.000-07:00

Here is a set of data on mining in Tibet that hopefully will be useful to some of the readers. This data is the most comprehensive and up-to-date publicly available information on the topic. If you have any additions and corrections to suggest, please let us know.

Also, see some recent Google Earth images (taken September 2010) at the bottom of this blog post for evidence of extensive mining exploration being conducted within the Three Rivers Headwaters Nature Reserve area, specifically near Chumarleb or Dachang Mines.

First, a map of Mining in Tibet.

Here are three spreadsheets with details on the information provided on this map and more, including information sources that you may refer to yourself.

First, a spreadsheet on Mining in Tibet.

Second, on Mining Tibet's Salt Lakes.

And third, on Mining for Petroleum in Tibet.

Now, let's move on to recent Google Earth images that clearly show mineral prospecting trenches (straight lines) in and around Chumarleb (ཆུ་དམར་ལེབ་) county. There are a lot of information on these mines online if you do a search on "Dachang mine". All the images below have latitude and longitude coordinates at the bottom if you want to check for more surprises.

First a larger regional image. Notice that the area is close to the two famous lakes, Kyareng (མཚོ་སྐྱ་རེངས་) and Ngoreng (མཚོ་སྔོ་རེངས་), situated at source of Machu (མ་ཆུ་ / Yellow) River. On the opposite corner are a bunch of orange and blue dots stacked on top of each other. These colored dots, and I believe the trenches as well, are the works of Inter-Citic, a "Canadian public company."

Now a closeup of the trenches. Trenches are dug in straight lines so their findings can be uploaded into the database. After digging the trenches, they also drill into the ground to see what's deeper inside. Computers then estimate what's (how much gold, for example) in between the points.

Here are two images that prove recent drilling activity in these trenches. The first one taken on August 8, 2010 shows the trench (ignore the yellow pin "Drill" marker. The second image below, which was taken a month after that (September 7, 2010), show machines, a shed and a vehicle, indicating active drilling activity.

The trenches can be seen as far as 50 km SE of the main mining sites, just near the Kyareng Lake.

You can also see the main camp of the miners, most probably of Inter-Citic.

There is also some interest whether there is "rare earth" in Tibet. So far we didn't find any rare earth mines in Tibet, although there are four mines in Southeast Sichuan Province. Here are two scientific papers with maps that describe rare earth elements in Tibet.

Hou, Z. & Cook, N.J. (2009). Mettalogenesis of the Tibetan collisional orogen: A review and introduction to the special issue. Ore Geology Reviews, 36 (2009) 2-24.

Hou, Z., Tian, S., Xie, Y., Yang, Z., Yuan, Z, Yin, S., Yi, L. Fei, H., Zou, T., Bai, G., & Li, X. (2009). The Himalayan Mianning-Dechang REE belt associated with carbonatite-alkaline complexes, eastern Ind0-Asian collision zone, SW China. Ore Geology Reviews, 36 (2009) 65-89.

If any of you have information about exploration of rare earth elements in Tibet, please let us know.

THanks!

Funding for Research on the Tibetan Plateau

2011-06-16T15:45:00.001-07:00

This just came to my attention: the Trace Foundation is accepting proposals for research that will be conducted on the Tibetan Plateau. I think that's fantastic and wish there were lots of applicants. So this blog post, after a long gap, is to encourage people (Tibetans, Chinese and all others!) to consider doing field research in Tibet!

There are lots of pressing environment and development issues that should to be researched: mining, hydro-power development, nomad resettlement or even something as simple as the significance of yak dung (Did you know there are as many as 14 different kinds of animal dung used by Tibetan farmers?). Really, there is no limit to the scope of useful topics that you could research. What is needed is your ability and desire to collect accurate and in-depth information.

Here are three examples of pressing topics that I would like to see researched, and why:

1) Economic benefits of Tibetan nomadic way of life. Not an easy topic of research. Ideally an interdisciplinary team of researchers should undertake the work. This research could be useful to counter the discourse that their 'backward" lifestyle is sign of poverty and under-development, one of the main reasons why this lifestyle faces extinction by deliberate government policy today.

2) Ecosystem services of Tibetan headwaters. Again a big topic. Perhaps someone can focus on one ecosystem service of a specific river in Tibet. This kind of research is needed to educate people (and the government) about the different useful services provided by a free-flowing river.

3) A Citizens Guide to mining operations. I would like to see a Tibetan language guide for local leaders to organize and educate their communities and authorities about people's constitutional rights in the face of mining activities in their region. (Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement has translated the Citizens Guide to the World Commission on Dams into Tibetan. For some reason, it's currently not available for download. I will check into this and try to make it available here)

Vanishing Nomads of Tibet

2011-02-16T22:42:00.000-08:00

Vanishing Nomads of Tibet
by Tsering Tsomo

Published in Border Affairs
Vol. 12 No. 1, Oct-Dec. 2010
www.borderaffairs.com
The full article can be read on the author's blog .

In 1930s Iran, many Kurdish and Lurid nomads were forced by government order to resettle as farmers in newly erected villages so that the itinerant nomads could be watched and controlled. This forced settlement took place from 1920s through 1960s. The number of nomads decreased considerably during this period. By 1970s, the government was actively ‘encouraging’, not ‘enforcing’ settlement. [Anne Whyte, Economic Geography, Vol. 53, No. 4, The Human Face of Desertification]

So Beijing was not alone when they resettled the Mongol nomads in Inner Mongolia and the Kazak nomads in Xinjiang from 1986 to 1997. In a dress rehearsal of sorts for the current resettlement of Tibetan nomads, Beijing has since the 1980s introduced fencing around pastures restricting nomads’ mobility that is indispensable to traditional methods of grazing and grassland conservation. But having a historical precedent should not be a justification to repeat the same mistakes. Rather it should serve as a warning for future planners in formulating sound humanistic policies.

Resettling of Tibetan nomads in nondescript urban towns began in the 1990s and continues to this day.

Beijing says it is just doing its bit to protect Tibet’s sprawling grasslands and blames the nomads for overgrazing their herds and for causing grassland degradation. Interestingly, large – scale environmental destruction through collectivization, logging, and mining that defined Beijing’s management of Tibetan land and resources since 1949 is not discussed in this primarily state-driven discourse on grassland degradation.

For instance, thanks to China, between 1950 and 1985, Tibet’s forest was reduced from 25.2 million hectares to 13.57 million hectares.

The sheer scale of the project, which aims at relocating all 2.25 million Tibetan nomads in fixed dwellings à la lowland Chinese farmers, has raised concerns not only over the ecology of the Tibetan plateau but the cultural identity of the Tibetan nomads who have lived there for centuries. Activist John Isom of Tibet Justice Center has said that China is “causing a cultural genocide by removing people from the livelihood they have known for millennia and sticking them in concrete walls they have never lived in before.” Diane Barker who has documented the Tibetan community in photographs has said the nomads are the “repository of original Tibetan culture”.

Beijing’s climate change rationale has so far deterred a shriller opposition to this state-sponsored remaking of a culture and a traditionally sustainable livelihood. The other sanctimonious spin of Beijing-led grassland degradation discourse is the poverty alleviation claim, that the nomads are too ‘backward’ and ‘unscientific’ and that they need help in managing their life, land and resources, in effect, denying the nomads their most primal right to choose for themselves the life they want.

To read the rest of the article, please visit the author's blog.

The Third Pole in Danger - Chinas Environmental Policy in Tibet

2011-01-19T10:22:00.000-08:00

Following is the program of an upcoming conference of the Tibet-Initiative Deutschland, where yours truly will be speaking.

“The Third Pole in Danger - Chinas Environmental Policy in Tibet”
Friday 25th , March, 2011, 10am - 6pm, at the Hessische Landesvertretung, Berlin

Introduction

The progressive destruction of the environment in Tibet is the result of a reckless mishandling of its natural resources. By exploiting these resources, China is attempting to secure enough raw materials and energy to support its economic growth at the cost of the Tibetan mountains, forests, and rivers.China’s actions constitute a crime not only against the unique ecosystems
that are being destroyed but also against the Tibetan people who suffer the consequences of environmental degradation: a lack of potable water, famine, disease, and displacement. With one-third of the world’s population dependant upon Tibet’s water resources, the environmental situation in Tibet is of global importance.

The conference “The Third Pole in Danger – China’s Environmental Policy in Tibet” is a part of the TID’s campaign “Green Tibet.Free Tibet”. Our goal is to disseminate information about Chinese environmental policy in Tibet, its impact on the living conditions of the Tibetan people, as well as its consequences globally. The conference was organized under the auspices of Dr. Franz Alt.

Program
10.00 am Doors Open
11.00 am Welcome and Opening of the Conference - Wolfgang Grader, Chair of Tibet Initiative Deutschland e.V.
11.15 am Introduction, Dr. Franz Alt, Co-host
11.45 am “Tibet's Nomads – From Nature's Guardians to Victims of Modernity?” - Gabriel Lafitte, lecture and discussion
12.45 am Lunch break, Hessian-Tibetan buffet
14.00 pm “China's Water Politics in Tibet” - Tashi Tsering, lecture and discussion
15.00 pm Coffee break
15.30 pm “Endless Resources? China's Environmental Policy in Tibet and its Global Impact” - Tenzin Norbu, lecture and discussion
16.30 pm Closing Words - Kelsang Gyaltsen, Special Envoy of H.H. the Dalai Lama

Speakers
Dr. Franz Alt is a well-known journalist, publicist and author. He is an expert on Tibet and also highly engaged in environmental issues.

Gabriel Lafitte is a public policy analyst who has worked with Tibetans for over 30 years, most recently as consultant to the Environment & Development Desk of the Tibetan exile government. He has written on development models suitable for Tibet, resource exploitation, education and basic needs, poverty, urbanisation, and the ways Tibetans accommodate modernity without embracing colonisation. He recently retired from teaching Asian Studies at universities in Melbourne, Australia.

Tashi Tsering is a PhD Candidate in Resource Management and Environmental Studies program at the University of British Columbia. His research probes into Tibetan water resource issues at the local as well as national and transboundary levels. Before joining UBC, Tashi served as the Environment Program Director of Tibet Justice Center and founded Trin-Gyi-Pho-Nya, a news digest on Tibet’s environment and development issues. Tashi also serves on the board of Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement, an environmental NGO based in Dharamsala. His personal blog, the Tibetan Plateau, has readers from more than a hundred countries and has made major news stories in the Guardian and the Hindustan Times. Tashi holds a BA from Bangalore University and MA's in Political Science from Portland State University and in Economics from Garhwal University.

Tenzin Norbu born in India, schooling from TCV school - Dharamsala, graduated from Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand with M.Sc of Environmental Technology & Management. He previously worked as a Senior research associate at the Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand (5 years). Tenzin also worked on different projects funded by EU, ADB, etc., and is now serving (since December 2008) at Environment and Development Desk under the Department of Information and International Relations of The Tibetan Government in Exile of H.H. The Dalai Lama at Dharamsala.

Kelsang Gyaltsen is the Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Europe and one of the two Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama entrusted with the task of conducting the dialogue with the representatives of the Chinese government.

Registration
Please note that capacity is limited. The deadline for registration is: March 11, 2011.

Please complete the attached registration form (in German) or send your registration details to: Tibet Initiative Deutschland e.V., Greifswalder Str. 4, 10405 Berlin, Phone/Fax: + 49 (0) 30 42 081 52 21 / 22, E-Mail: office@tibet-initiative.de

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VOA Kunleng discusses nomad resettlement issues

2011-01-13T11:03:00.000-08:00

The Tibetan language service of Voice of America has an excellent video discussion on the topic of nomad resettlement. The discussion is enriched by the input of two guest experts -- filmmaker-researcher Tashi Despa from London and Khenpo Choeying, who is from a nomadic region of Serta. The guests not only bring passionate Tibetan voices but also first hand knowledge of the conditions on the ground. I personally really liked Tashi Despa's input about the real conditions on the ground and the socio-economic implications of nomad resettlement policy. His use of small examples, such as the poor quality of houses, or the boredom experienced by youth, were very incisive. Khenpo Choying emphasized the significance of nomadic lifestyle for the purity of Tibetan culture and identity, and that the policy of resettlement is a deliberate attempt to sinocize the Tibetan people.

The interview is in Tibetan. If anyone would translate the interview for posting on this blog, it would be much appreciated. For those who don't understand Tibetan, I highly recommend watching Tashi Despa's English subtitled film "Undercover in Tibet". The film has good coverage of many of the issues discussed in the interview.

The video has been resized to fit this blog.

Tibetan Plateau blog posts on the topic of nomad resettlement are here and here.

Using Google Earth to Monitor Mining in Tibet 3: Example of Gyama

2011-01-09T12:00:00.000-08:00

Mining is one of the biggest topics of concern today. In the past, China could not exploit Tibet's rich mineral resources on a large scale due to lack of technology, capital and transportation facilities. Mining in Tibet was simply too expensive for China. China also lacked the political confidence to open Tibet to Western mining companies. Today, however, things have changed. With a railway line connecting the heart of Tibet, Lhasa, with the major Chinese cities all the way to Beijing, transportation of materials is cheap and easy. China has also become a global economic power and its confidence in dealing with overt Tibetan opposition is at a high. Today it is actively seeking collaboration with, or rather more accurately, it is seeking investment from Western companies to extract Tibet's gold, copper and other precious minerals. China now wants to voraciously exploit the mineral resources of Tibet and other areas such as Xinjiang to meet its skyrocketing domestic demands. China needs to create an independent resource base and Tibet is key in achieving that goal.

Big Western mining companies such as Rio Tinto have so far refrained from investing in Tibet, as a politically sensitive region. Only smaller companies willing to take the risk for potentially big profits have entered Tibet. However, their experiences have been jinxed so far. Vancouver based Continental Minerals, for example, faced the wrath of local people when two of their local employees were taken hostage and their jeep overturned and infrastructure destroyed in a protest a few years ago. Then they faced heavy criticism from Tibetan rights groups such as Students for a Free Tibet and Canada Tibet Committee. This was followed by unpleasant experiences working with their Chinese counterparts, finally being acquired at a large discount by the Gansu based Jinchuan Group Ltd last year.

In this blog post, I will share Google Earth images of the Gyama mine, which is located in Medrogungkar county near Lhasa. Tibetan Plateau blog has a post about Gyama and other mines under the title of Canada and Crimes Against the Tibetan People. For information about the mine, see a recent Vancouver Media Co-op article and Woser's article in Chinese or an English translation by High Peaks Pure Earth. For those interested in technical scientific studies about the impact of the Gyama mine on local water system, see here. Tibetan readers can see this report about about the poisoning of local waters and clashes between locals and miners.

The confluence of two rivers that form the Gyama Valley:

The main processing plant located right near the confluence and on traditional farming land. Google Earth on Tibet tip: if you find a blue colored roof, zoom in to often find something of interest:

Scarred mountains, evidence of intense drilling, which will become open pit mines of Gyama very soon:

Initial signs of open pit mine with trucks on mountain top. Notice the image was taken in November 2009:

Remember the clashes between locals and miners over water? Here's some evidence. Water being piped from river source right through the middle of people's fields:

Further upstream on the other tributary of Gyama River, you see this mine site. One of the great tools you can use in Google Earth is a time machine you can drag to see how the site looked at different times. Notice this image below was shot on December 17 2007, when the tailings pond is mostly empty and the open pit mine is not as deep:

Fast forward the image to the latest version of Nov 4 2009, and you can see the tailings pond filled and the mine dug much deeper:

Continue to go further upstream, and you will find this suspicious site. Are those soldiers standing together on the NNE of the blue structure? You can also see houses, vehicles and construction machinery:

Go further upstream and you will find this frightening sight. Huge areas covering several mountains have been drilled to prospect minerals here. I hope I am wrong but this is most likely the Qulong Copper Deposit, which was reported by the China Geological Survey in 2009 to contain at least 9 million tonnes of copper, plus molybdenum and silver. The Gyama mine, by comparison, has proven reserves of 2.2 million tonnes of copper. According to the International Mining, February 2010 issue (page 40): "In copper, the most famous deposit is Qulong, according to Chen Renyi and Xue Yingxi of the China Geological Survey. They say “With proved reserves of nearly 9 Mt, Qulong will soon be the largest copper deposit in China, and the perspective reserves are over 14-18 Mt.”"

If you follow the zig zag roads of this mine site to the West, it will curiously end near these two lakes, one of which is dry. Were they thinking of using these two remote lakes (5190 meters) as dumping sites for wastes?

These images are examples. The Tibetan Plateau is littered with mine sites, especially smaller sites. I will refrain from inundating this post with GE images. Look for these yourselves and please share information.

This blog post is the third in a series to advocate the use of Google Earth to monitor development projects inside Tibet.

You can easily locate the sites shown above on Google Earth by tracking the coordinates (latitude and longitude) shown at the bottom of the images.

Monitoring Tibet through Google Earth - 2

2010-12-16T18:36:00.000-08:00

A couple of quick updates: Zhikhong and Thrangu Dam

Last year, Tibetan Plateau blog reported a doctored Google Earth image, which suspiciously covers the Zhikhong Dam, located approximately 100 km NE of Lhasa. While Google did not respond to my queries, the company has now uploaded a different, untampered image of the dam. See below.

THRANGU DAM
In April 14, 2010, a huge earthquake hit Yushu County and caused massive destruction to life and property. The tremors had also damaged a dam, threatening to flood the main city located downstream.

Google Earth has uploaded a April 28, 2010 image of the dam, which shows the reservoir mostly empty.

Check out these images on Google Earth yourself! Notice the coordinates (latitude and longitude) at the bottom of most GE images posted on this blog. Share what you find with us and your friends!

Monitoring development and sharing information through Google Earth

2010-12-11T19:23:00.001-08:00

A friend forwarded this news story to me. About 3000-4000 Tibetans will have to leave their ancestral homes and villages to make way for a hydro-power project near Lhasa's Lhundrup county in a place called Phondo (ཕོད་མདོ་). Most of these people are agro-pastoralists. The farmers have been ordered to leave their homes by next year and that they cannot practice their traditional livelihood there any more. Farmers are worried that they will be forced to sell their animals and relocated to separate areas. Their requests for better relocation plans have been ignored. According to the report, all of the construction workers that have moved into the region are Chinese and there are a few thousand soldiers now stationed at the site.

This project is documented in our last map of Hydropower Projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river. This is only one of the many, many dams that will be built on the Tibetan Plateau. Tens of thousands more will be forcefully displaced from their homes to make way for these projects. What makes this situation really gloomy is that this news story, for example, did not come to the attention of most Tibetan internet users and Tibetan rights activists sooner. In the past we could blame lack of information and news from Tibet for our ignorance, but today we have such amazing technological tools as Google Earth at our disposal that can be effectively used for our information-sharing and advocacy work. Here's an example:

Someone has posted these some colorful still shots from what seems like a video clip on Google Earth:

These pictures, including some of the construction equipment, were probably taken by tourists visiting the area. All of these photos are from Google Earth:

Check out the comment posted by one of the visitors to the site:

Check out these Google Earth images of the area. The first two annotated images are from my colleagues at the Central Tibetan Administration's Environment and Development Desk. The remaining images, some of them are from November 8, 2008 and some of them are as recent as March 13, 2010. These images clearly show the villages and the fields, which will be inundated by the reservoir or developed beyond recognition. If only someone would archive all of these Google Earth images of Tibetan villages and pastoral lands before they are developed and their images updated on Google Earth.

If you would like to read some Tibetan language news from China, see this, this, this. You can get these news stories by doing a google search of "ཕོད་མདོ་" (phod mdo or Phondo).

རྣམ་གླིང་དུ་གཏེར་ཁ་བསྔོག་འདོན་ལ་ངོ་རྒོལ།

2010-07-16T10:43:00.000-07:00

Radio Free Asia reports that some Tibetans have been arrested in Shigatse protesting against an increasing number of Chinese miners in the region. See this link for a Tibetan language radio report and some pictures:རྣམ་གླིང་དུ་གཏེར་ཁ་བསྔོག་འདོན་ལ་ངོ་རྒོལ།

[end]

Tibetan environmentalist Karma Samdup to face court trial

2010-06-01T12:47:00.000-07:00

A prominent Tibetan businessman and environmental activist, Karma Samdup, who is also one of the founding members (first General Secretary) of the award-winning environmental NGO Three Rivers Environmental Protection Association and the main protagonist of the popular book "Heavenly Beads" by Liu Jianqiang, is scheduled to face court trial today on charges of tomb-raiding. Latest report from the Times say that the court has postponed the trial. Reports indicate that Karma Samdup has been framed by authorities for attempting to get his two brothers freed from prison. His brothers were arrested on state security charges related to a small environmental NGO that they had started. As indicated in the Times article below, the actual reason of their (Karma Samdup's brothers') arrest seems related to an incident when the brothers tried to stop a local police chief from hunting protected wild animals.

Photo: Woeser's blog

The story was first made public by Acha Woeser-la on her blog. The Times has published a more detailed story yesterday. See full text below for readers too lazy to register for a free preview of the online article. If you read Chinese, check out this article about Karma Samdup from 2006.

Full text of the Times article:
Tibetan antique dealer and environmental activist charged with grave robbing: Karma Samdup's arrest may have been politically motivated, Chinese sources told The Times

Jane Macartney Beijing
Last updated May 31 2010 9:45AM

China's leading private collector of Tibetan antiques, an environmental activist, is scheduled to go on trial today on charges of grave robbing, an accusation already dismissed by police 12 years earlier.

Karma Samdup, a Tibetan from a village in remote Gongjue county, faces up to life imprisonment on the charges, which are believed to stem from political differences between the prominent Tibetan businessman and Chinese authorities in the restive region.

Karma Samdup, who is in his early 40s, was arrested in January while on a trip to the central city of Chengdu for discussions with the Hyatt hotel group about setting up a museum-style hotel in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa.

He was transferred to the mainly Muslim region of Xinjiang to face trial for grave-robbing. The charge was first brought against him in 1998 but soon dropped after it emerged that the Tibetan businessman had been unaware that some antiques he had bought had been sold to him by grave robbers. He was equipped with a government licence to purchase antiques and told police at the time that he could not be aware of their provenance.

However, anti-Chinese unrest that has roiled Tibetan areas of China in recent years, coupled with a feud between an environmental organization set up by his family in his home village and the police, may have led to the revival of the charges, Chinese sources who have followed the case told The Times.

Karma Samdup is the third of three brothers to find himself behind bars in the last few months. The two others were arrested in August last year on accusations that their Voluntary Environmental Protection Association of Kham Anchung Senggenamzong was an illegal organization. Karma himself founded the separate, well-respected Three Rivers Environmental Protection Association, a non-governmental group that has won a string of domestic and international awards for its work to protect local Tibetan culture as well as wildlife on the Tibetan plateau.

However, the brothers ran into trouble after their small group clashed with the local police chief when they tried to stop him from hunting protected wild animals. A reference to the Dalai Lama as a Nobel Peace Prize winner on their website resulted in the case being handled as a more serious political crime. The police chief has since been promoted.

The youngest brother was sentenced to serve one year and nine months of "re-education through labour", which is an administrative punishment. The eldest is still awaiting trial on full criminal charges.

Karma Samdup had tried to keep the case out of the public eye and had been confident of winning the freedom of his brothers before he himself was arrested in January. One Chinese source who has known the collector for several years said: "He was completely surprised. He never expected that they would try to find a way to lock him up."

He believed that his prominence in the Tibetan community and in the world of collecting would protect him. He was the protagonist of the popular book "Heavenly Beads" by writer Liu Jianqiang which describes the importance of an elongated bead carved from black and white agate that is the most precious treasure of Tibetans.

Karma Samdup is China's biggest collector of the "dzi" beads – known popularly as "heaven's pearl" -- and he commanded the market and set the price with a personal stock valued at more than 7 million yuan (700 thousand pounds).

Tibetans, and many Chinese, regard the beads as protective amulets, sometimes paying hundreds of thousands of pounds for those with as many as nine "eyes" -- or circular dots in the distinctive black and white design.

His lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, said he was due to meet his client before the case came to trial today (Tuesday). He told The Times: "I have not seen sufficient evidence to support a criminal charge. This seems very inexplicable to me, especially since this dates back more than a decade. I have many questions."

Times of India: Response from Chinese official

2010-05-26T01:08:00.000-07:00

The Times of India has published an article in response to the recent article by the Guardian about hydropower projects in Tibet. The Guardian's article is based on my last blog post. The Times of India has interviewed a Chinese official, Ma Jiali, with the goverment-run Institute of Contemporary International Relations to respond to a claim (which I also made) that China is likely to build a massive 38 gigawatt hydropower project at the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river.

It is a privilege to have one's work discussed in major newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India and the Hindustan Times! Thanks to the reporters who did the stories to bring much needed attention to this important matter.

I wanted to write directly to Times of India with a response to Mr. Ma Jiali's comments but surprisingly I couldn't find a "Contact" link/info on their website! So here is a blog post instead.

Mr. Jiali's response: "There are some people in China including hydrological engineers and retired military officers pushing the government to build a major water project on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. But the Chinese government has no such plans. [...] Some people including retired military officers have been advocating such a project for a long time. But I can tell you there is no such plans in the government."

Yes, we knew that. However, it must be clarified that there are two components to the "major water project" discussed here: one is hydro-power project and the other is a connected water diversion project to China. My claim is that the hydropower project is likely to be built but the water diversion project is not very likely. Read my last blog post for more details.

Mr. Jiali continues: "All that the government wants to do is establish small hydro-electricity projects in a way that there is no environmental damage. It will be bad for China as well because such a project can cause serious damage to environment in the sensitive mountain areas. Also, where is the market for generating so much electricity in Tibet?" And Times of India adds, "A major project would not be economically viable."

Now this is not true and is very misleading. The Tibetan Plateau blog has identified at least 16 hydro-electricity projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo and its tributaries that can generate more power than the largest hydropower project currently operating in Tibet Autonomous Region, the 100 MWZhikong project near Meldro Gungkar (མལ་གྲོ་གུང་དཀར་).

Certainly there is no domestic demand for so much energy, except to power government's extensive plans to develop the region and to extract gold, copper and other minerals. The greatest demand for energy actually comes from Chinese cities. A senior researcher like Mr. Jiali cannot be ignorant of China's "West to East Power Transmission Project." Here is the State Grid map again, which shows Metog (Motuo) hydropower project connected to ultra-high voltage power transmission lines of China.

Damming Tibet's Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra and other South Asian rivers

2010-05-24T00:30:00.000-07:00

The Tibetan Plateau blog presents a preliminary map of hydropower projects on the upper reaches of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra (ཡར་ཀླུངས་གཙང་པོ༑) River in Tibet. It is hoped that this map will contribute new information to recent international discussions and clarify some of the misunderstandings about Chinese water control projects on the river.

Click on images for full size view

The map also shows hydropower projects (HPP) on the upper reaches of several other international rivers in South Asia, namely the Indus (Senge Khabab), Sutlej (Langchen Khabab), Karnali (Mabcha Khaba), Arun (Bumchu) and Subansiri (Loro Chu/ལོ་རོ་ཆུ་, alternative name: Jya Chu/བྱ་ཆུ་) rivers. This is the final map in a series that shows hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau.** Previous maps include those on the upper reaches of the Salween, Mekong and Yangtze rivers; the Yellow River; the Nyagchu or Yalong River; as well as the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau. As always, corrections as well as additions to any of these maps are most appreciated.

The status of dams on the upper reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra shows that there are 10 dams completed, three under construction, seven under active consideration and eight more proposed. There is one hydropower project completed, each, on the Senge Khabab (Indus), Langchen Khabab (Sutlej) and Mabcha Khabab (Karnali) rivers. Five large dams are proposed on the Bumchu (Arun) River and another large dam proposed on Loro Chu (Subansiri).

While the larger hydropower projects and a few of the smaller projects have been indicated, there are many small hydropower projects in the region, disconnected from any large power grids. Many Tibetans have until recently lived without electricity, and many still do. There is a pattern by which dams and power transmission lines are built on the Tibetan Plateau -- smaller and middle sized dams are built first, to provide a basis for the construction of larger ones to follow. The current push to provide Tibetans with electrical power seems primarily motivated by the need for larger HPPs to power resource extraction, infrastructure development, and ultimately for supply to coastal Chinese cities where demands are the highest.

A note on Tibetan and Chinese names on the maps: The maps show Tibetan names of places, rivers, mountains and lakes. However, HPPs are indicated with their Chinese names unless they are not known. The Chinese names are used mainly because these are Chinese projects better known with their own project names and also because it is easier to locate (less confusing) for researchers.

YARLUNG TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is a major international river shared between Tibet/China, India and Bangladesh. On the Tibetan Plateau, the river flows west to east, across Southern Tibet, from its sources near the sacred Mt. Kailash (གངས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ༑) all the way to the Great Bend, where the river turns north to take a sharp U-turn to flow south into India and then to Bangladesh. Hydrologically, this river is connected to the larger Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin.

Until recently, the Yarlung Tsangpo was considered as an undammed river. China has officially announced plans to build five dams on the middle section of the river, including the Zangmu project currently under construction, which has caused much concern in India. The absence in these debates of the voices of Tibetans who live in the valley and are traditional users of its waters in these debates is deplorable, especially given their historical, religious and economic connections to the river.

The Yarlung Tsangpo River is intimately linked to the history of Tibetan civilization, indigenous religious beliefs and practices, and ultimately to the Tibetan identity. As the River Nile is to Egypt, Yarlung Tsangpo can be considered the cradle of Tibetan civilization. The Yarlung Valley is the home of the earliest Tibetan kings known as the Yarlung Dynasty. From its sources near the sacred Mt. Kailash, the Yarlung Tsangpo valley is dotted with pilgrimage sites and power-places such as meditation caves of past masters and beyul (་"hidden valleys") for spiritual practices. The river is also shown in paintings of the famous imagery of Tibet as a supine demoness (སྲིན་མོ་གན་རྐྱལ༑).

THE TSANGPO GORGE: THE SACRED LAND OF PEMA KOE
The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, also known as the Tsangpo Gorge, has attracted significant international attention as the "Last Secret Place on Earth" and for having the greatest hydropower potential of any site in the world. Through the 19th century, cartographers were not certain whether the Yarlung Tsangpo emerged from the other side of the Gorge as the Brahmaputra, the Irrawaddy, or some other river. Just downstream of Lungpe (ལུང་དཔེ་), the Yarlung Tsangpo enters one of the world's deepest and largest gorges, starting from a 4,900-meter cleft between two of the highest mountains in Eastern Himalaya: 7756 meters high Namchak Barwa and 7294 meters tall Gyala Pelri. As the river drops nearly 2500 meters in altitude through the length of the bend, the gorge is considered ideal for hydropower generation. Speculation about the construction of the world's most powerful dam and a major water diversion project at this site (discussed below) has been a major cause of concern in downstream countries.

The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo River is also known as one of the most bio-diverse regions in the world in terms of plant species. Although it is hard to imagine how botanists studied and added up the numbers of different plant species in this hard-to-travel corner, this official site boasts the existence of 3,700 plant species and emphasizes "the primordial nature of the plants" in the region. The ecological integrity of the Great Bend area is critical for the conservation of the Himalayas as one the world's richest but at greatest-risk areas for biodiversity (hotspot).

To the Tibetans, the Great Bend region is known as Pema Koe, the most sacred beyul blessed by Guru Rinpoche, Padmasambhava, the Indian Buddhist yogin credited with firmly establishing Buddhism in Tibet. Generations of visionary Tibetan Buddhist masters have revealed "hidden treasures" (གཏེར་མ་) and made journeys through the different layers of spiritual doors of beyul Pema Koe. Tibetans also consider the region as the home of the Goddess Dorje Phakmo (Vajra Yogini).

Similar to the Tibet map depicted as a demoness lying on her back, this local trekking group describes the sacred geography of the Pema Koe region as mapped onto the body of the goddess Dorje Phakmo herself: "Her head is the Kangri Kangpo [White Snow Mountain], her two breasts [are] Namche Barwa and Gyala Peri [mountains] respectively. The lower part of her body lies in Yangsang or the innermost Pemako which is the upper Siang region of Arunachal Pradesh. In the confluence of Siang (Tsangpo) and Yangsang is the sacred tri[a]ngle Kila Yangzom the vulva of Goddess Dorje Phagmo." These beliefs and pilgrimage practices have religious and cultural significance for millions of Buddhists around the world.

The Great Bend of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. Photo courtesy of Christoph Hormann of www.imagico.de

HYDROPOWER PLANS AT THE GREAT BEND OF THE YARLUNG TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA
The map shows two different proposals to harness the hydroelectric potential of the Great Bend: Motuo and Daduqia. The tunnels for Motuo project starts at Lungpe and ends at Metog (མེ་ཏོག༑). Daduqia starts near Pe (ཕད་) and ends at Digdong (སྡིག་གདོང་) near the Indian border. Of these two projects, China is likely to build the 38,000 MW hydropower station near Metog called Motuo in Chinese. This project is feasible from an economic and engineering perspective, although there will be major environmental and seismic issues involved due to the size of the reservoir if the Chinese government decides to build a large dam at the lower end of the tunnels. The status of the project shown as under active consideration is based on informed assessments and evidence. The project is likely to be built after related infrastructure of nearby dams to supply power for its construction and ultra-high voltage power transmission lines are completed. Although the July 2003 Xinhua reports of preliminary studies conducted in the region are not available online anymore, there are several evidences online including discussions of the project on official, academic and other professional websites. The following annotated map of the State Grid Corporation of China envisions the Motuo project connected to ultra high voltage lines of China.

Any tunnels associated with hydropower projects would be approximately 15 - 25 km long, of similar length to those currently being constructed for the Jinping II project on the Nyagchu. These proposed tunnels would likely be attached to large pipes on the downstream side to convey the water through a number of generators before reaching the lower leg of the bend. At this point it is likely that there would also be a large dam (Motuo) in the Grand Canyon of the bend. An alternative proposal, shown on the map as "Daduqia", avoids large dams altogether and takes full advantage of the 2400m drop in altitude, but it is near the border with India and would be highly exposed if there were another conflict. The details of the tunnel routes as presented on the map are inferred but are presented with high confidence based on the assumption that China's engineers have sought to optimize the return on the project.

The greatest risk to a large dam at the Great Bend comes from seismic activity. The Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau were formed by the collision of techtonic plates. As such, earthquakes are not uncommon in Tibet. Metog County, where Motuo reservoir is likely to be built, had a "moderate" earthquake in 2008 before the disastrous Sichuan Earthquake that killed over 90,000 people. The recent earthquake in Yushu and the cracking of Thrangu dam is a nerve-wracking example for people living downstream in India and Bangladesh, given the proximity of the Great Bend to India. Chinese government seismologist Fan Xiao has suggested that man-made activity such as the weight of a large artificial lake near fault-lines can trigger earthquakes.

WATER DIVERSION FROM THE TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER
Several ideas have been proposed to divert water from a giant dam at the Great Bend, through hundreds of kilometers of long canals, to the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, or even the Gobi Desert. Two individuals are key sources of these ideas: Guo Kai, a retired Chinese People's Liberation Army general, whose ideas were published in a book titled "How Tibet's Water Can Save China" by Li Ling (published December 2005), and the late Mr. Masaki Nakajima, "founder and special advisor to the Mitsubishi Research Institute of Japan," who first proposed a $500 billion project to the Global Environmental Fund in 1977 (See, Verghese in "Waters of Hope", 1990, pp. 188-189). These proposals are not shown on the map because there is no evidence of government interest and also because these ideas do not make practical or economic sense.

While Masaki Nakajima and Guo Kai were the two main sources of speculation, there are actually many different proposals for diverting water from the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. The only project that had "official" interest at one time envisioned diverting water from near Tsethang, in the mid-reaches of the river at about 3500m, and directing it through a tunnel into the Nyang valley, and from there eventually to the Yellow River. It would rely on both gravity and power generated by a HPP on the Great Bend to move the water to the intended location. This project has been officially dismissed. There are other "unofficial" proposals, including connecting different rivers of Tibet as if these were streets that can run in all directions.

Close study of the terrain around the Great Bend area and possible canal routes on Google Earth show that the laws of physics will not allow water diversion from the Great Bend as suggested. For example, a reservoir like Motuo (850 m altitude) which is ideal for taking advantage of the drop in the Great Bend altitude would have lost 2000 meters of height that must be transferred over corrugated mountain ranges--through canals that are hundreds of kilometers long. Some may stubbornly argue that it is possible to divert the water with the combined power supplied by the dams at Motuo and Yiwong-Parlung rivers and with "peaceful nuclear explosions" to bore tunnels in the mountains. Even if these were possible, the immense costs do not make sense given the fact that water can be diverted from other rivers more easily and the key attraction for power generation at the Great Bend is economic development, not pumping water. Another major issue is the climate of the Tibetan Plateau, where it is below freezing point during winters and during early spring when water demand is highest in North China.

The Mid-Reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo
This is where major development is currently taking place. The 510MW Zangmu (རྫམ་ or Zam) is under construction and three other projects, Lengda (གླིང་མདའ་ or Lingda), Zhongda (སྒྲོམ་མདའ་ or Zhomda), and Langzhen have begun site preparation. Construction could begin within a few years. Development of Jiacha (རྒྱ་ཚ་ or Gyatsa) is also expected soon. It appears Jiexu will be developed last. As this is the upstream dam in this cascade of six projects, and the last to be developed, this may have a large reservoir to assure a constant flow for the downstream dams.

Here is an annotated high-resolution image of Zangmu project under progress from GeoEye that is annotated by one of Tibetan Plateau blog's consultants. Tibetan Plateau blog is responsible for the annotation.

The Yiwong and Parlung Rivers
Site planning is currently under way on these tributaries of the Yarlung Tsangpo. Completion of projects on these rivers is likely required for development of the Motuo HPP. The sites indicated are based on a map on Hydrochina's website. As the characters of the names of most of the projects shown were unintelligibly small and vague on the Hydrochina map they have been assigned the Tibetan names of nearby towns, which are approximate sites of future developments.

**The Tibetan Plateau blog is grateful to many individuals and organizations for their support and guidance in making this series of maps possible for publication. Organizations include International Rivers, Probe International and the University of British Columbia. People include friends and experts living/working in Tibet and China, Kevin Li, Bruce Lee, James Trevor, Stone Routes, Dorothy Berger and most of all to M, who did most of the laborious work behind these maps. Thank you all!

Tibetan girl band Acha and Jackie Chan sing for the environment

2010-05-09T23:58:00.000-07:00

The popular Tibetan girl band, Acha or Ajia, has posted an interesting music video on their blog. The song has mixed themes of animal rights, environment and peace. The video also shows Jackie Chan dressed as a Tibetan and singing glu (གླུ་) with both hands around his mouth as if shouting to someone at distance.

Tibetan Plateau blog presents a translation of the lyrics and an interesting viewer comment on Acha's blog. The comment is apparently written by a Tibetan who is angry at certain performers in the Qinghai TV benefit gala for Yushu earthquake for their inappropriate choice of dress and songs. Amongst others, the comment expresses shock to see singers dressed in traditional costumes decorated with otter skin. Although wearing of traditional costumes decorated with animal skins was popular until recently, the practice has been largely shunned by Tibetans following instructions from His Holiness the Dalai Lama in January 2006.

LYRICS OF THE SONG "CALLING"

Where have all the forests gone? where have all the stars gone?
Where has the blue ocean gone?
Where have all the kites gone? where have all the doves gone?
Where has the young cyclist gone?

The antelope from kekexili, the rhino from tropical Africa,
they have not yet closed their hopeless eyes,
The deserted grassland,the gradually warmed up earth,
Who will save all the green lives?

Love every breath of this earth's air,
Love the glory of mother earth,
And all the flying birds
as well as creatures,
Sing a song,
to call upon the light of peace,
to carve the future,

Our dear mother standing in the remote distance in hope,
with a smile on her face but her heart heart trembling inside,
The ruined wall in old summer palace,
The blood on the streets of Iraq,
I do not want to see hands that are holding guns.

Love every breath of this earth's air,
Love the glory of mother earth,
And all the flying birds
as well as creatures,
Sing a song,
to call upon the light of peace,
to cease the fires of war,

Love every breath of this earth's air,
Love the glory of mother earth,
And all the flying birds
as well as creatures,
Sing a song,
to call upon the light of peace,
to carve the future

The forests are back,
The fairytale is back,
The hope from our hearts is back.

[end of lyrics]

The shame of the disaster relief benefit gala

After watching the Qinghai TV benefit gala for disaster relief yesterday evening, the feeling was of great shame, first of all the Tibetan compatriots taking part in the gala, each and every one of them was all dressed up, more ironically, some of them, unexpectedly, were wearing Tibetan dress with otter skin trim, also when I looked at Wangmo's costume it was as though she were performing at a carnival, looking crazy and stupid to the extreme, how can you not look at the Han Chinese singers' costumes, at the very least the other costumes were appropriate for the occasion, even more incredibly, Yungdrug Gyal was singing Tashi Delek songs, what an idiot, not knowing on what kind of occasion to sing what kind of songs, we are dead people, so many of us died and he is still singing Tashi Delek, really such an idiot, sadly, we Tibetans have some singers, who for their own pitiful names, allow themselves to turn into foolish clowns at the mercy of others. The two of them are a disgrace to Tibetan stars.

Tibetan Plateau blog is thankful to a friend and High Peaks Pure Earth for help with translations.

China's railroad plans

2010-05-06T23:53:00.000-07:00

Prof. Jan T. Andersson has translated a part of an interview with Wang Mengshu, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and a senior consultant on China's domestic high-speed railways, in the German language newa magazine Der Spiegel, issue no. 12, 2010. The translation is posted here with Prof. Andersson's permission. In this interview, Wang Mengshu discusses Beijing's geostrategic railroad projects, including visions to 200 to 300 million people in western China and a tunnel connecting Taiwan and mainland China.

Image: EU Infrastructure.

China
"Very proud"
Der Spiegel, Nr. 12, 2010
Interview with Wang Mengshu

Spiegel: China intends to extend its railroad system to Singapore and Europe. When do you expect the first high-speed trains to roll?
Wang: The Southeast-Asia route should be the first one to be ready, by 2030. We still need to negotiate the gauge, since we want to use the Chinese system. Some Southeast Asian countries have already signalled their consent.

Spiegel: What does China expect from this project?
Wang: We will obtain commodities that the huge Chinese population needs. Burma, for instance, has no money but plenty of resources. We will help such underdeveloped countries to build railroads and to exploit their resources. Many countries have oil, gas and water resources.

Spiegel: Is railroad technology China's new export hit?
Wang: Seventeen countries have asked us to help them build high-speed lines. I am very proud of our technology.

Spiegel: You invest in railroads also in China. Are you going to pay more attention to the western parts of China?
Wang: In 2009 China invested more than 60 billion euros in the train infrastructure. Our network grows by more than 2000 km every year. We expect to have 120 000 km of railroad tracks in China in 2015. If we expand the network into China's Western regions and solve the water problem, then in the future 200 or 300 million people will be able to move there. The West will change China's economy.

Spiegel: You are even thinking of a tunnel to Taiwan. The shortest distance would be some 150 km. Which problem is larger: the technical or the political?
Wang: Technically only the ventilation is a problem. The demand for a tunnel is large, and politics must serve the people. Beijing doesn't see any problems. If there is a tunnel between Great Britain and France, why not between the mainland and Taiwan?

"A Drop of Tear: Nyenpo Yutse's Cry for Help"

2010-04-29T10:37:00.000-07:00

This is a translation and re-creation of a Tibetan language blog post by Kunga Tsayang, also known by his pen name Gangnyi (གངས་ཉི་ or "Sun of the Snow"). The original post is not available, as are all other posts on the major Tibetan language blog site, tibetabc.cn, at least since the Janurary of 2010. Thanks to High Peaks Pure Earth, which had saved a copy of the original post on 26 March 2009, Tibetan Plateau blog and Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement are able to present the following translation.

The author, Kunga Tsayang or Gangnyi, was arrested by Chinese authorities on 17 March 2009 and sentenced to 5 years of prison on 17 November 2009 on various charges including posting articles online. Gangnyi is one of the many Tibetan writers, artists and educators who are being arrested or punished by the Chinese government in the recent years, as reported on the blog of Lungrig Gyal, editor of Tibet Times (བོད་ཀྱི་དུས་བབ༑). The following post is an evidence that Gangnyi was an environmental activist and reporter.

The first page of the saved original blog post

མིག་ཆུ་རྡོག་གཅིག༑ གཉེན་པོ་གཡུ་རྩེའི་འོ་དོད༑
A Drop of Tear: Nyenpo Yutse's Cry for Help

Purely beautiful

The mountains, waters and forests of my country are scarred with these unhealable wounds.

Despite forty years of mining, from the beginning of eighties till now, one cay say that no benefits to the locals are seen or heard.

Effects of coal mining: The holy mountain in the ancestral land of the three tribes of Golok people has been scarred with unhealable wounds. The glacier of the upper valley is visibly melting; the lakes and the streams are dwindling and the trees and plants of the lower valleys are dying out silently. All these have happening for years, yet nobody in the area seems to pay attention. So after two years of studying the situation we on behalf of the local people urged local authority to stop these mining activities.

As par the written decision of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which states that "The sources of resource depletion and environmental pollution are backward modes of production. The local authorities should decisively enforce the necessary national laws, guidelines and policy to quickly stop such activities." Accordingly, these non-beneficial and polluting activities should be stopped immediately. [The written decision of the Party also states that] "Whoever develops a region should also preserve it; whoever destroys the environment should restore it and whoever receive benefits should also compensate." So according to this principle, it is high time that those who caused this destruction and received benefits take responsibility for their actions.

India poorly informed about Chinese dam project

2010-04-26T00:58:00.000-07:00

In recent days, Indian media has been running a story that China has "admitted" that it is building a dam (Zangmu) project on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River). It is rather frustrating for me to read or comment on this development because this should not be "news" and there is a lot of misinformation being spread around in the media and on the web.

China acknowledging that it is building the Zangmu hydropower project should not be "news" because the project has long been openly advertized in Chinese media, including official websites. There should not be any question of admission about things that are open public knowledge. Tibetan Plateau blog reported on the construction of Zangmu dam more than a year ago, in English! Indian reporters surely know how to use google.

India came to know about construction of Zangmu project after its "intelligence agencies" received satellite images of construction work going on for the Zangmu project last fall. This was widely (mis)reported in Indian media late October 2009. I suppose the Indian External Affairs Minister, the person who brought the "news" from his Chinese counterpart, raised Indian concerns about the Zangmu project based on these satellite images. Indian reliance on vague satellite images as some kind of evidence is really embarrassing because chinese official websites have been carrying clear photos of Zangmu construction work (see below) and models of completed project for a long time.

Then there is the issue of serious misinformation. In my previous post on misinformation about Zangmu project, I identified confusions about Zangmu project's location and use as a water diversion project. The same confusion continues, here and here are a couple of examples.

Indian media and online writers cannot be blamed too harshly for treating this as "news" and being confused about location of the project, even Hong Kong based South China Morning Post is in the same boat. Zangmu project is located in the middle reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo on the Tibetan Plateau in dZam (རྫམ་) township of Lhokha (Shannan) Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region, about 140 km southeast from Lhasa, between Zangs-Ri (Sangri) and rGya-Tsha (Jiacha) counties.

Here is a high resolution image of Zangmu project under progress from GeoEye that is annotated by one of Tibetan Plateau blog's consultants. Tibetan Plateau blog is responsible for the annotation.

Tibetan Plateau blog will soon be posting a map of planned hydropower projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo river. There are more than the five projects "admitted" by China that are planned on the river. Stay tuned.

Thrangu dam: safe for now

2010-04-22T16:28:00.000-07:00

According to reports, a dam near Thrangu (ཁྲ་འགུ་དགོན་ or "Changu" in Chinese media) monastery has been damaged. Many people, including nomads, had fled higher up into the mountains out of fear that the dam might collapse and the water in its reservoir will destroy the town of Jyekundo (སྐྱེ་རྒུ་མདོ) or Yushu (ཡུལ་ཤུལ / ཡུས་ཧྲུའུ).

This report from The Independent indicates that the dam is sitting like a time bomb that might cause another tragedy: "Emergency officials said the dam could burst at any time, putting 100,000 people in danger".

Thankfully it seems like the water in the reservoir of the dam has been drained and Jyekundo is safe for now.

Imagine what would have happened if the dam had bursted and its water swept the town of Yushu, minutes after the earthquake? Such concerns should be a wake up call for Chinese authorities to reconsider their dam building plans on the Tibetan Plateau, much of which is affected by seismic zones. See here, here and here for China's plans for hydropower development on the Tibetan Plateau.

Below are three Google Earth satellite images (click for larger view) of the dam and the town of Yushu. According to Google Earth, Yushu or Jyekundo is at an altitude of 3,685m and the upstream dam, located South, is at an altitude of 3,800m.

Earthquake in Yushu

2010-04-14T00:08:00.000-07:00

See the last section for ways you can donate to help with the relief work

A nice Tibetan song dedicated to the earthquake victims

Google has added some useful tools to support earthquake disaster relief in Yushu. And for regular real time updates (even better than tweeter), check this link. Here are some informative satellite images from google. Click to make images bigger.

GeoEye GE-1 high resolution satellite imagery of Yushu after the earthquake

USGS Shake Map showing different colors for different intensity levels of tremor

Surface acceleration

Damage intensity

Click on this link to see Kyegu Monastery relief work album. Lots of pictures.

Xinhua reports China is carrying out a geological reconnaissance for the rebuilding of the quake-hit township of Jyekundo, to be turned into "a plateau ecological tourist city."

Tibetan language map the region

Websites specifically dedicated to providing information on the ongoing situation and relief work:

Special website of local consortium of NGO's, now active in
Jiegu, Xining and Chengdu.

Plateau Perspectives is one the best sources of updates on the situation on the ground. See this special website.

University of Virginia also has a special website.

This photo of a girl reading her book in front of earthquake ruins is really something. Photo from pourmecoffee.com.

Al Jazeera report on cremations for the dead:

Here are three Google Earth images (Thanks Nima-la!) of the damaged dam near Thrangu (ཁྲ་འགུ་དགོན་ or "Changu" in Chinese media) monastery. The first two images show the town of Yushu (ཡུལ་ཤུལ / ཡུས་ཧྲུའུ) or Jyekundo (སྐྱེ་རྒུ་མདོ) at an altitude of 3,685m and the dam located South, upstream at an altitude of 3,800m. The second is a close image of the dam. This report from The Independent says that "Emergency officials said the dam could burst at any time, putting 100,000 people in danger". This dam is like a time bomb that might cause another tragedy. I urge governments, groups and citizens of China to urge China to use its resources to gradually empty the reservoir, secure the dam and take people living downstream away to safer areas.

The following images are from a Chinese language blog.

For more images from the same source (warning: disturbing images of dead victims), click here

lhatseri tweets: "Tibetan language blogs sites from PRC have been blocked. No posts about the earthquakes."

Death toll rises to 589, according to China Daily

A "Letter from China" in the New Yorker talks about China's news censorship about the earthquake

The International Rivers has raised timely concerns about dam safety and questioned the sensibility of proposed dam projects in the region.

A set of still images from the Telegraph also shows aid work going to the region.

This New York Times video shows a different set of clips.

High Peaks Pure Earth has translated Tibetan netizen reactions to the earthquake. More here.

Chinese language CCTV report

Two English language news reports available on youtube:

For more information, see these stories from Xinhua and BBC. For technical information about the tremors, see this US Geological Survey site.

==================
SUPPORT RELIEF WORK BY DONATING TO ORGANIZATIONS THAT WORK IN THE REGION

1. Donate to Tibetan Village Project's earthquake relief fund by clicking here

2. Another NGO working locally is Machik. You can donate to Machik's earthquake relief fund by clicking here

3. Tibet Foundation

Update on big dam (Shuangjiangkou) in Ngawa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture

2010-04-06T09:08:00.000-07:00

Tibetan Plateau blog reader-contributor James Trevor has compiled a brief informative report on the status and impacts of Shuangjiangkou dam. The main source of information for the report is from the (Chinese language) Journal of the Southwest Minority University, Vol. 2009 / 07, pages 16 to 19.

The Shuangjiangkou dam will be located in Ngawa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, approximately two kilometers from the point where Barkham county’s Kyomkyo River (Jiao-Muzu in Chinese) and Chuchen county’s Trokyab River (Chuosi-Jia in Chinese) merge into a single river. Shuangjiangkou is “confluence of two rivers” in Chinese. The dam will serve as an upstream regulatory dam for a series of dams downstream on the Dadu River (Gyalrong Gyamo Ngulchu in Tibetan). Several of these dams will be built in Tibetan areas of Trokyab, Tsodun, Drakpar, Kyomkyo, and Dampa in Chuchen and Barkham counties.

Here are some photos of the site posted by Kou Lihang on Google Earth. The first photo shows construction work on the project.

Here is James' full report:

At present the Shuangjiangkou dam is under construction and the local people have to move out of the area of the future reservoir. The only descriptions of the project I could find on the internet written in English is an article by Tashi Tsering from 2004, see pages 9 and 10. He has also reported about the dam in this short news release:

At that time in 2004 and 2005 it was just a plan for another dam. While there were concerns concerning “local Tibetans who have been ordered to move away” and “historical Buddhist shrines in the area … likely to be submerged… ” no details were available. Using various sources published since then and the internet I was able to get a much more detailed view of what happens in Gyarong in 2010. On Google Earth a photo of construction activity at the construction site has been posted by Kou Lihang at position 31° 47´ 54” N and 101° 54´ 50” E [posted above]. This is more or less where the dam is built. The exact position is 2 kilometers downstream from where the two rivers meet.

Shuangjiangkou Dam Impact Data

Technical project description
The dam is 314m high. The reservoir storage capacity is 2.732 billion cubic meters of water. Installed generating capacity is 2000 MW with four turbines rated at 500 MW each. The average water flow at the dam site was measured at 524 cubic meters per second as the year round average. The average generated electricity is expected at 8.128 billion kw/h per year. The minimum expected generated electricity is 4.86 billion kw/h per year. The dam is expected to be filled with water by November 2014 and the first turbine is to run in 2015. The building cost is estimated to be 20 billion RMB or 3 billion US Dollars.

By regulating the water flow of the Dadu River with such a big reservoir the generating capacity of the dams planed or in operation further downstream will also increase by an estimated 1782 MW per year. The reservoir is also intended to hold back as much as possible of the sand that currently flows down the Dadu. Each cubic meter of water contains at present on average of between 225 grams to 298 grams of sand and silt. The total amount expected to arrive at the reservoir per year is around 4 million tons. Holding back such a large amount of sand has a positive effect on all dams downstream, as all dam reservoirs remain working at full capacity for longer and turbines are not damaged by sand. The foundation of the dam is at 2196 m above sea level and the top of the dam at 2510 m. The water level is planned to reach a maximum level of 2500 m or 10 meters below the top of the dam. At the top the dam will be 16 meters wide.

Impact on nature, population and culture
The reservoir size, once the level of 2500 meters above sea level is achieved, is from the dam about 33 kilometers along the river in direction west or Guanyin. In direction east the water will reach just below the town of Songgang which is 35 kilometers from the dam. Travelling for example from east to west with a visit to the dam it is a 68 kilometers long trip.

Impact on population
A total of 5925 persons have to move out of the flooded area. Nearly all of them are Gyarong Tibetans. The areas to be flooded are part of Ma’erkang (Barkham) and Jinchuan (Chuchen) county. Only one small township (Xiang) named Baiwan (Pagbar, meaning “White Bend”) with a population of 2390 persons is inside the reservoir area. The main village of Baiwan Xiang is called Jiada (Kyodag) with a population of 300 persons. All other people are from other small villages along the rivers. The dam is designed to fill up to a level of a maximum of 2500 meters above sea level as the towns of Songgang (Zonggag) and Guanyin would be under water too, if a higher level would have been decided. It looks like the reservoir size is designed to minimize the impact on the local population. Any other site along the Dadu River for a similar sized dam would result in much more people resettled.

Impact on culture
The two counties have a total of 82 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples with 2252 monks in 2009. There are 7 monasteries or village temples which will be under water. The number of monks in the 7 monasteries is 137 in 2009. The 7 monasteries have 1787 followers (persons supporting and visiting frequently) in the surrounding villages which are 4.8% of the population of the two counties. This means the majority of the 5925 persons who will be resettled will be able to visit their traditional monastery. The resettlement as planed in 2009 is to move people in the same township to higher ground and not far away to new locations. An archeological survey of the reservoir area was completed during 20 days in June 2005. The archeologists from Chengdu were searching for new underground sites. Indeed 12 sites, mostly from the New Stone Age, were discovered in such a short time. The details are published in “Sichuan Wenwu” (Sichuan Cultural Relics) 6 / 2005 pages 17 to 20.

The main source for the data: Journal of the Southwest Minority University, Vol. 2009 / 07, pages 16 to 19. Chengdu, China. No abstract in English. For the technical data the most up to date sources from the internet were used. Older articles are still available but the most recent figures were used for this update.

Using Tibetan nomads for border claims

2010-04-06T08:23:00.000-07:00

A couple of days ago, Press Trust of India reported about China pushing Tibetan nomads towards Ladakh region of India to strengthen territorial claims over disputed border areas. PTI had quoted an Indian Bhartiya Janata Party delegation visiting Ladakh about the phenomenon. Since the PTI report is a very brief, I quote here in full:

China pushing nomads into Ladakh region: BJP
STAFF WRITER 19:19 HRS IST

Leh, Apr 4 (PTI) Accusing China of pushing its nomads and grazers into Ladakh, a BJP delegation which visited the region today demanded that Government open the area to tourism to defeat the "Chinese design of grabbing the land by inches".

"We have come here to ascertain reports about the Chinese incursion and what we have found is shocking...," said party spokesperson Rajeev Pratap Rudy, who was part of the five-member delegation that visited Ladakh and bordering areas of Nyoma and Demchok, 300 kilometres from southeast of this Himalayan town.

This is the first national-level political delegation to visit the far flung areas of the Himalayan town. The team included former Uttrakhand Chief Minister Bhagat Singh Koshiyari and former J and K unit chief Nirmal Singh.

I asked around for more information on this. My Ladakhi friend, Tashi Morup, who is also a local journalist, told me that this phenomenon has been happening for a long time.

Here are some pictures of Tashi Morup and I visiting this part of Indo-Tibetan border.

"Flower power monk protects 'wild west'"

2010-04-01T09:47:00.000-07:00

The following article, including photos, is from China Daily. Thanks to a reader for sharing this article. It's about a monk's research and public education work on flowers of the Tibetan Plateau. Normally I add articles of interest published elsewhere on a separate "Other Stories" page, but this one gets a special place on the Tibetan Plateau Blog. I hope Sonam Konchog la's story inspires more Tibetans to engage in environmental or other such research and education initiatives, and not be completely bogged down by religion or politics.

Flower power monk protects 'wild west'
By Guo Shuhan (China Daily)
Updated: 2010-02-01 09:52

Sonam Konchog, 44, is obsessed with flowers. The lama of Serkhang Monastery in southwestern Qinghai province has spent a good part of his life observing the plants blanketing the holy Gadoiqowo Mountain in Chindu county, Yushu Tibetan prefecture.

"Have you ever gazed at a flower for more than a minute? If you have, you'll know you can communicate with them," he says.

This passionate man of flowers has compiled an illustrated pamphlet of the indigenous flora and distributed it to the villagers in this area. Sonam believes that only when they become aware of their natural environment, will they be motivated to stop tourists and pilgrims from picking the flowers at will.

In the 25 years that he has spent at the monastery, Sonam has traveled to the holy mountain every August, as dictated by his religion. The numerous flowers fascinated him and he began to set aside some money to buy himself a camera. He finally got one in 2004.

Flowers in full bloom always draw his full attention. His favorite is the red poppywort. The lama seems to share a special relationship with this tiny flower with bright red petals and a sweet fragrance. Sonam sets off on its trail between May and June, as the flower stays in bloom for just four short days.

Red poppywort is an endangered species. Courtesy of Sonam Konchog

A senior lama of the monastery, who specializes in traditional Tibetan medicine, told Sonam the flower is good for the liver and lungs. It was once common in the area, but is becoming harder to find, as are many other kinds of plants.

In 2005, Sonam decided to do something to protect these flowering plants. Every year, he along with 19 other monks and villagers, visits the mountain in August when the flowers are in bloom.

In 2008, he put together some 200 pictures of different flowers into a pamphlet titled Botany Archives of Holy Gadoiqowo Mountain. Each flower is carefully catalogued with its name in Tibetan, English, Latin and Chinese. The pamphlet also details the medicinal properties of the flowers, if any.

Thanks to help from the Shanshui Conservation Center, an organization for bio-diversity conservation founded by professor Lu Zhi of Peking University, and the Qinghai Forest Bureau, 1,500 copies of the pamphlet have been distributed to the locals for free.

"We have been looking for people like Sonam who are dedicated and capable in environment protection," Lu says. "These grass-root conservationists are actually the most powerful force in protecting China's wild west."

Sonam has included parts of the pamphlet in 1,000 textbooks, in Tibetan, for students, which he has helped edit. He has enlisted the support of herdsmen to ensure these flowers are not picked, and also made a short documentary about dandelions last year for a video project sponsored by the EU-China Biodiversity Program.

The project invited 10 amateur filmmakers to articulate the challenges for biological and cultural diversity. Eight documentaries were shown last December in Kunming, Yunnan province.

"We Tibetan Buddhists revere nature. The pamphlet tells people that plants cannot survive if torn from their roots.

"I trust the good nature of the locals. Their care of plants and animals will bring about a lasting harmonious relationship with the holy mountain, which has blessed us generation after generation," Sonam says.

Photos of fish caught in dry lake bed in China's Yunnan Province

2010-03-29T17:39:00.000-07:00

ChinaSmack has posted some amazing photos of fish trapped in a dry lake bed in Southeastern Yunnan Province. The province and other parts of mainland South-east Asia have been suffering from severe drought this year. Although the images were captured in Luliang county , which is not on the Tibetan plateau, I still find them worth sharing. Pictures speak a thousand words.

To see more pics, check out ChinaSmack.

New environmental documentary by a Tibetan

2010-03-11T22:40:00.000-08:00

A Tibetan man, Tsultrim Gyatso, has made a documentary film on the Colorado River. Gyatso-la is a staff and board member of the Tibetan Ecology Foundation, which has a wonderful environmental education website in both Tibetan and English languages. As a part of Tibetan Ecology Foundation's project, the film "The Blood of the Earth: Colorado River" aims to educate Tibetan people about river ecology and implications of development. The film website does not have any video clips right now but it says that the entire documentary will be available for viewing online both in English and in Tibetan. The following two paragraphs from the film website sums up their vision:

Twenty-three years ago, in 1985, television came to Tibet. From television, we learned how to change our dress, we learned how to eat new species (like crustaceans – sea insects), and from Hollywood, it seems people learn how to be violent. Through this medium, we can also learn how to protect our environment.

The Tibetan Ecology Foundation proposes to produce a documentary movie about the Colorado River. The movie would be made in both the Tibetan and the Chinese language, for distribution and viewing among the Tibetan and Chinese people, all of whom share a responsibility for the Tibetan Plateau. The Blood of the Earth-Colorado River will discuss river management, utilization, and conservation in the American Southwest. For Tibetans, the story of the Colorado River will help them to prophesize the future story of their own rivers. And with a glimpse into their future, perhaps the people of the Tibetan Plateau will have the tools to fulfill their responsibility to best care for their rivers.

Position at International Rivers

2010-03-11T16:31:00.000-08:00

The International Rivers wants to hire a China Global Program Coordinator. The following is their announcement which came through an email. Please spread the word to interested people.

Position Available - Please Post:
China Global Program Coordinator (80%)

International Rivers supports civil society groups and communities around the world which seek to stop destructive dams and promote better methods of meeting energy and water needs. We promote stronger social and environmental standards for international dam builders and financiers, including from China.

International Rivers is looking for an experienced, skilled, dynamic coordinator for our China Global Program. The Program Coordinator will work with partner organizations in China and other parts of the world, and with colleagues in our Berkeley headquarters and our satellite offices around the world.

This is currently a 80% position (32 hours/week). We are hoping to increase the working hours as funding permits. The position is located in Berkeley, and requires traveling to China at least once a year. The Program Coordinator oversees interns and volunteers, and reports to the Policy Director.

The duties and responsibilities of the Program Coordinator are:

1. Program coordination: Coordinate International Rivers' program to strengthen the social and environmental standards and practices of Chinese overseas dam builders and financiers. Develop strategies and carry out activities to promote awareness about China's role in global dam building within China, and strengthen the capacity of host-country NGOs to deal
with Chinese-built projects. Supervise interns and volunteers. Help with fundraising, budgeting and financial oversight for the China Global Program.

2. Monitoring and research: Conduct research on the role of Chinese dam builders and financiers overseas. Monitor Chinese dam projects in the Mekong region and other parts of the world. Maintain a database of these projects.

3. Capacity building: Strengthen the capacity of civil society groups in China and the host countries of Chinese dam projects to understand and influence the role of Chinese overseas dam builders. Share information, publish reports and fact-sheets, organize trainings and other workshops, and give direct advice.

4. Media work and other communications: Edit and manage the translation, publication and distribution of our quarterly Chinese-language newsletter, World Rivers Bulletin. Respond to media inquiries and carry out targeted international media work. Contribute articles to our English-language magazine, World Rivers Review, and maintain the China Global Program's web pages.

5. Advocacy: Help create pressure within China and internationally to encourage Chinese dam builders and financiers to strengthen their social and environmental guidelines, and to stop developing destructive projects around the world.

Requirements:

. Excellent research, writing and verbal communication skills in English and Chinese;
. Demonstrated ability to think strategically and develop effective campaign strategies;
. Knowledge and understanding of China's political landscape and NGO community;
. At least four years of experience in social or environmental advocacy work;
. Diligence, independence, ability to handle multiple tasks and deadlines;
. Ability to work well in a team and within an international network;
. Commitment to environmental integrity, social justice and the mission of International Rivers;
. Strong computer skills (e.g. ability to maintain web pages);
. Bachelor's degree or equivalent professional experience required; Master's degree a plus;
. Authorization to work in the United States;
. Advanced Chinese language skills required; other language skills a plus.

International Rivers offers a stimulating, casual and flexible work environment. Our competitive salary and benefits package includes health insurance and excellent vacation and sick leave. Salary commensurate with experience.

To apply, send a cover letter, resume and writing sample to jobpost@internationalrivers.org or to International Rivers, 2150 Allston Way, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA; fax +1 510 848 1008. Please mention "China global program" in the address or subject line. Deadline for applications: March 24, 2010.

International Rivers is an Equal Opportunity Employer and First Source Berkeley employer. We encourage applications from all qualified candidates regardless of age, class, disability status, ethnicity, gender, race and sexual orientation.

Hydropower Projects on Drichu (Yangtze), Zachu (Mekong) and Gyalmo Ngulchu (Salween)

2010-02-16T23:07:00.000-08:00

Tibetans proudly sing of their land as "the Land of Snows, the source of great rivers." Indeed, Tibet is widely regarded as “Asia’s Water Tower.” This blog post highlights hydropower projects (HPPs) on three of the major rivers that flow from Tibet: the Yangtze, the Salween and the Mekong. The Yangtze River originates in Tibet as “Drichu” and flows into China, supporting one of the most densely populated watersheds in the world. The Salween River, known as “Gyalmo Ngulchu” in Tibet, supports one of the most biodiverse watersheds of South Asia, mainly in Yunnan Province, Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. And the Mekong River, known as Zachu in Tibet, flows from Tibet through six countries: China, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. What goes on in the sources of these great rivers should concern not only Tibetans but also all citizens of the world.

The map below highlights 81 HPPs on the upper reaches of Yangtze, Mekong and Salween rivers. There are many more, especially smaller projects on the many tributaries of these rivers, which are not included in the map. We have only indicated HPPs that are relatively large, on the main stream and confirmed by two or more reliable sources. Unlike HPPs on the Yellow River and in the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau, most of the HPPs on these three rivers have not reached power generation stage yet. The completed projects are mostly smaller HPPs. The larger projects are either under construction (Gangtuo, Boluo, and Lawa) or in the construction ‘pipeline’ as “Under Active Consideration” or “Proposed.” It makes sense to build smaller ones first, which can help supply energy and infrastructure for construction of bigger projects.

Click on image below for enlarged view and download

Why is China building so many dams on these rivers? To answer this question, it is important to ask who makes the decision and benefits, and what are the larger (political, economic and historical) contexts under which these water development projects are being implemented. An important slice of this puzzle concerns China's Water Industrial Complex. Other contextual answers include China’s project of promoting rapid economic development in Tibet under the Go West! or Western Development Campaign. Energy needed for major mining, infra-structure construction and urban development projects under the Western Development Campaign will be supplied by these HPPs. Many of these HPPs will eventually be connected to larger (“Ultra-high voltage”) power transmission lines to supply energy to prosperous Chinese cities in the East.

China also plans to divert Tibet’s rivers. The Western Route of the South to North Water Transfer Project , which is slated to begin construction in 2010, is one such project. A detailed report published by the Ministry of Water Resources in 1995 reveals plans to build at least three very large dams on the upper reaches of Yangtze River. We have indicated one of these three dams, the 302 meter tall Tongjia dam, with a separate color for three reasons: details may have changed since 1995; the dam is not a HPP; and to keep the project under public scrutiny.

Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Drichu (Upper Yangtze)

Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Zachu (Upper Mekong)

Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Gyalmo Ngulchu (Upper Salween)

Since these HPPs are Chinese projects, we have used their Chinese names. Although a lot of work has gone into this map, including feedback from various experts, it is not final. The data shown in the map should be seen as our current knowledge, arrived at after research and consulting others, what the current situation is. We will be improving on this, so we seek your feedback, to produce a better and more formal report publication in the future. Meanwhile, those interested in using this map are free to do so.

Sources and Methods
The information shared in this series of maps on hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau has been obtained from a variety of sources. These include: Probe International, International Rivers, HYDROCHINA, news reports from both inside and outside of China, Chinese government and state owned corporation websites, Google Earth, JPRS China technical reports, and a number of scholars and experts who reviewed our maps.

The map is a collaborative project, as have been the others in this series. While I take full responsibility for inaccuracies, the real credit of this amazing work goes to my research assistant and map maker, who must remain anonymous for good reasons. I would also like to thank the many experts who have made valuable contributions to these maps. Your contributions have resulted in a much better map than would have been produced otherwise.

Hydropower Project: Definition and Categories
A Hydropower Project consists of an electrical hydropower station and associated dams, tunnels, ancillary buildings, roads, and modifications to the surrounding environment.

For the purposes of this map, a hydropower project's status has four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. These categories are fuzzy in the sense there is some overlap and each category can cover a wide range of examples.

The term 'Built/Operational' includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, those complete and operational, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. The first report of a generator becoming operational is sufficient for a project to be assigned this status.

'Under Construction' indicates that work is proceeding on the ground though not necessarily that the river has been blocked or diverted. Ideally we would be able to have a 'Site Preparation' Status which would indicate that preparatory work is occurring at the site, but this is not possible without more detailed information than is typically available to us.

'Under Active Consideration' indicates that according to current data the project is being considered for construction, which may include exploratory work at the site, but is mainly intended to include design and other work not necessarily involving modifications of the site.

'Proposed' includes those HPPs which have been discussed but for which we have no information suggesting that they are currently under consideration.

'On Hold' indicates either that a project is being reviewed by Beijing, or that it has been reviewed and the government has decided not to allow it to go ahead.

Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources.

The positions of the HPPs shown on the map are approximate. A professional map should be used for accurate geographic information.

This map is the third in the series of maps of HPPs on the Tibetan Plateau. See here and in the here for HPPs on northern and eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau and stay tuned for HPPs on the Brahmaputra River.

Wildlife of Tibet posters

2010-02-02T22:57:00.000-08:00

Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement has published some splendid posters on Tibet's wildlife. Thanks to generous funding from Care for the Wild International, UK, which has allowed us to produce large color posters for free distribution. If you can read Tibetan, you will find a wealth of information by clicking on the images. Please feel free to download these images and to use them for educational purposes. Visit TEAM's website for more information.

China's Water Industrial Complex

2010-01-21T13:06:00.000-08:00

Why is China building so many large dams?

Peoples Republic of China has built 22,000+ large dams since it came into existence in 1949. If we do the math, we can say that PRC has been building more than one large dam per day. And if we probe into the politics of dam building in China, i.e., who makes decisions, how decisions are made, what kinds of people, institutions and organizations are benefited, etc., there are striking structural similarities between the phenomenon of Military Industrial Complex ("described as an all-too friendly relationship that may develop between defense contractors and government forces, where both sides receive what they are perceivably looking for: a successful military engagement for warplanners and financial profit for those manning the corporate boardrooms") and what goes on in China's water construction industry. Check out the following chart:

China's Water Industrial Complex compared with America's Military Industrial Complex

America’s Military Industrial Complex

China’s Water Industrial Complex

Ideology

· Realism

· Anarchic international system

· American Primacy

· “City on the Hill,” “uphold freedom and democracy”

· Marxist-Leninist-materialism

· “Man over nature”

· Powerful China

· Greatness of socialism, “Socialist re-construction”

Elite
involvement

· Corporate and other private sector executives

· Defense services, Pentagon leaders

· Family business involvement

· "Revolving door system" of professional and political roles

· Engineers, “Red Specialists,” “Tsinghua Clique”

· Party leaders

· Family business involvement

· “Revolving door system” of professional and political roles

Decision

making

· Crisis management small groups

· Closed door system

· Crisis management small groups

· Closed door system

Mode of public support

· Propaganda through mainly corporate owned media

· “Communist threat,” “rogue states,” “terrorist” groups

· Rally behind the flag, “national interest,”
patriotism, etc.

· Propaganda through govt. owned and controlled media

· Natural threats like flood and draught, “Thirsty North”

· Rally behind the flag, “national interest,”
patriotism, etc.

Size of
Complex

· World’s largest in terms of monetary value of production

· Over $ 305 billion in military expense

· World’s largest in terms of project sizes and numbers

· 22,000 of the world's 45,000 large dams

Interests

served

· Economic interest of military-industrial firms

· Departmental bureaucratic interest in expansion of size and power

· Economic interest of water-industrial firms

· Dep'tal bureaucratic interest in expansion of size and power

Influence on gov't policy

· Perpetuation of military related production

· Development of the most advanced and deadly weapons

· Perpetuation of water related construction

· Construction of the largest water control projects

Source: Tsering, T. (2003). China’s Water Politics: In Whose Interest? Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science at the Portland State University.

By China's Water Industrial Complex, I mean the professional and ideological alliance of technocratic Communist Party elites with water-related bureaucracies and businesses that influence government policy. In this context, the WIC has three principle features: dominance of hardline technocratic elites in decision-making; their professional, ideological and economic alliance with the economic and bureaucratic interests of water industry and bureaucracies (water sector entities); and this alliance’s major influence on government policy to further water-related construction. Within this framework, it appears that decisions regarding major water control projects are being made to serve the bureaucratic and commercial interests of China’s WIC, and not necessarily its people.

The immediate purpose of introducing the concept of a Chinese water-industrial complex is to highlight the power alliances (formal and informal, as well as professional and ideological) and the structure of interests that shape water policy in China. My underlying objective is to contribute to social justice debates in Chinese water policy.

Since 1950, the PRC has achieved an astounding 12% annual growth rate in its hydropower production. China's water construction industry is continues to grow as significant sources of China’s hydropower, especially on the Tibetan Plateau, are still untapped and the demand for energy is high in the fastest-growing electric power industry in the world.

By law, the Ministry of Water Resources is the main agency responsible for water management in China. Analysts have long identified the Ministry’s bureaucratic self-interest (and corruption prospects) in large-scale projects. In reality, the management of China’s water industry is split among three ministries—the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry—and municipal and provincial government water-resource bureaus. The responsibilities of these three ministries match their names: the Ministry of Water Resources plans for reservoirs and river projects, and allocates water to industry and cities; the Ministry of Construction administers large public works projects; and the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry is charged with partial oversight of the water engineering equipment sector. The close functional relationship between these ministries and other institutions provides them with a similar interest—promotion and expansion of their activities.

Policy decisions regarding major projects remain highly autarkic, under the control of a small number of Party elites, whose professional and ideological backgrounds are rooted in near-religious faith in big engineering approaches to water development. In fact, since the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party, leadership has been dominated by individuals with technical engineering backgrounds. Although the generation of influential hongse zhuanjia (“red specialists,” or party leaders trained in the former Soviet Union as engineers) like Li Peng are retiring, the nature of internal Party politics ensures assumption of leadership by cadres with similar ideological and professional backgrounds.

In Novemeber 2002, there was a major power shift in Chinese leadership, from the “third generation leaders” to the “fourth generation leaders.” The “fourth generation leaders” who assumed power, although considered fresh and least dogmatic in their outlook, share with their predecessors a professional background and ideological approach to development. Jiang Zemin and his team of six other outgoing members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making authority in China, were engineers by training. And interestingly enough, all the nine new members of the Committee headed by its new leader Hu Jintao are engineers by training. Technocratic dominance is likely to continue in the next Chinese government. Engineers also dominate China’s provincial leadership, which is considered “the training ground for national leadership.” As of September, 2001, 62.9% of Chinese provincial leaders had engineering degrees, followed by economics, physics and Chinese with 6.5, 4.8 and 4.8%, respectively.

An important Party policy regarding the tenure of its top leaders is a professional revolving door system by which top provincial leaders are frequently reshuffled to avoid a situation of cadres accumulating excessive influence and power in a region. Owing to the common engineering background shared by most Chinese leaders, the practice of this professional revolving door system results in certain technocratic bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Machine Building, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Energy becoming influential bases for these leaders to climb the Party’s bureaucratic ladder. Arguably this practice feeds the influence of China’s Water Industrial Complex: the technocratic bureaucracies become politically more powerful with the association of the party elites. The flip side of this is something students of bureaucratic politics would observe; the party leaders would have a professional bureaucratic bias toward these government agencies.

Party leaders are both decision makers and issue framers. The dominance of technocrats in China’s leadership, their bureaucratic bias toward construction-related bureaucracies, and the fact that important decisions are made behind closed doors combine to bias government water policies in favor of structural solutions. These reasons provide an explanation for the fact that People's Republic of China is building more than one large dam per day since its inception in 1949 and continues to expand its dam building industry around the world.

Tawu dam protest: a reader contributes information

2010-01-17T00:01:00.000-08:00

In May 2009, it was reported that six Tibetan women were wounded by gunshots after Chinese security forces opened fire at protestors venting their opposition to a hydroelectric dam near Tawu County in Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of China’s Sichuan Province. There were no reports after this incident. The Tibetan Plateau Blog provided some information about the region and made an astute speculation that the dam must be Lianghekou. We also provided additional, updated map of hydropower development in the region.

One of the readers of this blog, James, who has travelled to the dam sites, wants to contribute new information about the dam and the protest. He sent us three photographs with captions (see below) that he will use to share information. Please look for James' comments (below) on this post.

View of the Chaba valley about 25 kilometers upriver from the dam. This place will be under water soon.

A view of Lianghekou. On the left side the Yalong river goes up to Nyarong (Xinlong) and on the top right side the Chaba valley leads up to Tawu (Daofu).

Map of the dam

Avatar has a good story

2010-01-13T19:17:00.000-08:00

Criticisms of Avatar, the movie, is getting a bit too much. There are all these reviews online, most of them describing the movie's story as unimaginative and cliched. And now the Vatican news agencies have joined the bandwagon calling the movie "simplistic" and promoting nature worship as a substitute for religion. (Wonder what Zizek has to say on these developments. There must be some major ideological issues going on here.) Avatar's story, despite all its "simplistic" and "racist" overtones, raises thought-provoking and philosophical questions that are good for our capitalistic society. I am not sure if most people miss these subtle messages or if these topics are just too sensitive to be taken up. Avatar is a welcome story, as far as I am concerned.

As for the Vatican's dismissal of nature worship, I think the comment operates at a disturbingly deeper level of racism than Avatar showing a white man as the rescuer of the natives. Religious leaders, please stop saying this or that religious practice is bad or "primitive." That doesn't make you any better. Don't hate, appreciate. Avatar has done a great service to the environmental movement and the cause of indigenous peoples of the world. I don't think a single film or educational material on these topics has ever reached (and touched) so many people in such a short period of time. People now have some ideas about aspects of Native American, African, Maori and other wisdom cultures of the world. Our world. It's unfortunate that many people today continue to see indigenous cultures, just like the human invaders of the movie, as "tree hugger crap" or in the words of Vatican media, "nature worship."

One of my favorite books is Ian Baker's Heart of the World: Journey to the Last Secret Place on Earth. In the book, Baker describes how Tibetan tribals of the Eastern Himalayan region of Pema Koe hunt Takin, an endemic animal, and offer ritual prayers believed to liberate the soul of the animals into a blissful heavenly realm. This story resonated when Neytiri, the Na'vi girl who saves Jake, the protaganist, from a wild dog-like animal and prays after killing the animal. Praying for a deceased soul is not nature worship. Perhaps the Na'vi people doing their ritual around the sacred tree is more along the lines of what the Vatican doesn't appreciate. See this clip from the movie Baraka, I think the sacred tree ritual is inspired by the Balinese Kecak ritual:

There is more than one way to skin Avatar: a love story, a white man-goes-native story, or an ecological saga. I think James Cameron is great film maker. His greatness is using the spectacular visuals to tell a story that will sell at the blockbuster, a love story of course, but one that is also deeply thought provoking and pertinent to our capitalistic society. The destruction of sacred ancestral lands of indigenous people for natural resources happens all the time today. Based on this realist premise, Avatar also raises fundamental moral and philosophical questions facing humanity and science. How alienated are postmodern humans from nature and spirituality? Can scientific technology ever grok the interconnectedness of nature? Towards what ends are the best of scientific knowledge and technology used? Why do wars happen in today's world? Who and what suffers in war?

Some critics don't like the story's resemblance to the American invasion of Iraq, especially the colonel saying that they will "shock and awe" the Na'vi people by bombing them into submission. That was not very subtle, alright, but that's exactly why it is good. Isn't it great that an American film (although the director is a Canadian) can be so openly critical of its government's imperialistic policies and actions? Can you imagine a mainland Chinese film criticizing China's invasion of Tibet?

Speaking of China and Tibet. It is interesting to read about Chinese reactions to the movie. Chinese viewers sympathize with the Na'vi people because the destruction of the Na'vi Treehome reminds them of local Chinese government using violence to forcefully evict residents from their homes for redevelopment, such as construction of Olympic stadiums or dams. As an analyst of Tibetan environment and development issues, I cannot help but compare the Na'vi's to the plight of Tibetan nomads and farmers. It is almost like the story is inspired by the Khampa farmers who fought against a Chinese mining company and armed security forces to save their sacred mountain, Ser Ngul Lo, from being mined for gold.

Efficiency vs Effectiveness: South-North Water Diversion Project

2010-01-06T10:50:00.000-08:00

The China Beat blog has published a response article by Prof. Ken Pomeranz to a Financial Times (FT) article on China's South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). Although I appreciate the scholarly tradition of being critical of simplistic and extreme viewpoints, I think Pomeranz's criticism of the FT article is based on questionable grounds.

In brief: China is undertaking the largest water control project known in world history. The project is known as SNWDP and is designed to solve water scarcity and pollution issues in northern China, mainly the cities of Beijing and Tianjin. As most informed people can imagine, the project has enormous social and environmental costs that are largely externalized. And so the debate goes whether this is justifiable or not. I recommend you read the FT article online. In order to avoid filling FT subscription forms, etc., do a Google search on "china blast from past" and read it from there. The FT link also has a good video story.

Pomeranz's arguments are summed up in the conclusion of his response:

"So while the water diversion scheme carries enormous risks, and is certainly very far from the optimal solution, it may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come. It’s not, I think, that people in the government don’t realize that controlling demand (and pollution) may be more promising than increasing supply, or that they aren’t trying to do those things, or that those who support the water diversion scheme are indulging in nostalgia for Maoist gigantism. The real point is that its not at all clear that efficiency gains can be realized fast enough to keep North China, which has about 6 percent of the global average per capita water supply, from facing a devastating water crunch – especially if its people are to see their living standards improve. (Remember, for instance, that even a small increase in the amount of meat people consume increases water demand very sharply.) The project may well be too much of an environmental gamble to undertake, at least in its full-blown form; I lean towards that position myself. But it is a response to very real dilemmas: when the Financial Times article calls it a 'pharoanic gesture,' and treats it simply as an anachronistic and brutal act of a government completely heedless of its people, it distorts a much more complicated reality."

There are a couple of things with Pomeranz's thinking or what is expressed in his response that bothered me. To say that the project "may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come" is thinking along evolutionary ideas of development. This line of thinking tends to gloss over issues of politics. What happens in the name of development is a direct result of decisions imposed by certain people, not because of certain evolutionary concept such as "time." Yes, Prof. Pomeranz does not mean it that way, but I think it is important to point that out.

The rationale behind Prof. Pomeranz's argument is that China's leaders must deal with some real and very serious (water) problems that the SNWDP, even though it is "very far from the optimal solution", "may" just have become the most efficient solution. What is not clear is if the "very real dilemmas" faced by China's leaders include, most importantly, the need for ever increasing action/profit for China's water-industrial complex. Judging from the text of the response, it seems that the dilemmas are mainly management issues of alleviating water supply/demand/quality problems. While I disagree with such an assumption, I am also skeptical of the more specific argument that the project is necessary to save North China from a "devastating water crunch." The project can be sold as an efficient short-term solution to deal with the problem, like the American invasion of Iraq, but will it be effective?

Happy 2010: SpitiValley.org Website Launch

2009-12-31T19:35:00.000-08:00

May 2010 be a great year for you all!

Taking the new year as an auspicious start, I am excited to release a in-progress-wwwsite of a project I am supporting in Spiti Valley, Himachal Pradesh, India.

The Kachen Dugyal Memorial Welfare Society is an amazing spiritual project. Please visit their wwwsite to enjoy some inspiring stories and pictures.

Denmark's anticipatory sale of Tibet bears no fruit

2009-12-23T09:32:00.000-08:00

Did you know that Denmark sold Tibet's historical status as a sovereign state and the Tibetan people's right to struggle for freedom from Chinese rule at the beginning of the COP 15 meetings (on December 9) to appease China, in the hopes that China will behave like a responsible superpower? [Denmark is not the only country that has sold Tibet. Last year England issued a similar statement.] So what did China do during the COP 15 negotiations? An insider at a crucial meeting of two dozen heads of states, Mr. Mark Lynas, blames China for the failure of the COP 15 summit. I was most startled to read this:

"It was China's representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. "Why can't we even mention our own targets?" demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia's prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil's representative too pointed out the illogicality of China's position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point."

While I don't believe in everything noted by Mr. Mark Lynas, his conclusion about China's game plan makes sense: "China wants to weaken the climate regulation regime now 'in order to avoid the risk that it might be called on to be more ambitious in a few years' time'."

I have been to several international environmental conferences, including IUCN 2000, IUCN 2004 and WSSD 2002, and I have seen with my own eyes how these negotiations work, especially at the UN level. You get to see basic world politics in operation. World politics, by the way, are different from international politics, which again are different from global politics. By basic world politics in action, I mean that states quickly get grouped into the politics of "developed countries" versus "developing countries." Issues of global politics, such as human rights, poverty reduction, environmental protection and women's empowerment will get hijacked under international (between key states) and world (developed vs. developing states) politics.

What is interesting is the level of world politics that operates at these conferences: it's so basic! The developed versus developing countries politics is so 80's and it still dominates these meetings. While I definitely came across undercurrents of deeper layers of world politics, such as the aspirations of the 53-member African states and the Muslim bloc, these don't come up in an articulate and forceful way. These, somehow, get subsumed under the larger 'developing versus developed countries' politics. The African and Muslim blocks, for example, are generally happy to vote "No" to anything that the developed countries, usually headed by the U.S., put forward. And China is really good at taking advantage of this situation.

What is even more interesting is how the vastly different developing countries, from major powers like India and Brazil to climate-vulnerable states like Maldives and Bangladesh, allow China, which is so much more powerful and has completely different sets of interests, take the lead in these negotiations. Amazing, really. Will China advocate for the interest of countries like Maldives? Read an observation by Mr. Lynas:

"With the deal gutted, the heads of state session concluded with a final battle as the Chinese delegate insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas. President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number. "How can you ask my country to go extinct?" demanded Nasheed. The Chinese delegate feigned great offence – and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless. The deed was done."

So there, Denmark sacrificed Tibet on the altar of a global environmental issue, but to no avail. With the lessons learned, does Denmark have the integrity to acknowledge its mistakes and retract the statement?

Can you tell the name of this flower?

2009-12-22T09:44:00.000-08:00

Yes, can you please tell me the English or botanical name of this flower? Apparently this flower is quite popular among the Tibetans. Its Tibetan name is Dolma Metok (སྒྲོལ་མ་མེ་ཏོག༑).

I like how these flowers are planted in used paper packets and old rusty tins. This white Dolma Metok is planted in a Amul milk packet. Amul dairy products are a favorite of exile Tibetans. [Amul, by the way, has an interesting story behind its inception as a farmers' cooperative society in the Indian state of Gujarat.] This photo was taken at Mussoorie's Tibetan temple and these flowers belong to an older monk, whose name I don't know. Tibetans are quite ingenious about their flower pots. My mother has a couple of begonia (Chuzin Metok) plants in broken thermos cases. My friend Tsering Chophel, in Clementown Dhondupling Settlement, has, for example, cut empty plastic jars into halves and made two flower pots, one with the lid on, of each plastic jar!

Gen Tamding-la, of Tibetan Homes School, told me how they used to take care of Dolma Metok. Apparently this is a perennial flower. Winters in Tibet are cold, so they keep the flowers indoor during night and they take it outside in the morning when the sun rises. Dolma metok is a special "ornament" of Losar (Tibetan new year) decoration. Interestingly, the white flowers have a nice subtle scent, which the red ones don't seem to have. Dolma metok also comes in yellow and other colours.

Here (above) is a close-up photo of Dolma Metok. Even the red ones on the back is Dolma Metok.

The older lama's flower collection overlooking the Himalayas. He has many kinds of geranium (Trung Trung Metok) and marigolds (Serchen Metok).

This (above) daisy-like flower is actually chrysanthemum. Now, there are many Tibetan names for chrysanthemum such as Khenpa (འཁན་པ་), Lugmig (ལུག་མིག་) and Drangsong (དྲང་སྲོང་). Khenpa is the most commonly used name. Lugmig is the name used in Tibetan medicine, I think, so I should consult an expert on Tibetan medicinal plant names about this. And Drangsong, which means old sage or ascetic in Tibetan, is a specific kind of chrysanthemum. Drangsong metoks have fluffier blossoms with longer petals, see below.

If you wish to learn Tibetan flower names, see this post. I would love to hear from readers about flower names. Please share.

Woser's article on "Tibet's Water Pollution and China's 'Global Warming'" on HPPE

2009-12-22T09:16:00.000-08:00

There is a really good Chinese language article on pollution of Lhasa River and problems associated with mining at Gyama village of Meldro Gungkar county by Woser, the premier Tibetan blogger. You can read an English translation of the article by High Peaks Pure Earth. Check out the striking photographic evidences of the problems with water pollution and mining in the region.

The Gyama mine is now owned by a Canadian company named Jinshan. I have written about human rights implications and Canada's involvement in these projects. See: Canada and Crime Against the Tibetan People

Dams on Machu/Yellow River/Huanghe (Northeast Tibetan Plateau)

2009-12-18T12:08:00.000-08:00

I am pleased to publish this map of hydropower projects on the upper Yellow River known as Machu (᪵ᨋᩛᨋ) [རྨ་ཆུ་] in Tibetan and Huanghe in Chinese. Many thanks to my amazing map maker and to all others, especially Bruce Lee, who have provided us information and corrective feedback. If you find the following map of dams in Northeast Tibetan Plateau of interest, check out related maps of the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau as well. We are working on more maps, so please stay tuned.

For the sake of simplicity and accuracy a project's Status has only four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. "Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. "Under Active Consideration" includes those HPPs that are those projects which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. "Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.

Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.

Information shared here are obtained from the Northwest Hydro Consulting Engineers, CHECC, a Qinghai government website, and a number of other web based resources. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information.

The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.

COP 15, China and Tibet

2009-12-18T11:15:00.000-08:00

Another quick post to recommend an article by Ma Jun, director of Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs based in Beijing. I like the way Ma Jun has described the problem of the COP 15 agreement deadlock between developed and developing countries as having to do with issues of efficiency and equity. It is also always refreshing to hear reasonable Chinese or Tibetan (where are they?) voices that move environmental issues beyond the confines of national politics to the global level.

One may argue that Tibetan environmental issues must be seen within the context of the Chinese political economy and the historical context of their rule in TIbet. Agreed. In fact I argue further that finding solutions--i.e., reversing adverse Chinese development policies and practices in Tibet--would require working with Chinese environmental leaders. Talking about Tibet's environmental problems to the world, via Western media and supporters, will not reverse disturbing trends such as excessive damming of rivers or displacement of nomads. Tibetans working with Chinese environmentalists like Ma Jun, however, may start the incremental steps necessary to ameliorate these disturbing trends within the Chinese political economy.

I came to know about Ma Jun's work nearly ten years ago when he was an environmental journalist trying to get his book on China's Water Crisis translated/published in English. I was a fresh graduate student then at the Hatfield School of Government in Portland, Oregon. I vividly remember watching Ma Jun's presentation on China's Water Crisis live online, which was telecast from the office of International Rivers in Berkeley. I even managed to ask him a question during the Q&A session. It was quite an experience. What struck me from this exchange, although I don't remember what we talked about, was his affable personality and his deep sense of commitment to deal with China's environmental problems, character traits I noticed in several other Chinese environmental leaders whom I came to know in the coming years. Unlike the Communist brainwashed and racist Chinese stereotype that I had heard so many times growing up in exile, Chinese environmental leaders I met, such as Wang Yongchen, Yu Xiaogang and Wen Bo are all extremely nice and open-minded people.

Metok Dumra: a collection of common flower names

2009-11-28T19:54:00.000-08:00

In the past few months, I have spoken with many Tibetans to collect names of common flowers. Many elders and Tibetans from Tibet were delighted to engage in these conversations. Listening to them describe the colors, shapes and even the timing of different blossoms, it is clear that people in Tibet have great appreciation for flowers.

Exile Tibetans, however, can barely identify more than three or four flowers. Perhaps this is because traditional ecological knowledge is less relevant in foreign environments. Additionally, while names of vegetables, fruits and animals are taught in school textbooks, flower names are generally omitted. That exile Tibetans grow up not knowing flower names is unfortunate not only for loss of language but also for lacking appreciation for nature's most delightful gift--flowers. I hope this collection of flower names will help Tibetans, particularly children, identify flowers in their mother tongue.

I am grateful to all those who spoke to me about flowers, including Ugyen Tsephel-la for cross checking flower names, and to the many photographers who share photos through (flickr.com) the Creative Commons license. I trust the use of some of these photos in this educational video/booklet is permissible. The soundtrack for this video is the song 'Khawe Metok' (Snow Flower) by Dolma Kyab.

Here are some more flower names in Tibetan for which I would love to know their English names.
ᨨ᫞ᨋ᪠᫐ᩏᨋ
ᩍᨕ᫞ᨋ᪱ᨋ
᪱ᩛᨋ᫓ᨋ᪠ᨋ
᫞ᨕᨋᨵ᫥᫙ᨋ
ᨳᨋᩲᨑᨵᨋ
ᩆ᪱
᪠ᫎᨋ
ᩧᨑᨋལུᩏ་
᫕ᩜ᪱ᨋ᩶᪣ᩏ᫥ᨋ
ᩂᨋ᪣᪱᫥
᫥ᨓ
ᩂ᫞ᨋ᫄᪱᪄ᨋ᫨᪄ᨋ᪱ᨋ
ᩘᩏᨋ᪱ᨋ
᫬᫥ᨋᩲᩏᨋ
᫞ᨓ᪄ᨋ᩠ᩏᨋ᪍ᨋ
ᨵᩏ᫥ᨋ᫱ᨋ
ᩖᨑ᪄ᨋ᪽ᨑᨋ᫞ᨑᨋ (nasturcium? morning glory?)
᫱ᨋᨡᨋ

A related post on flowers.

Updated* maps of dams: Eastern Tibet

2009-11-28T02:02:00.000-08:00

*The maps on this blog, and the details, have been updated since it was first posted. Special thanks to Fan Xiao, the chief engineer of the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau in Chengdu, for providing details on Minjiang dams. What follows is the most up to date publicly available information on hydropower projects in the region.

This is an update on maps I shared on this blog on Zungchu/Minjiang and Gyarong Ngulchu/Dadu rivers. Thanks to encouraging and informative feedback from Bruce Lee, Fan Xiao, Kevin Li, Stone Routes, and from Probe International researchers, the following maps and tables provide a unique and reliable information on dams on the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau.

For the sake of simplicity and accuracy a project's Status has only four possible values: Built, Under Construction, Planned/Proposed, and Cancelled. The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. "Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. "Planned/Proposed" includes those HPPs that are those projects which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. "Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.

Capacity is given in MegaWatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.

Height is given in meters and indicates the total height of the dam associated with the HPP.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC CDM) assisted projects have been included on the tributaries map for three reasons. One is simply that reliable information is available for them. A second reason is that they provide examples of the thousands of small HPPs built throughout China which may (or may not) have negative consequences to the environment or local residents. A third reason they are shown is that they are examples of where Carbon Trading funds are going, which means that the general public overseas are subsidizing these projects since the Carbon Credits bought are tax deductible in developed nations. The CDM reports are available on the internet and at the UNFCCC site. More information regards UNFCCC at Wikipedia.

GYARONG NGULCHU or DADU RIVER

MEGOE TSO and TIANWAN HE

Click on the image below for details on Gyarong Ngulchu and Tianwan He dams

Hydropower Project on Zungchu / Minjiang River

Dams on the tributaries of Zungchu/Minjiang

Click on image below for details on Zungchu/Minjiang dams

Sources of data presented here: websites of Probe International, UNFCCC, China Guodian Corp., and a number of other web based resources. Various Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information. The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A detailed professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.

Suggested reading on policy implications of these dam projects."

Indian media and misinformation on Chinese dam on the Brahmaputra

2009-11-09T05:55:00.000-08:00

The Indian media has been discussing Tibet for the last two weeks. The visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang, a Tibetan region "disputed" between India and China, is a key story these days. The subject of this blog, however, is a different story. On 4th November 2009, India's Zee TV News reported that China is indeed building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. Satellite images from India's National Remote Sensing Agency were reported as shocking evidence of the dam construction activity.

Readers of the Tibetan Plateau Blog know that China's building of dam on the Brahmaputra (or Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet) is old news. The construction of Zangmu Hydropower Project is openly reported in Chinese media for a long time. I blogged about this development as early as March 5, 2009. The Zee News report did not talk about the four other dam projects, which are planned on the Brahmaputra, just near the Zangmu project.

Another important point that the Indian media does not clarify is that the Zangmu dam, which is located on the upper-middle reaches of Brahmaputra, should not be confused with the controversial mega-hydropower project that may get built at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, just near the point where the river enters Indian controlled territory. Much of the Indian and Bangladesh's hoopla over Chinese dams on the Brahmputra revolve around rumours of this latter mega-project. Indian misunderstanding is further obscured by this image from the Great Bend area in the Zee TV News report. Print news materials are even worse. For example, this article completely confuses the two different projects as one.

To read my views about about the proposed mega project on the Great Bend, and a disturbing Indian view that India should quickly build some dams on the Brahmaputra to establish prior use claims over China, see this post.

Here is the youtube video of the Zee News story, followed by my rough English translation of the Hindi audio report:

Despite all the opposition from India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. India has found clear evidence that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra River. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river. Trucks moving about 3 to 4 kilometers near the construction site have also been observed. NRSA has alerted the Indian government about these findings. This matter has been raised with China, according to India.

Zee News correspondent, Dilip Tiwari, is here with us with more information on this. It is clear again that China's intentions are not good, Dilip. Dilip, can you hear us? OK, we will speak with Dilip [if/when we can reach each other]. Let's report to you again that despite all the opposition expressed by India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra. Clear evidence has been found that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river.

And at this time, we have former Foreign "Sachiv" (representative?), Mr. Kamal Sabbal. Welcome to Zee News, Sabbal-ji, now that it is clear from the satellite images that China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra in full swing, what steps should India take? And how serious is this situation from the Indian point of view?

[Mr. Kamal Sabbal speaks over the phone:] "Right now, it may not be a serious issue as the Indian Prime Minister has said that this is a 'run-off-river' project, which does not have storage [water reservoir] and there will not be decrease in supply of water. However, this can get serious in the future since China has many major plans. One of their plans is to divert water from Brahmaputra to Northern China. If they undertake such a plan, then the consequences will be very serious. The thing is that, projects like this, develop slowly overtime. China has just started the work. If we don't speak to them properly, fail to ask for explanations, or fail to express our concerns, then these [projects] will develop further. So we should find out what their plans are. What are their short and medium term plans? And what effects will these have on us [India]? We should also realize that these projects will have tremendous impacts in Bangladesh. So we should also try to see if India and Bangladesh can jointly put pressure on China.

[News anchor:] How can India lay its concerns in front of China? What immediate steps should India take?

[Mr. Kamal Sabbal:] One, there should be [a joint] experts committee from both the countries to share data and to assess the impacts of the plans and projects. [You] see, if the projects don't have serious downstream impact, we cannot stop them. If water supply is indeed likely to decrease, and then there is the case of global warming and everyone is afraid that water supply will be reduced for everyone, from that perspective, it will become a very serious issue. So data-sharing is a very important point. And the third thing that we should do, with full force, is to undertake the [dam] projects on our [the Indian] side ... because if we keep talking, that these [Chinese] dams will impact us, and if we don't have any downstream projects of our own, our protests will not have much strength. However, if we have downstream projects, these [projects] will have impact over them (Chinese plans and projects), then our protests will also have more weight in international law and to the international community.

[News anchor:] Yes. It is necessary that the issue is taken up seriously by the Indian government. Thank you, Sibbal-ji, for talking to Zee News.

Zungchu: More on Dams in Eastern Tibet

2009-11-06T04:36:00.000-08:00

[Note: Refer to this updated post]

This is in continuation to my last post to share maps and information on "hydropower projects on the eastern fringes of the Tibetan Plateau. Here is a relevant article on the policy implications of these dam projects."

The information on these two maps and the table on Zungchu and its tributaries has been obtained from the Probe International website and a number of other web based resources which served to verify or correct the main sources. Again, many thanks to my ghost map maker and Kevin Li who helped locate the HPPs. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information and the maps are only approxiamtely to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A detailed professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.

Dams on Gyarong Ngulchu or Dadu River

2009-11-06T02:56:00.000-08:00

[Note: Refer to this updated post]

This is a quick post to share a couple of maps which show hydropower projects on the eastern fringes of the Tibetan Plateau. As rivers on "mainland China" are dammed and diverted beyond recognition, Chinese dam builders and hydro-engineers are looking towards the Tibetan Plateau for more business. Owing to this trend, more and more dams are being built on the rivers of the eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau, mainly in Western Sichuan or Kham region. You may read an article on the policy implications of these dam projects.

Information on these maps have been obtained from websites of the Probe International, China Guodian Corp, Tibet Justice Center, and a number of other web based resources which served to verify or correct the main sources. Many thanks to my ghost map maker and to Kevin Li for corrections and clarifications on the facts, and for detailed information on the Tianwanhe Cascade. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information and the maps are only approxiamtely to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate.

This first map shows dams on the Dadu River, known to Tibetans as Gyarong Gyalmo Ngulchu (རྒྱལ་རོང་རྒྱལ་མོ་རྔུལ་ཆུ་). Shown dam projects also include those downstream of the Tibetan Plateau to help researchers who may find locating different dam names on the river confusing. For more information on these hydropower projects, see the table at the end of this post.

This second map shows on two tributaries of Gyarong Ngulchu, Wasi River and Tianwan. The Megoe Tso dam project shown on this map became controversial due to opposition from local Tibetans, who consider the lake (also known as the Yeti Lake and Megucuo) as sacred.

Canada and Crime Against the Tibetan People

2009-10-07T10:26:00.000-07:00

The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, also known as the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, has made a statement on mining in Tibet on Sept 22-23, 2009, at a London roundtable discussion on Shethongmon mining project. Shethongmon is situated near the city of Shigatse in southern Tibet. The roundtable meeting was organized by TibetInfoNet, which is also a consultant for the Canadian company, Continental Minerals, which is investing in the project.

The CTA statement is clearly against any mining project in Tibet but it does not condemn or express the seriousness of these investments. Despite having its pleas and moral suasions repeatedly ignored by Canadian mining companies, the exile Tibetan leadership continues to engage in these discussions. For the purposes of this blog, I think it is better to highlight the injustice and crime that these mining projects perpetuate than to write about about these exchanges.

The CTA statement cites three major protests in Tibet in 2009 against mining projects (Bathang county in March, Ser Ngul Lo in Markham county in May, and Meldo Gungkar county in June). It does not mention that a protest actually also took place against the Shethongmon mining project on 19th June 2006. Soon after the protest, disciplinary officials of the Party started "education campaigns" about the benefits of the project among the farmers.

Local protests against mining in Tibet are not new. Farmers in Meldo Gungkar have been protesting against mining at least since 1991 (see chapter 6 of CTA's report, Tibet: Environment and Development Issues 2000). Even as recent as two months ago, there were reports of clashes between local Tibetans and Chinese miners at the Gyama mine site. And two weeks ago, this intensely disputed mine was bought by another Vancouver based company named Jinshan.

As usual, here's a question for you readers: How is Canada attracting such deals in Chinese controlled Tibet? Canada is the only Western country with significant investments in Tibet. Any informed person would tell you that such deals must include heavy corruption and deep connections with the Party.

As I write this, my thoughts go to people like Thupten Yeshi, a farmer from Meldro Gungkar who expressed opposition to mining in his ancestral lands. Thupten Yeshi has been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for opposing the Gyama mining project, which is now legally owned by a Canadian company. Here is a GuChuSum file photo of Thupten Yeshi. I wonder how many others are imprisoned or have mysteriously "disappeared" ...

I am not saying that all Tibetans are against mining. Apart from Tibetans profiting from Chinese rule, there are also some progressive and business minded Tibetans in exile as well. The issue is not mining. It is about how decisions are made, who gets the benefits and who the losers are.

Affected local Tibetans will probably be given some compensation in the case of Shethongmon mine, but the bulk of the profits go to the company and the Chinese government. About 200 to 300 million US dollars would be paid by the company from their net profit to the government as Corporation Tax (at 35 %), which is the international norm. The company's conservative estimate of the expected return rate is 2.5 times their capital investment. Issues of environmental pollution, jobs and training of workers, etc. are important and a Canadian company may do a better job on these issues than a Chinese company. However, these issues are only secondary to larger and more fundamental issues of politics and moral principles.

Despite their best efforts to ensure fair and lawful business, foreign companies mining in Tibet are engaging in a kind of legalized robbery. Stealing can be lawful when lawmakers are colonial masters. The application of principles of corporate social responsibility ought to first look at more fundamental questions such as "Who are the legitimate owners of Tibet's gold and other mineral resources?" "What are the rights of an indigenous people (or nation) to their land?" These are not academic or philosophical questions. Canadians need not look far but into their own constitution (Section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act) for general guidance.

++++++++++++
For background information on Shethongmon project, visit Continental Minerals' website. TibetInfoNet has published some reports on the project which can be read here and here. There is a campaign against these projects lead by Students for a Free Tibet and Canada Tibet Committee. Visit their website.

Dams on Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra): More Info

2009-10-06T12:29:00.000-07:00

Thanks to 'Stone Routes' who just posted a comment on one of my posts about dams on Yarlung Tsangpo. It made me realize that I had forgotten to share further information about the five dams on the river (also called the Brahmaputra).

These five dams are Zangmu (རྫམ་ or dzam), Jiacha (རྒྱ་ཚ་ or Gyatsa), Zhongda (སྒྲོམ་མདའ་ or Zhomda) and Lengda (གླིང་མདའ་ or Lingda), and Jiexu and Langzhen. Only Zangmu project is being built right now and others are in the project pipeline. I am unable to find the original Tibetan names for Jiexu and Langzhen so far. If any of the readers know the Tibetan names, please let me know. I used the Tibetan & Himalayan Library to find the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of Zangmu (29.14 and 92.52), Gyatsa (29.11 and 92.71) and Lingda (29.07 and 92.72) townships. Here is a Google Earth image of the location of these five dam sites.

You can use the coordinates at the bottom of the image or the inverted 'V' shape of the river on the right hand corner of the image to navigate approximate locations. Better still if you have good internet connection to browse Google Earth online, you can use this link prepared by Kevin Li of the International Rivers Network.

Doctored Google Earth Images: Is Google Helping China Falsify Information?

2009-09-22T20:28:00.000-07:00

A dam located about 100 km NE of Lhasa, known as the Zhikhong Dam, is mysteriously vague in Google Earth (GE). A new high-resolution image in GE shows the area including the large reservoir, but the precise location of dam and power station is a low-resolution image, and the boundary between them is curved. It is possible to see strips of old images between new images in GE but in this case it fits the end of the reservoir exactly, and the boundary between the two images is curved, which is unusual.

A jpg image of the region taken from GE is posted here (below). I don't know how to upload kmz files or links that will take readers directly into Google Earth. So readers interested in looking up more closely should use the coordinates at the bottom of the image. Going up closer to the location in GE is much more convincing than the jpg photo shared here.

I told this observation to a friend and colleague from Green College, who used to work for Google Maps, the amazing Ducky. She checked the images and found them suspicious. Upon her advice, we decided to alert Google Earth about this and to see their response.

What do you think is going on here? Is Google Earth covering up for China? Or is someone supplying GE with doctored images? Or may be someone in Google Earth is working against company policies?

Did you know that a giant alian bug was found in a part of Germany in GE?

"How life is for 'The urbanised nomads' "

2009-08-06T20:02:00.000-07:00

I came across a great website today: the Tibet Web Digest (བོད་ཀྱི་དྲ་གནས་ཕྱོགས་སྡུས༑). This website translates note worthy Tibetan language articles into English to "provide access to the vigorous intellectual and cultural activity of the Tibetan language cybersapce." I encourage you to visit this website as it contains many interesting posts, including the subject tile of my post today.

"How life is for 'The urbanised nomads' ” is a brief report on the condition of resettled Golok nomads from the Three Rivers Headwaters Nature Reserve. The writer shares data on the living condition, income level and experiences of the resettled nomads. The writer also recounts some of the interviews conducted at the relocation camp on April 14, 2007. The original Tibetan language article is currently inaccessible [At least two popular sites -- www.tibetabc.cn and www.tibettl.com -- are inaccessible right now].

If you want to read my older posts related to the topic of resettlement of nomads, see here.

"Are the police allowed to fish?"

2009-07-26T12:00:00.000-07:00

A Tibetan blogger by the name "Ling Se Jur Tha" (གླིང་སྲས་བྱུར་མཐའ) reports fishing in the Zoege (Ch: Ruo’ergai) grasslands at the source of Machu (Yellow) River. The blog was posted on July 26, 2009. The blogger is reporting this incident because on the one hand the government claims protection of the Zoege Wetland as a nature reserve, while its own policemen, on the ground, are breaking the same law "with pride".

When independent media is absent, such citizen journalism deserves our close attention. If you read Tibetan, read the comments by readers on the original post . One of them suggests noting the vehicle number and reporting to higher authorities. Tibetans bloggers engaging in citizen journalism was first publicly identified by High Peaks Pure Earth.

A quick note on the importance of wetlands: Wetlands perform key roles in a river's hydrological cycle. During wet seasons when there is risk of flooding and high erosive activity due to increased flow in rivers, wetlands help reduce these risks by absorbing water like a sponge. The excess water is slowly released during dry season. Wetlands also filter sediments, chemicals and nutrients in groundwater.

I don't know what kind and quantity of fish are in the Zoege Wetlands but this area is known to bird lovers as a prime site for viewing migratory birds such as Black-necked Crane and Mongolian Plover.

Here is the translated post (in italics) with pictures.

Are the police allowed to fish?

This policeman is fishing in the vast Zoege grassland region (read the Tibetan language post for precise description of the location). I asked the policeman, "Can the police fish in the river?" He replied, "Of course," with pride.

Here he is, fishing. The laws and regulations of China are a joke.

This is his [police] car.

Tourism and Festivals in Tibet

2009-07-17T14:44:00.000-07:00

I often hear from people wanting to visit Tibet. They usually want to know what places to visit, what to avoid, when is a good time, and if they could work with some local group as a volunteer. I think these are good questions. And then there are stupid, or should I just say, bad, questions.

Here is one of the bad questions people ask: what kind of things, such as pencils and photos of the Dalai Lama, should they take as gifts for Tibetans, especially for poor children. Giving gifts randomly is a bad idea, especially if it is something the government prohibits, such as pictures of the Dalai Lama. Giving candies, pencils, etc., randomly to children reminds me of throwing bread crumbs to fish in the lake, or to monkeys by the roadside. At parks here in Canada, I see signs restricting people from giving food to animals -- it habituates them, changing their normal way of life. Same thing, but only worse. Tibetans are humans! A friend said it quite well: Tourists should not demean children by treating them as beggars and coming across as a rich almsgiver.

If you are interested in visiting Tibet, read How Not To Be A Tourist in Tibet.

The inspiration for writing this blog actually came from reading this news piece. If you are able to decipher the statistics explained in the article with strange English, please explain in the comments section below. The gist of the article as I understand it is this: A lot of tourists are pouring into Tibet, much more than last year, especially from within China. The rise in the number of tourists is not surprising. The number of tourists last year dropped radically after the March 14 Uprising, and the martial law, and the shutting-off of the Tibetan Plateau, and all the sensitivities surrounding the Olympics.

What really got me thinking was the last sentence which is clearly meant to entice more tourists. I quote a section of the sentence: "in the second half year, more tourists will be attracted as some large-scale activities such as "Miss Asia" Tibet Division Contest, 4th Namtso International Hiking Convention and the annual Shoton Festival will kick off."

Miss Asia? Surely Miss Tibet should be invited. OK, I am being facetious here. But more seriously, it is deeply disturbing that the government promotes certain Tibetan festivals such as the Shoton because of their tourism prospects, while at the same time they tell Tibetans not to celebrate other festivals such as the Buddha Purnima, Sakadawa in Tibetan, the most sacred day for all Buddhists. The government has instructed Tibetans to celebrate Chinese (or is it Korean?) Dragon Boat Festival instead. I highly recommend a close reading of this blogpost by a Tibetan expressing his/her feelings about this in a clever way. Read the contextual introduction of the blogpost by High Peaks Pure Earth carefully as well, and you will know what I am talking about.

New Map Throws Light on Tawu Protest and the Future of Eastern Tibet

2009-06-17T19:13:00.000-07:00

Recently it was reported that tens of thousands of Tibetans gathered in Tawu county of Kandze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture to protest against government issued relocation notice. The incident resulted in the police shooting at the protesters. The resettlement project, according to the report, is to make way for a major hydroelectric dam between Nyagchu and Tawu counties. In a previous blog post, I opined that the dam is the Lianghekou dam. The Lianghekou will be one of the world's tallest dams with a height nearly 300 meters. The dam will have a 6.33 billion cubic meter capacity reservoir that will extend 90 km from the dam up the Nyagchu River. A dam as big as the Lianghekou will most likely require relocation of thousands of farmers living along the river.

Unfortunately, Lianghekou is just one of the 21 dams built/planned on the Nyagchu River by the Ertan Hydropower Development Company. I write this blog to share the following copyright-free map of these dams.

I will not repeat what is clearly shown in the map. Click on the map to find out for yourself how these dams will change the face of eastern Tibet. This map is the most accurate publicly available document of its kind.

I like to share questions that I wonder about with readers. Here are three questions:

1. Where are most of the corruption happening with these projects, assuming corruption is endemic in the Chinese dam industry?
2. Where will most of the power generated from these dams be diverted? To the west for China's most ambitious copper mine/smelter, the Yulong, or to the east for Chinese cities?
3. What is the best way to raise awareness about the social and environmental costs of these projects within China?

Dams Planned, Under Construction, or Operated by Ertan Hydropower Development Company, Ltd. on the Nyagchu (Yalong River), Sichuan, PRC

There are currently 21 hydropower dam planned, under construction, or operated on the Nyagchu (Yalong River) by Ertan Hydropower Development Company, Ltd.. These are listed below and their locations shown on the map "Nyagchu/Yalong River: Dams Completed, Under Construction, and Planned by Ertan". The five categories are those given on the Ertan website and are most likely out of date. While the operational dams and dams under construction are still correct, it is possible that one or more of the dams said to be in the preparatory stage to be in fact more accurately characterized as under construction.

Location of Projects on the Map

The positions of the projects on the map have been estimated from the Ertan Cascade Projects Planning chart, several maps showing planned dams along the Nyagchu, a 1984 report on dams planned in the PRC by U.S. Department of Commerce which included a map and a cascade chart for all but one of the dams from Lainghekou south, and additional geographical information about the dams. The locations of projects from Lianghekou south have been confirmed by at least two sources as well as the Cascade Projects Planning chart. The distances up the river were also verified using the path option in Google Earth, which in a couple of cases was surprisingly accurate. The Ertan dam is visible in Google Earth image so coordinates are available for it. The map is not definitive (i.e. is not based on a exact coordinates verified on the ground), but is accurate for its scale, based on information currently publicly available. It corrects some of the maps which were used as sources, and is more accurate and complete than any we were able to find.

The following information are directly from the website of Ertan Hydropower Development Company.

Power Station in Operation

Ertan
The Ertan website states "Ertan Hydropower Station is China’s largest hydropower station completed in the 20th century. Construction of Ertan Power Station created several “No. Ones” in China and in the world, which are:

No. ones in China:
1. China’s first high dam exceeding 200m.
2. China’s largest group of underground caverns and tunnels (also the largest in Asia).
3. China’s largest power plant built in the 20th century (with a total capacity of 3,300MW).
4. China’s largest unit capacity of 550MW, realizing a big leap from 335MW to 550MW.
5. China’s first hydropower project fully open for international competitive bidding.

No. ones in the world:
1. A project for which the World Bank provided the largest loan as a single project.
2. The total load of 980 tonnes taken by the dam and the designed spillway capacity of 22,480 m3/s are the largest among high dams in the world.
3. The cross section of the diversion tunnels (23m high by 17.5m wide) is the largest in the world."

Projects Under Construction

Jinping I
Located in the counties of Yanyuan and Muli, Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its large reservoir makes it a controlling project in the lower reach of the main river. Jinping-I is huge in scale, and power generation is its main purpose. The project has a total installed capacity of 3,600MW (6 × 600MW). Its total storage capacity is 7.76 billion m3, and with a regulation storage of 4.91 billion m3, it is a storage capacity is 7.76 billion m3, and with a regulation storage of 4.91 billion m3. The project consists of permanent structures categorized as water retaining, spillway and dissipation, and power tunnels and powerhouse complex. Its 305m-high double curvature concrete arch dam is one of the world’s highest dams. Total construction period of the project is 9 years and 3 months, and its total static investment is RMB19.68 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB24.58 billion yuan.

Jinping II
Located on the large Jinping River Bend, and is the second of the five cascade projects on the river section from Kala down to the estuary. Jinping-II is designed to cut the 150km river bend by a group of power tunnels to use the natural drop created by the bend. The project primarily consists of a headwork sluice dam, spillway structures, power tunnels and powerhouse complex. The dam is 7.5km downstream of Jinping-I dam. Jinping-II reservoir itself only has a capacity of daily regulation, but when jointly operated with Jinping-I, it also has the capacity of yearly regulation. The 4 power tunnels have an average length of 16.6km and an excavated diameter of 13m, which are among the world’s longest and largest hydraulic tunnels. The powerhouse complex sits underground on the other side of the river bend. The project has a total installed capacity of 4,800MW (8 × 600MW), which gives a multiyear average annual generation of 24.23TWh. Total construction period of the project is 8 years and 3 months, and its total static investment is RMB24.98 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB29.77 billion yuan.

Projects in Preparatory Stage

Guandi
Situated 30 km from Xichang City in straight line and 80 km by road. It is the third of the five cascade projects on the river section from Kala to the estuary, and connects with the downstream Ertan Project. The main purpose of Guandi Project is power generation, and its total installed capacity is 2400MW. With the maximum height of the dam being 168m. The reservoir has a total storage of 760 million cubic meters. The complex mainly consists of a RCC (roller compacted concrete) gravity dam, an underground powerhouse on the right bank, and spillway facilities. Its total static investment is RMB12.49 billion yuan, while the total dynamic investment is RMB15.2 billion yuan.

Tongzilin
Situated in Yanbian County of Panzhihua municipality, Sichuan Province, 18km to its upstream Ertan Dam and 15km to the confluence of the Yalong and Jinsha rivers. It is the last cascade project on the Yalong River. The total installed capacity of the project is 600MW (4×150MW). The complex consists of the water-retaining dam sections on both sides, a river-bed type powerhouse, and spillway structures. The maximum dam height is 66.63m, and the length of the dam crest is 468.7m."

Lianghekou
Situated in Yajiang County of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. The project sits where the Yalong merges respectively with the Qingda and Xianshui rivers, hence the name “lianghekou” (meaning “estuary of two rivers”). Because of its particular location with one dam blocking three rivers, and because of its large reservoir, this project is truly a controlling project in the middle and lower reaches of the Yalong. The reservoir, with a regulation storage of 6.33 billion cubic meters, has the capacity of multi-year regulation, and will therefore provide good compensation for all its downstream cascade power stations on the Yalong and even on the Jinsha and Yangtze. The total installed capacity of the project is 3,000MW. The project has favorable development conditions, and will play an important role in improvement of the power source structure of Sichuan power grid, optimization of power source configuration, and fulfillment of the strategy of West-to-East transmission of electric energy. It is a strategic fulfillment of the strategy of West-to-East transmission of electric energy. It is a strategic project for hydroelectric development of the Yalong River and even the whole West, and for coordinated socioeconomic development.

Projects in Investigation Stage

The Ertan website states "The middle reach river section, from Lianghekou to Kala, is 268km long. According to the approved planning, there are six projects in this section of the river, namely Lianghekou (3,000MW), Yagen (1,400MW), Lenggu (2,718MW), Mengdigou (1,840MW), Yangfanggou (1,500MW), and Kala (1,080MW), with a total capacity of approximately 11.54GW. Of these projects, Lianghekou has a large controlling reservoir.

Yagen Hydroelectric Project Yagen Hydroelectric Project is located in Yajiang County of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,400MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 6,368GWh. The expected static investment is about 9.64 billion yuan.

Lenggu Hydroelectric Project Lenggu Hydroelectric Project is located in Kangding and Yajiang counties of Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 2,718MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 12,570GWh. The expected static investment is about 22.25 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.

Mengdigou Hydroelectric Project Mengdigou Hydroelectric Project is located in Jiulong County of Ganzi Prefecture and Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,840MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 9,070GWh. The expected static investment is about 12.62 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.

Yangfanggou Hydroelectric Project Yangfanggou Hydroelectric Project is located in Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,500MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 7,05GWh. The expected static investment is about 10.77 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process.

Kala Hydroelectric Project Kala Hydroelectric Project is located in Muli County of Liangshan Prefecture, Sichuan Province. Its intended capacity is 1,080MW, which will yield a multi-year power generation of 5,24GWh. The expected static investment is about 9.0 billion yuan. Pre-feasibility study of the project is in process."

Projects in Planning Stage

The Ertan website states, "The upper reach of the river, from Jiayisi to Lianghekou, is 688km long, and development planning for this section is underway. Based on the investigation data obtained to date, 10 cascade projects with a total installed capacity of 3,250MW are intended to be built, which are Wenbosi (150MW), Renqingling (300MW),Reba (250MW), Ada (250MW), Geni (200MW), Tongha (200MW), Yingda (500MW), Xinlong (500MW), Gongke (400MW), and Gongbagou (500MW)."

"Medicinal Herbs"

2009-06-13T16:12:00.000-07:00

I was browsing through Tibetan language blogs, and I came across this brief post by sKar Mig (སྐར་མིག་གི་ཟིན་བྲིས་) expressing concern about the ecological implications of excessive digging of medicinal herbs on the Tibetan Plateau. Over the years, the number of Tibetan families depending on the harvest of herbs, mainlyYartsa Gunbu (དབྱར་རྩ་དགུན་འབུ་ / also known as caterpillar fungus or Cordyceps sinensis), has been growing throughout the TIbetan Plateau, mainly in the south and the east. Daniel Winkler's website has lots of useful information and pictures related to mushrooms of the Tibetan Plateau. I met Daniel Winkler last year at UBC, where he did a presentation on "The Mushrooming Fungi Market on the Tibetan Plateau". I asked him about the ecological sustainability of Yartsa Gumbu, and he did not seem too worried about it because data available to him show that so far both the harvest and growth of cordiceps around the plateau have been favorable.

While there seems to be no systematic study that looks at the question of the ecological sustainability of livelihood based on yartsa gunbu, informed people like Professor Emily Yeh are concerned about the long term social and economic risks associated with excessive reliance on the yartsa gunbu trade. Today a significant proportion of the Tibetan population depend on collection and sale of cordyceps. What if this livelihood becomes impossible for whatever reason (legal bans/ecological/etc/)?

Here are the Image of the original Tibetan blog post and its English translation:

This year again people are digging the ground everywhere on the Tibetan Plateau . Since numerous Tibetans, Chinese as well as Muslims (harvesters) have been digging out the earth to gain medical herbs for decades. If this continues, severe damage in the ecosystem of the region will occur. It is urgent that the Government and the informed people do something to avert such a situation.

2 Yunnan dams cancelled for environmental concerns

2009-06-13T12:16:00.001-07:00

Xinhua reported on June 11 that the government canceled several projects, including two hydro-electric dam projects in Northern Yunnan. The article, however, does not provide any information about these two dams. Which are these two dams and where are they?

The dams are called Ludila and Longkaikou projects, which are a part of eight dams planned on upper Yangtze (Drichu in Tibetan and Jinsha in Chinese). The eight dams are shown with blue pointers here . Ludila and Longkaikou are the two southernmost dams among the eight. These two dams are about 50 km south of Lijiang (Sartham) as shown in the Google Earth image below.

[end of post]

Do not click on this link:

Update: Mining protest over Ser Ngul Lo

2009-06-09T23:29:00.000-07:00

Earlier, I posted about a news report on a standoff between local Tibetans and police over a mining project. The protesters were demanding that a Chinese mining company stop its activities and plans on a sacred site, Ser Ngul Lo. Radio Free Asia has an update that the Tibetans have succeeded in stopping the mining project. There is hope.

[End of update].

I don't know how to remove this automated link:

Police shoot at Tibetan protesters: which dam project is it?

2009-06-07T01:53:00.000-07:00

Two weeks ago in Tawu region in Kandze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, there was a major protest against relocation of tens of thousands of Tibetans to make room for a dam/reservoir. The most shocking part of news was that officials from China's Public Security Bureau and People's Armed Police shot "indiscriminately" into the crowd and left six Tibetan women "seriously wounded." I blogged about the news sharing some photos and Google Earth images of the region.

Unfortunately, there is very little information about the protest. Both Tibetan language and English language sources use the same narrative about the incident with no specific information about the dam project. This leaves us wondering: how are so many Tibetans affected by a dam project? Which dam project is this? Here are my answers (please correct me if you think I am wrong):

It is the Lianghekou dam project (see copyright-free map below). The Lianghekou is a very large reservoir that will be built at the confluence of three rivers: Nyagchu (or Yalong), Qingda and Xianshui (does anyone know the Tibetan name for this river? Is it Dachu? Zhe Chu?). It is designed as one of the three regulatory reservoirs for 21 dams that are built/planned on the Nyagchu River by the Ertan Hydropower Development Company. According to information on company's website, the reservoir's capacity is 6.33 billion cubic meters, the second largest on the river. It is estimated that the reservoir will extend 90 km from the dam up the Nyagchu, 80 km up the Xianshui River approaching Tawu, and 28 km up the Qingda (see google earth image below).

[This map is copyright-free. Please use it!]

[Rough estimation of Lianghekou Reservoir extension according to altitude and distance. This is guesswork: do not use this image. Stay tuned. I will post more accurate information soon]

Who funds these dam projects?
Ertan Hydropower Development Company is jointly owned by China's State Development & Investment Corporation (48% of shares), the Sichuan Provincial Investment Group Co., Ltd. (48%), and China Huadian Corporation (4%). According to the General Manager Chen Yunhua, Ertan Hydroelectric Project was "the only project world-wide which received, as a single project, the biggest sum of loan (930 million USD equivalent) from the World Bank" (see p.5 of the link).

Is the project good for the local people, the economy or the environment?
Agriculture and pastoralism are the main livelihoods of the people in the region. The Lianghekou Reservoir will inundate most of the farms (agricultural fields) and villages within the area it will cover. The area is also famous for its forests and beautiful lakes. Below is a Google Earth image as an example of farmland and forest area near the Xianshui River that will be inundated by the reservoir. Marshall and Cooke has written about China's disturbing logging practices in the region, which probably continued until such practices were banned in the late 90's due to flooding downstream in the Yangtze River. I also found this essay about the region's wondrous beauty by a little girl from Kangding (Dartsedo) Middle School.

If the project is so bad for the local economy, the environment and the people, one has to ask why local authorities are so adamant about the project going ahead that they would shoot at protesters. What do you think?

Tibetan Poppy Blues

2009-05-27T16:13:00.000-07:00

Blue poppy..
Originally uploaded by jetbluestone

"It's worth dying after you've seen a blue poppy once."

Who doesn't like flowers? I have been wanting to blog about flowers. This is my first post on the topic. I would like to post more entries on flowers, so if any of you readers have information about any flower or would like to read about any specific flower, please let me know. That might provide some inspiration for me. I would like to make a collection of Tibetan names of different common flowers, for educational purposes. I think it is "cool" for Tibetans to be able to name flowers in their mother tongue.

So let's start with the Tibetan names. The coveted Blue Poppy is known to Tibetans as Utpal Ngonpo (ཨུཏྤལ་སྔོན་པོ༑), and also as Tser-Ngon Metog (ཚེར་སྔོན་མེ་ཏོག༑) as it is known in Bhutan, where it is the national flower. An Amdo Tibetan doctor once told me about this flower and I have been fascinated by it since. I also have a friend nicknamed Utpal and that added to the fascination with the beautiful name. So I got distracted this morning and started looking up information on the web about the flower.

And boy was I surprised to see all the information! There are tons of scientific papers and many books written about this "elusive" flower. There is a young Tibetan woman who is doing her PhD on Blue Poppy -- isn't that great!? Some of the books that have Blue Poppy in its title include Dreams of the Blue Poppy by Angela Lock, The Blue Poppy and the Mustard Seed: A Mother's Story of Loss and Hope by Kathleen Willis Morton, Blue Poppies by Jonathan Falla, and most notably, The Land of the Blue Poppy by Francis Kingdon Ward. I will write more about Francis Kingdon Ward later. First, this question: if this flower is studied and grown so much in gardens around the world, what is so "elusive" about it?

There is a new book and a website specifically devoted to this flower/book, Blue Heaven: Encounters with the Blue Poppy. The site describes the flower as "the most alluring due to its sheer beauty, its perfect poise and the astonishing clarity of the blue. It is the most sought after because it is rarely seen and widely thought to be impossible to grow, listed even by as experts as a formidable challenge."

Blue Poppies belong to the genus Meconopsis, which is endemic to only two regions of the world: Western Europe (known as the Welsh Poppy) and the Himalayas (known as the Himalayan or the Tibetan Poppy). Welsh Poppies are yellow or orange in color and the Himalayan Poppies are blue. There are three species of Himalayan Poppy: Meconopsis simplicifolia (discovered around 1848 in central Nepal by Dr. Wallich's collectors); Meconopsis Betonicifolia (discovered in 1886 in the Kham region by the eccentric British officer/spy Frederick Marshman Bailey); and Meconopsis Grandis (discovered around the 1880's in east Nepal). Here are some of the differences among these species: M. simplicifolia is the least known of the three species, grows up to 5 feet in height, with each stem holding a single flower, which is smaller than flowers of the other two species. M. Betenoifolia is the most common of the three (easiest to grow, more suitable to drier climates), grows 3 to 5 feet high and gets stems that can hold up to 5 flowers each. M. Grandis is the shortest, usually growing to a height of 2 feet, but its stems can handle up to 5 flowers. And the flowers are much bigger than in M. Betonicifolia.

Interestingly, Poppies International classifies M. Betonicifolia as "Himalayan Blue Poppy" and M. Grandis as "Tibetan Blue Poppy." I wonder about the basis/origin of these two common names. I wonder if the two Tibetan names Tsher-sNgon and Utpal sNgon-po can be separated for Himalayan Blue Poppy and Tibetan Blue Poppy. I don't think so.

So Blue Poppy is mostly found on south and eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau. Clearly this flower of high Asia requires cooler and moist soil to grow. If you are interested in growing "the most alluring" Utpal Ngonpo, The Garden of Eden blog has a few posts which might be a good introduction. This post suggests ways of growing from seed, and this has information about planting and growing Blue Poppy. Here is an interesting tip from Garden of Eden, the depth or shade of blue color of Tibetan poppies depends on soil pH level, just like hydrangeas. For those interested in more factual information, this is the best site I found.

Some myth busters: Blue Poppies do not produce the drug, opium. Sorry guys! Not all poppies are narcotic. And although Blue Poppies are used in Tibetan medicine, they have no scientifically proven medicinal value. Apparently there are all kinds of products and services marketed in the name of Blue Poppies hyped up around myths surrounding the flower, the Himalayas, and Tibet. This site has some hilarious stories about this topic.