Managing Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra): new article

The Third Pole website recently published an article I wrote: A new course for the Brahmaputra, pairing it with another piece by Prof. Ben Crow and Prof. Nirvikar Singh of University of California at Santa Cruz.

These two articles present elaborations on previous discussions on managing the Brahmaputra. Earlier, Crow and Singh wrote a compelling piece calling for a new multilateral regulatory authority for the river. The article was published by the East Asia Forum. In response, I wrote that a common development plan for the river should be based on human development principles. My response piece was published in the Asia Pacific Memo.

In brief, Crow and Singh argue that all the countries sharing the Brahmaputra river must come together under a common framework for development. They suggest that the Mekong River Commission and the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development offer a good starting point for discussion on possible institutional design of a new regulatory authority.

My piece highlights the fact that India and China, the two main riparian countries, are simply not interested in a common development plan for the river because of strategic or political reasons. Any discussion of joint management of the river ought to be mindful of the fact that the region is heavily militarized to maintain "social order" and border security. These factors are far more important to China and India than a common development for the river, which is also why existing models of joint management of transboundary rivers, including the Mekong River Commission, will not work. One possible and desirable way of breaking the deadlock, I suggest, is to put the needs of people and ecosystems before national strategic goals. You can read the full article here.

Thanks for your interest.

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Mining for gold after kicking out the pastoralists

The establishment of protected nature reserves is a time-tested method of asserting state authority over territories and peoples that were previously subject to weak control. Whether it is in the name of protecting tigers in India, forests in Central America or headwaters in Tibet, the creation of protected parks often come with coercive laws that limit the rights of people who live in and around the designated area.

Often state discourse on protecting parks portrays itself as benign environmental projects. However, on the dark side, protected parks and nature reserves frequently introduce mechanisms for social control and facilitate resource development and eco-tourism plans. It is little wonder that between 1980 and 2003, China has established 70 nature reserve parks in the Tibet Autonomous Region.


Figure 1) Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve, based on a 2004 Qinghai Forestry Bureau map.


One of the most controversial nature reserve areas of the Tibetan Plateau is the San Jiang Yuan Three Rivers Headwaters Nature Reserve (SNNR), formed in 2000 to protect the sources of the Mekong (Zachu), Yangtze (Drichu) and Yellow (Machu) rivers. At the heart of the controversy is the relocation and settlement of tens of thousands of pastoral nomads into camps reminiscent of those built for First Nations people in North America.

The socio-cultural disruption caused by these resettlement projects is so severe that Andrew Fischer from the Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, recently raised the point that the locations of recent spate of Tibetan self-immolations correspond, “with a few exceptions”, to areas of intensive resettlement. (To digress a little: In the same issue of the journal of Cultural Anthropology, Emily Yeh and Tsering Shakya observed how the Tibetans represent homo sacers, a group of people that the state is allowed, by its unquestioning citizens, to use brute force and violence upon.)

This blog post, however, is more specific to the SNNR. It builds on the questions raised in a previous blog post in which the first publicly available map of SNNR was released. These questions concern around the strategic motives of establishing nature reserves, the problematic use of scientific discourses, and on China’s commitment to environmental protection in relation to its development goals. Specifically, this post provides new information and analysis, which show that conservation is secondary to resource development projects in the SNNR area.

CHANGING THE BOUNDARIES OF SNNR
The map of SNNR first published on this blog was mainly based on a map of SNNR published by the Qinghai Forest Bureau in 2004. The SNNR is composed of 18 subareas. Each subarea is divided into three zones: a Core Zone, a Buffer Zone, and a multiple-use Experimental Zone. What follows in the rest of this post is evidence that shows that the boundaries of at least one of the SNNR subareas have been changed. Available information indicates that the changes have been made, amongst other things, to allow gold mining in the region.

The Yuegu Zonglie (Tibetan: Yos gi slang leb chu, ཡོས་གི་སླང་ལེབ་ཆུ་) is one of the Wetland Conservation Subareas of SNNR. Located to the east of Kyaring and Ngoring lakes. This subarea covers the uppermost headwaters of the Yellow River, and is critical to the SNNR project, which aims to prevent ongoing deterioration of the sources of the Yellow River.

If we overlap the 2004 map on Google Earth image of the region, we can see trenches (marked with pins), indicating mineral prospecting, within the Buffer and Experimental Zones of Yuegu Zonglie subarea of the 2004 map. These trenches are protected environmental zones from where people were to be resettled. The policy assumption is that nomad’s herds were responsible for the deterioration of the grasslands there.


Figure 2) A Google Earth Image showing the 2004 boundaries of the SNNR and the locations of streams (turquoise) and evidence of prospecting (yellow).

The trenches in the north of Yuegu Zonglie subarea belong to Inter-Citic, a Canadian mining company. The proposed Dachang Mine, with its processing plant and tailings, would be 12 kilometers upstream from the Core Zone, and there is evidence of prospecting as close as 4 kilometers to the Core Zone. We can also see on Google Earth that the grasslands has been severely damaged by Inter-Citic’s exploration work, far beyond anything nomads’ herds could ever do. Inter-Citic’s 2004 technical report acknowledges that its Dachang prospects “appear to be within an environmentally sensitive area around the headwaters of the Yellow River.”

However, in 2009, Inter-Citic published another technical report with a map of SNNR, showing their Dachang property completely outside of SNNR. The 2009 technical report states “Dachang is located proximate to but outside of the Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve”, and “The location of the Dachang concession is north of the outermost boundary of the Sanjiangyuan EPZ as described in the Sanjiangyuan Nature Reserve Environmental Protection and Development Plan approved by the State Council on January 26, 2005”. Between March 10, 2004, the date of the 2004 technical report, and January 26, 2005, the date of the approval for the SNNR plan, the SNNR boundaries that affected the Dachang gold project and nearby gold prospects were changed.


Figure 3) Inter-Citic’s map of the SNNR near the Dachang exploration site. The brown area at the top represents the Dachang property. The red dashed line represents the Core Zone, the pink dashed line represents the Buffer Zone, and the blue-black dashed line represents the Experimental Zone.

The new boundaries now exclude the sources of the Yellow River, where the gold mines are to be situated, from SNNR, and includes new rivers, which are not a part of watershed region that SNNR is supposed to protect. It appears the changes in boundaries are made in such a way that the total area under protection remains the same before and after the change.

The figure below shows the Inter-Citic SNNR map overlay showing the relation between Dachang, other prospecting projects, streams and rivers, and the 2004 and 2005 boundaries of the SNNR. The dashed lines are from the Inter-Citic map (2005), the solid lines are from the 2004 map. The Core Zone remained the same, but the Buffer Zone was reduced in the north and extended in the southwest, and the Experimental Zone was reduced in the north and extended in the west.



An examination of the extension of the Experimental Zone to the west of the Core Zone reveals that the river (drawn in turquoise in the figure above) to the west of the Core Zone flows north into the Tsaidam (Qaidam) basin. It does not flow into the Yellow River, the Yangtze or Mekong, the rivers protected by the SNNR. Extending the Experimental Zone in this direction has no bearing on protecting the headwaters of the Yellow River.

In contrast to the rivers that flow outside the protected watershed area, the rivers near Dachang and other gold prospects taken out of the SNNR flow directly into the Core Zone. The 2004 Buffer and Experimental Zones would have protected the Core Area from the inflow of industrial waste from the North, where Inter-Citic and the Qinghai No. 5 Geological and Mineral Exploration Institute plan to create an open pit mine and build an ore processing plant. These will require hundreds of workers and extensive supporting infrastructure, resulting in, needless to say, severe pollution of the Yellow River at its uppermost sources.

THE OTHER REALITY OF NATURE RESERVES IN TIBET
The documentation and analysis provided above demonstrates what happens in the name of protected nature reserves in Tibet in general and what is likely to happen more frequently in these protected areas in the future. For example, government reports announce discovery of major gold deposits in the area, and that there will be further changes to SNNR Experimental Zones to boost incomes in the region. The Songpan-Garze gold belt, within which Dachang is found, runs through another nature reserve in Qinghai Province, the Hoh Xil reserve, which was created to protect the Tibetan Antelope and other endangered wildlife. Recent reports also mention that geologists are currently carrying out exploration in the Hoh Xil reserve area, just to the west of the Dachang region.




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READ ON:

➢ To find out what you can do to help with the situation, visit Nomad Rights and Stop Mining Tibet websites.

➢ The most extensive discussion of the plight of the Tibetan nomads are on the Rukor blog.

➢ Readers may also contact the International Tibet Network and the Canada Tibet Committee for more information.

➢ In addition to the links provided above, you can read past Tibetan Plateau blog posts on topics concerning resettlement of Tibetan nomads here and here. Those interested in mining issues in Tibet must check out our database of mines in Tibet.

➢ All the data incorporated in this report is available online and for free. The Inter-Citic website has a lot of useful information. As well as numerous maps and reports it has a useful downloadable Google Earth .kml file. Once locating Dachang in Google Earth, closely checking the area, particularly to the southeast, will reveal numerous exploration trenches and placer mining sites, along with a few camps, etc. Additional data and technical reports can be found at SEDAR.


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REFERENCES

Cargill, D.G. (2004). DACHANG GOLD PROPERTY IN QUMALAI COUNTY, QINGHAI PROVINCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Source: Inter-Citic website.

Gorman, P.W. et al. (2009). A TECHNICAL REPORT ON AN UPDATED MINERAL RESOURCE ESTIMATE, AND A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE DACHANG GOLD PROJECT, QINGHAI PROVINCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, VOLUME 1 REPORT. Micron International Ltd. Source: Inter-Citic website.

Fischer, A. (2012). The Geopolitics of Politico-Religious Protest in Eastern Tibet. In Mcgranahan, C. and Litzinger, R. (Eds), Self-immolation as Protest in Tibet. Special issue, Cultural Anthropology. Accessed online on April 14, 2012.

Shakya, T. (2012). Transforming the Language of Protest. In Mcgranahan, C. and Litzinger, R. (Eds) Self-immolation as Protest in Tibet. Special issue, Cultural Anthropology. Accessed online on April 14, 2012.

Yeh, E. (2012). "Terrorism” and the Politics of Naming. In Mcgranahan, C. and Litzinger, R. (Eds) Self-immolation as Protest in Tibet. Special issue, Cultural Anthropology. Accessed online on April 14, 2012.


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"Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau"

The University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research is publishing a series of four memos on water security, policies, and practices related to the Tibetan Plateau. This special series of Asia Pacific Memos titled Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau is guest edited edited by Tashi Tsering and Prof. Jack Hayes of Norwich University. Contributors, other than the two guest editors, include Prof. Kelly Alley of Auburn University and Prof. Darrin Magee of Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Discourse on the implications of China's plans to divert Tibet's waters tends to portray a strategic issue of concern for downstream countries and/or the local Tibetans. The first memo on the series, which was published last week, China’s Plans to Divert Water on the Tibetan Plateau, makes a different argument: it is the Chinese people who will be adversely affected.

You can read this and the forthcoming memos on the series Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau here.

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Times of India: Response from Chinese official

The Times of India has published an article in response to the recent article by the Guardian about hydropower projects in Tibet. The Guardian's article is based on my last blog post. The Times of India has interviewed a Chinese official, Ma Jiali, with the goverment-run Institute of Contemporary International Relations to respond to a claim (which I also made) that China is likely to build a massive 38 gigawatt hydropower project at the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river.



It is a privilege to have one's work discussed in major newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India and the Hindustan Times! Thanks to the reporters who did the stories to bring much needed attention to this important matter.

I wanted to write directly to Times of India with a response to Mr. Ma Jiali's comments but surprisingly I couldn't find a "Contact" link/info on their website! So here is a blog post instead.

Mr. Jiali's response: "There are some people in China including hydrological engineers and retired military officers pushing the government to build a major water project on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. But the Chinese government has no such plans. [...] Some people including retired military officers have been advocating such a project for a long time. But I can tell you there is no such plans in the government."

Yes, we knew that. However, it must be clarified that there are two components to the "major water project" discussed here: one is hydro-power project and the other is a connected water diversion project to China. My claim is that the hydropower project is likely to be built but the water diversion project is not very likely. Read my last blog post for more details.

Mr. Jiali continues: "All that the government wants to do is establish small hydro-electricity projects in a way that there is no environmental damage. It will be bad for China as well because such a project can cause serious damage to environment in the sensitive mountain areas. Also, where is the market for generating so much electricity in Tibet?" And Times of India adds, "A major project would not be economically viable."

Now this is not true and is very misleading. The Tibetan Plateau blog has identified at least 16 hydro-electricity projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo and its tributaries that can generate more power than the largest hydropower project currently operating in Tibet Autonomous Region, the 100 MWZhikong project near Meldro Gungkar (མལ་གྲོ་གུང་དཀར་).

Certainly there is no domestic demand for so much energy, except to power government's extensive plans to develop the region and to extract gold, copper and other minerals. The greatest demand for energy actually comes from Chinese cities. A senior researcher like Mr. Jiali cannot be ignorant of China's "West to East Power Transmission Project." Here is the State Grid map again, which shows Metog (Motuo) hydropower project connected to ultra-high voltage power transmission lines of China.


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Damming Tibet's Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra and other South Asian rivers

The Tibetan Plateau blog presents a preliminary map of hydropower projects on the upper reaches of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra (ཡར་ཀླུངས་གཙང་པོ༑) River in Tibet. It is hoped that this map will contribute new information to recent international discussions and clarify some of the misunderstandings about Chinese water control projects on the river.


Click on images for full size view


The map also shows hydropower projects (HPP) on the upper reaches of several other international rivers in South Asia, namely the Indus (Senge Khabab), Sutlej (Langchen Khabab), Karnali (Mabcha Khaba), Arun (Bumchu) and Subansiri (Loro Chu/ལོ་རོ་ཆུ་, alternative name: Jya Chu/བྱ་ཆུ་) rivers. This is the final map in a series that shows hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau.** Previous maps include those on the upper reaches of the Salween, Mekong and Yangtze rivers; the Yellow River; the Nyagchu or Yalong River; as well as the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau. As always, corrections as well as additions to any of these maps are most appreciated.

The status of dams on the upper reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra shows that there are 10 dams completed, three under construction, seven under active consideration and eight more proposed. There is one hydropower project completed, each, on the Senge Khabab (Indus), Langchen Khabab (Sutlej) and Mabcha Khabab (Karnali) rivers. Five large dams are proposed on the Bumchu (Arun) River and another large dam proposed on Loro Chu (Subansiri).

While the larger hydropower projects and a few of the smaller projects have been indicated, there are many small hydropower projects in the region, disconnected from any large power grids. Many Tibetans have until recently lived without electricity, and many still do. There is a pattern by which dams and power transmission lines are built on the Tibetan Plateau -- smaller and middle sized dams are built first, to provide a basis for the construction of larger ones to follow. The current push to provide Tibetans with electrical power seems primarily motivated by the need for larger HPPs to power resource extraction, infrastructure development, and ultimately for supply to coastal Chinese cities where demands are the highest.

A note on Tibetan and Chinese names on the maps: The maps show Tibetan names of places, rivers, mountains and lakes. However, HPPs are indicated with their Chinese names unless they are not known. The Chinese names are used mainly because these are Chinese projects better known with their own project names and also because it is easier to locate (less confusing) for researchers.

YARLUNG TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is a major international river shared between Tibet/China, India and Bangladesh. On the Tibetan Plateau, the river flows west to east, across Southern Tibet, from its sources near the sacred Mt. Kailash (གངས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ༑) all the way to the Great Bend, where the river turns north to take a sharp U-turn to flow south into India and then to Bangladesh. Hydrologically, this river is connected to the larger Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin.

Until recently, the Yarlung Tsangpo was considered as an undammed river. China has officially announced plans to build five dams on the middle section of the river, including the Zangmu project currently under construction, which has caused much concern in India. The absence in these debates of the voices of Tibetans who live in the valley and are traditional users of its waters in these debates is deplorable, especially given their historical, religious and economic connections to the river.

The Yarlung Tsangpo River is intimately linked to the history of Tibetan civilization, indigenous religious beliefs and practices, and ultimately to the Tibetan identity. As the River Nile is to Egypt, Yarlung Tsangpo can be considered the cradle of Tibetan civilization. The Yarlung Valley is the home of the earliest Tibetan kings known as the Yarlung Dynasty. From its sources near the sacred Mt. Kailash, the Yarlung Tsangpo valley is dotted with pilgrimage sites and power-places such as meditation caves of past masters and beyul (་"hidden valleys") for spiritual practices. The river is also shown in paintings of the famous imagery of Tibet as a supine demoness (སྲིན་མོ་གན་རྐྱལ༑).



THE TSANGPO GORGE: THE SACRED LAND OF PEMA KOE
The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, also known as the Tsangpo Gorge, has attracted significant international attention as the "Last Secret Place on Earth" and for having the greatest hydropower potential of any site in the world. Through the 19th century, cartographers were not certain whether the Yarlung Tsangpo emerged from the other side of the Gorge as the Brahmaputra, the Irrawaddy, or some other river. Just downstream of Lungpe (ལུང་དཔེ་), the Yarlung Tsangpo enters one of the world's deepest and largest gorges, starting from a 4,900-meter cleft between two of the highest mountains in Eastern Himalaya: 7756 meters high Namchak Barwa and 7294 meters tall Gyala Pelri. As the river drops nearly 2500 meters in altitude through the length of the bend, the gorge is considered ideal for hydropower generation. Speculation about the construction of the world's most powerful dam and a major water diversion project at this site (discussed below) has been a major cause of concern in downstream countries.

The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo River is also known as one of the most bio-diverse regions in the world in terms of plant species. Although it is hard to imagine how botanists studied and added up the numbers of different plant species in this hard-to-travel corner, this official site boasts the existence of 3,700 plant species and emphasizes "the primordial nature of the plants" in the region. The ecological integrity of the Great Bend area is critical for the conservation of the Himalayas as one the world's richest but at greatest-risk areas for biodiversity (hotspot).

To the Tibetans, the Great Bend region is known as Pema Koe, the most sacred beyul blessed by Guru Rinpoche, Padmasambhava, the Indian Buddhist yogin credited with firmly establishing Buddhism in Tibet. Generations of visionary Tibetan Buddhist masters have revealed "hidden treasures" (གཏེར་མ་) and made journeys through the different layers of spiritual doors of beyul Pema Koe. Tibetans also consider the region as the home of the Goddess Dorje Phakmo (Vajra Yogini).

Similar to the Tibet map depicted as a demoness lying on her back, this local trekking group describes the sacred geography of the Pema Koe region as mapped onto the body of the goddess Dorje Phakmo herself: "Her head is the Kangri Kangpo [White Snow Mountain], her two breasts [are] Namche Barwa and Gyala Peri [mountains] respectively. The lower part of her body lies in Yangsang or the innermost Pemako which is the upper Siang region of Arunachal Pradesh. In the confluence of Siang (Tsangpo) and Yangsang is the sacred tri[a]ngle Kila Yangzom the vulva of Goddess Dorje Phagmo." These beliefs and pilgrimage practices have religious and cultural significance for millions of Buddhists around the world.


The Great Bend of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. Photo courtesy of Christoph Hormann of www.imagico.de

HYDROPOWER PLANS AT THE GREAT BEND OF THE YARLUNG TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA
The map shows two different proposals to harness the hydroelectric potential of the Great Bend: Motuo and Daduqia. The tunnels for Motuo project starts at Lungpe and ends at Metog (མེ་ཏོག༑). Daduqia starts near Pe (ཕད་) and ends at Digdong (སྡིག་གདོང་) near the Indian border. Of these two projects, China is likely to build the 38,000 MW hydropower station near Metog called Motuo in Chinese. This project is feasible from an economic and engineering perspective, although there will be major environmental and seismic issues involved due to the size of the reservoir if the Chinese government decides to build a large dam at the lower end of the tunnels. The status of the project shown as under active consideration is based on informed assessments and evidence. The project is likely to be built after related infrastructure of nearby dams to supply power for its construction and ultra-high voltage power transmission lines are completed. Although the July 2003 Xinhua reports of preliminary studies conducted in the region are not available online anymore, there are several evidences online including discussions of the project on official, academic and other professional websites. The following annotated map of the State Grid Corporation of China envisions the Motuo project connected to ultra high voltage lines of China.



Any tunnels associated with hydropower projects would be approximately 15 - 25 km long, of similar length to those currently being constructed for the Jinping II project on the Nyagchu. These proposed tunnels would likely be attached to large pipes on the downstream side to convey the water through a number of generators before reaching the lower leg of the bend. At this point it is likely that there would also be a large dam (Motuo) in the Grand Canyon of the bend. An alternative proposal, shown on the map as "Daduqia", avoids large dams altogether and takes full advantage of the 2400m drop in altitude, but it is near the border with India and would be highly exposed if there were another conflict. The details of the tunnel routes as presented on the map are inferred but are presented with high confidence based on the assumption that China's engineers have sought to optimize the return on the project.

The greatest risk to a large dam at the Great Bend comes from seismic activity. The Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau were formed by the collision of techtonic plates. As such, earthquakes are not uncommon in Tibet. Metog County, where Motuo reservoir is likely to be built, had a "moderate" earthquake in 2008 before the disastrous Sichuan Earthquake that killed over 90,000 people. The recent earthquake in Yushu and the cracking of Thrangu dam is a nerve-wracking example for people living downstream in India and Bangladesh, given the proximity of the Great Bend to India. Chinese government seismologist Fan Xiao has suggested that man-made activity such as the weight of a large artificial lake near fault-lines can trigger earthquakes.

WATER DIVERSION FROM THE TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER
Several ideas have been proposed to divert water from a giant dam at the Great Bend, through hundreds of kilometers of long canals, to the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, or even the Gobi Desert. Two individuals are key sources of these ideas: Guo Kai, a retired Chinese People's Liberation Army general, whose ideas were published in a book titled "How Tibet's Water Can Save China" by Li Ling (published December 2005), and the late Mr. Masaki Nakajima, "founder and special advisor to the Mitsubishi Research Institute of Japan," who first proposed a $500 billion project to the Global Environmental Fund in 1977 (See, Verghese in "Waters of Hope", 1990, pp. 188-189). These proposals are not shown on the map because there is no evidence of government interest and also because these ideas do not make practical or economic sense.

While Masaki Nakajima and Guo Kai were the two main sources of speculation, there are actually many different proposals for diverting water from the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. The only project that had "official" interest at one time envisioned diverting water from near Tsethang, in the mid-reaches of the river at about 3500m, and directing it through a tunnel into the Nyang valley, and from there eventually to the Yellow River. It would rely on both gravity and power generated by a HPP on the Great Bend to move the water to the intended location. This project has been officially dismissed. There are other "unofficial" proposals, including connecting different rivers of Tibet as if these were streets that can run in all directions.

Close study of the terrain around the Great Bend area and possible canal routes on Google Earth show that the laws of physics will not allow water diversion from the Great Bend as suggested. For example, a reservoir like Motuo (850 m altitude) which is ideal for taking advantage of the drop in the Great Bend altitude would have lost 2000 meters of height that must be transferred over corrugated mountain ranges--through canals that are hundreds of kilometers long. Some may stubbornly argue that it is possible to divert the water with the combined power supplied by the dams at Motuo and Yiwong-Parlung rivers and with "peaceful nuclear explosions" to bore tunnels in the mountains. Even if these were possible, the immense costs do not make sense given the fact that water can be diverted from other rivers more easily and the key attraction for power generation at the Great Bend is economic development, not pumping water. Another major issue is the climate of the Tibetan Plateau, where it is below freezing point during winters and during early spring when water demand is highest in North China.

The Mid-Reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo
This is where major development is currently taking place. The 510MW Zangmu (རྫམ་ or Zam) is under construction and three other projects, Lengda (གླིང་མདའ་ or Lingda), Zhongda (སྒྲོམ་མདའ་ or Zhomda), and Langzhen have begun site preparation. Construction could begin within a few years. Development of Jiacha (རྒྱ་ཚ་ or Gyatsa) is also expected soon. It appears Jiexu will be developed last. As this is the upstream dam in this cascade of six projects, and the last to be developed, this may have a large reservoir to assure a constant flow for the downstream dams.

Here is an annotated high-resolution image of Zangmu project under progress from GeoEye that is annotated by one of Tibetan Plateau blog's consultants. Tibetan Plateau blog is responsible for the annotation.



The Yiwong and Parlung Rivers
Site planning is currently under way on these tributaries of the Yarlung Tsangpo. Completion of projects on these rivers is likely required for development of the Motuo HPP. The sites indicated are based on a map on Hydrochina's website. As the characters of the names of most of the projects shown were unintelligibly small and vague on the Hydrochina map they have been assigned the Tibetan names of nearby towns, which are approximate sites of future developments.




**The Tibetan Plateau blog is grateful to many individuals and organizations for their support and guidance in making this series of maps possible for publication. Organizations include International Rivers, Probe International and the University of British Columbia. People include friends and experts living/working in Tibet and China, Kevin Li, Bruce Lee, James Trevor, Stone Routes, Dorothy Berger and most of all to M, who did most of the laborious work behind these maps. Thank you all!

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China's railroad plans

Prof. Jan T. Andersson has translated a part of an interview with Wang Mengshu, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and a senior consultant on China's domestic high-speed railways, in the German language news magazine Der Spiegel, issue no. 12, 2010. The translation is posted here with Prof. Andersson's permission.


Image: EU Infrastructure.



China
"Very proud"
Der Spiegel, Nr. 12, 2010
Interview with Wang Mengshu

Spiegel: China intends to extend its railroad system to Singapore and Europe. When do you expect the first high-speed trains to roll?
Wang: The Southeast-Asia route should be the first one to be ready, by 2030. We still need to negotiate the gauge, since we want to use the Chinese system. Some Southeast Asian countries have already signalled their consent.

Spiegel: What does China expect from this project?
Wang: We will obtain commodities that the huge Chinese population needs. Burma, for instance, has no money but plenty of resources. We will help such underdeveloped countries to build railroads and to exploit their resources. Many countries have oil, gas and water resources.

Spiegel: Is railroad technology China's new export hit?
Wang: Seventeen countries have asked us to help them build high-speed lines. I am very proud of our technology.

Spiegel: You invest in railroads also in China. Are you going to pay more attention to the western parts of China?
Wang: In 2009 China invested more than 60 billion euros in the train infrastructure. Our network grows by more than 2000 km every year. We expect to have 120 000 km of railroad tracks in China in 2015. If we expand the network into China's Western regions and solve the water problem, then in the future 200 or 300 million people will be able to move there. The West will change China's economy.

Spiegel: You are even thinking of a tunnel to Taiwan. The shortest distance would be some 150 km. Which problem is larger: the technical or the political?
Wang: Technically only the ventilation is a problem. The demand for a tunnel is large, and politics must serve the people. Beijing doesn't see any problems. If there is a tunnel between Great Britain and France, why not between the mainland and Taiwan?

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India poorly informed about Chinese dam project

In recent days, Indian media has been running a story that China has "admitted" that it is building a dam (Zangmu) project on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River). It is strange that this "news" is presented as some some shocking new information. There is a lot of misinformation being spread around in the media.

China acknowledging that it is building the Zangmu hydropower project should not be "news" because the project has long been openly advertised on official Chinese websites. There should not be any question of admission about things that are open public knowledge. Tibetan Plateau blog reported on the construction of Zangmu dam more than a year ago, in English!

New reports say that India came to know about construction of Zangmu project after its "intelligence agencies" received satellite images of construction work going on for the Zangmu project last fall. This was widely (mis)reported in Indian media late October 2009. I suppose the Indian External Affairs Minister, the person who brought the "news" from his Chinese counterpart, raised Indian concerns about the Zangmu project based on these satellite images. Indian reliance on vague satellite images as some kind of evidence is embarrassing because chinese official websites have been carrying clear photos of Zangmu construction work (see below) and models of completed project for a long time.





Then there is the issue of serious misinformation. In my previous post on misinformation about Zangmu project, I identified confusions about Zangmu project's location and use as a water diversion project. The same confusion continues, here and here are a couple of examples.

Indian media and online writers cannot be blamed too harshly for treating this as "news" and being confused about location of the project, even Hong Kong based South China Morning Post is in the same boat. Zangmu project is located in the middle reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo on the Tibetan Plateau in dZam (རྫམ་) township of Lhokha (Shannan) Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region, about 140 km southeast from Lhasa, between Zangs-Ri (Sangri) and rGya-Tsha (Jiacha) counties.

Here is a high resolution image of Zangmu project under progress from GeoEye that is annotated by one of Tibetan Plateau blog's consultants. Tibetan Plateau blog is responsible for the annotation.


Tibetan Plateau blog will soon be posting a map of planned hydropower projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo river. There are more than the five projects "admitted" by China that are planned on the river. Stay tuned.

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Using Tibetan nomads for border claims

A couple of days ago, Press Trust of India reported about China pushing Tibetan nomads towards Ladakh region of India to strengthen territorial claims over disputed border areas. PTI had quoted an Indian Bhartiya Janata Party delegation visiting Ladakh about the phenomenon. Since the PTI report is a very brief, I quote here in full:

China pushing nomads into Ladakh region: BJP
STAFF WRITER 19:19 HRS IST

Leh, Apr 4 (PTI) Accusing China of pushing its nomads and grazers into Ladakh, a BJP delegation which visited the region today demanded that Government open the area to tourism to defeat the "Chinese design of grabbing the land by inches".

"We have come here to ascertain reports about the Chinese incursion and what we have found is shocking...," said party spokesperson Rajeev Pratap Rudy, who was part of the five-member delegation that visited Ladakh and bordering areas of Nyoma and Demchok, 300 kilometres from southeast of this Himalayan town.

This is the first national-level political delegation to visit the far flung areas of the Himalayan town. The team included former Uttrakhand Chief Minister Bhagat Singh Koshiyari and former J and K unit chief Nirmal Singh.

I asked around for more information on this. My Ladakhi friend, Tashi Morup, who is also a local journalist, told me that this phenomenon has been happening for a long time.

Here are some pictures of Tashi Morup and I visiting this part of Indo-Tibetan border.

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Hydropower Projects on Drichu (Yangtze), Zachu (Mekong) and Gyalmo Ngulchu (Salween)

Tibetans proudly sing of their land as "the Land of Snows, the source of great rivers." Indeed, Tibet is widely regarded as “Asia’s Water Tower.” This blog post highlights hydropower projects (HPPs) on three of the major rivers that flow from Tibet: the Yangtze, the Salween and the Mekong. The Yangtze River originates in Tibet as “Drichu” and flows into China, supporting one of the most densely populated watersheds in the world. The Salween River, known as “Gyalmo Ngulchu” in Tibet, supports one of the most biodiverse watersheds of South Asia, mainly in Yunnan Province, Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. And the Mekong River, known as Zachu in Tibet, flows from Tibet through six countries: China, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. What goes on in the sources of these great rivers should concern not only Tibetans but also all citizens of the world.

The map below highlights 81 HPPs on the upper reaches of Yangtze, Mekong and Salween rivers. There are many more, especially smaller projects on the many tributaries of these rivers, which are not included in the map. We have only indicated HPPs that are relatively large, on the main stream and confirmed by two or more reliable sources. Unlike HPPs on the Yellow River and in the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau, most of the HPPs on these three rivers have not reached power generation stage yet. The completed projects are mostly smaller HPPs. The larger projects are either under construction (Gangtuo, Boluo, and Lawa) or in the construction ‘pipeline’ as “Under Active Consideration” or “Proposed.” It makes sense to build smaller ones first, which can help supply energy and infrastructure for construction of bigger projects.

Click on image below for enlarged view and download


Why is China building so many dams on these rivers? To answer this question, it is important to ask who makes the decision and benefits, and what are the larger (political, economic and historical) contexts under which these water development projects are being implemented. An important slice of this puzzle concerns China's Water Industrial Complex. Other contextual answers include China’s project of promoting rapid economic development in Tibet under the Go West! or Western Development Campaign. Energy needed for major mining, infra-structure construction and urban development projects under the Western Development Campaign will be supplied by these HPPs. Many of these HPPs will eventually be connected to larger (“Ultra-high voltage”) power transmission lines to supply energy to prosperous Chinese cities in the East.

China also plans to divert Tibet’s rivers. The Western Route of the South to North Water Transfer Project , which is slated to begin construction in 2010, is one such project. A detailed report published by the Ministry of Water Resources in 1995 reveals plans to build at least three very large dams on the upper reaches of Yangtze River. We have indicated one of these three dams, the 302 meter tall Tongjia dam, with a separate color for three reasons: details may have changed since 1995; the dam is not a HPP; and to keep the project under public scrutiny.

Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Drichu (Upper Yangtze)


Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Zachu (Upper Mekong)


Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Gyalmo Ngulchu (Upper Salween)


Since these HPPs are Chinese projects, we have used their Chinese names. Although a lot of work has gone into this map, including feedback from various experts, it is not final. The data shown in the map should be seen as our current knowledge, arrived at after research and consulting others, what the current situation is. We will be improving on this, so we seek your feedback, to produce a better and more formal report publication in the future. Meanwhile, those interested in using this map are free to do so.

Sources and Methods
The information shared in this series of maps on hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau has been obtained from a variety of sources. These include: Probe International, International Rivers, HYDROCHINA, news reports from both inside and outside of China, Chinese government and state owned corporation websites, Google Earth, JPRS China technical reports, and a number of scholars and experts who reviewed our maps.

The map is a collaborative project, as have been the others in this series. While I take full responsibility for inaccuracies, the real credit of this amazing work goes to my research assistant and map maker, who must remain anonymous for good reasons. I would also like to thank the many experts who have made valuable contributions to these maps. Your contributions have resulted in a much better map than would have been produced otherwise.

Hydropower Project: Definition and Categories
A Hydropower Project consists of an electrical hydropower station and associated dams, tunnels, ancillary buildings, roads, and modifications to the surrounding environment.

For the purposes of this map, a hydropower project's status has four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. These categories are fuzzy in the sense there is some overlap and each category can cover a wide range of examples.

The term 'Built/Operational' includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, those complete and operational, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. The first report of a generator becoming operational is sufficient for a project to be assigned this status.

'Under Construction' indicates that work is proceeding on the ground though not necessarily that the river has been blocked or diverted. Ideally we would be able to have a 'Site Preparation' Status which would indicate that preparatory work is occurring at the site, but this is not possible without more detailed information than is typically available to us.

'Under Active Consideration' indicates that according to current data the project is being considered for construction, which may include exploratory work at the site, but is mainly intended to include design and other work not necessarily involving modifications of the site.

'Proposed' includes those HPPs which have been discussed but for which we have no information suggesting that they are currently under consideration.

'On Hold' indicates either that a project is being reviewed by Beijing, or that it has been reviewed and the government has decided not to allow it to go ahead.

Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources.

The positions of the HPPs shown on the map are approximate. A professional map should be used for accurate geographic information.

This map is the third in the series of maps of HPPs on the Tibetan Plateau. See here and in the here for HPPs on northern and eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau and stay tuned for HPPs on the Brahmaputra River.
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China's Water Industrial Complex

Why is China building so many large dams?

Peoples Republic of China has built 22,000+ large dams since it came into existence in 1949. If we do the math, we can say that PRC has been building more than one large dam per day. And if we probe into the politics of dam building in China, i.e., who makes decisions, how decisions are made, what kinds of people, institutions and organizations are benefited, etc., there are striking structural similarities between the phenomenon of Military Industrial Complex ("described as an all-too friendly relationship that may develop between defense contractors and government forces, where both sides receive what they are perceivably looking for: a successful military engagement for warplanners and financial profit for those manning the corporate boardrooms") and what goes on in China's water construction industry. Check out the following chart:

China's Water Industrial Complex compared with America's Military Industrial Complex

	America’s Military Industrial Complex	China’s Water Industrial Complex
Ideology	· Realism · Anarchic international system · American Primacy · “City on the Hill,” “uphold freedom and democracy”	· Marxist-Leninist-materialism · “Man over nature” · Powerful China · Greatness of socialism, “Socialist re-construction”
Elite involvement	· Corporate and other private sector executives · Defense services, Pentagon leaders · Family business involvement · "Revolving door system" of professional and political roles	· Engineers, “Red Specialists,” “Tsinghua Clique” · Party leaders · Family business involvement · “Revolving door system” of professional and political roles
Decision making	· Crisis management small groups · Closed door system	· Crisis management small groups · Closed door system
Mode of public support	· Propaganda through mainly corporate owned media · “Communist threat,” “rogue states,” “terrorist” groups · Rally behind the flag, “national interest,” patriotism, etc.	· Propaganda through govt. owned and controlled media · Natural threats like flood and draught, “Thirsty North” · Rally behind the flag, “national interest,” patriotism, etc.
Size of Complex	· World’s largest in terms of monetary value of production · Over $ 305 billion in military expense	· World’s largest in terms of project sizes and numbers · 22,000 of the world's 45,000 large dams
Interests served	· Economic interest of military-industrial firms · Departmental bureaucratic interest in expansion of size and power	· Economic interest of water-industrial firms · Dep'tal bureaucratic interest in expansion of size and power
Influence on gov't policy	· Perpetuation of military related production · Development of the most advanced and deadly weapons	· Perpetuation of water related construction · Construction of the largest water control projects

Source: Tsering, T. (2003). China’s Water Politics: In Whose Interest? Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science at the Portland State University.

By China's Water Industrial Complex, I mean the professional and ideological alliance of technocratic Communist Party elites with water-related bureaucracies and businesses that influence government policy. In this context, the WIC has three principle features: dominance of hardline technocratic elites in decision-making; their professional, ideological and economic alliance with the economic and bureaucratic interests of water industry and bureaucracies (water sector entities); and this alliance’s major influence on government policy to further water-related construction. Within this framework, it appears that decisions regarding major water control projects are being made to serve the bureaucratic and commercial interests of China’s WIC, and not necessarily its people.

The immediate purpose of introducing the concept of a Chinese water-industrial complex is to highlight the power alliances (formal and informal, as well as professional and ideological) and the structure of interests that shape water policy in China. My underlying objective is to contribute to social justice debates in Chinese water policy.

Since 1950, the PRC has achieved an astounding 12% annual growth rate in its hydropower production. China's water construction industry is continues to grow as significant sources of China’s hydropower, especially on the Tibetan Plateau, are still untapped and the demand for energy is high in the fastest-growing electric power industry in the world.

By law, the Ministry of Water Resources is the main agency responsible for water management in China. Analysts have long identified the Ministry’s bureaucratic self-interest (and corruption prospects) in large-scale projects. In reality, the management of China’s water industry is split among three ministries—the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry—and municipal and provincial government water-resource bureaus. The responsibilities of these three ministries match their names: the Ministry of Water Resources plans for reservoirs and river projects, and allocates water to industry and cities; the Ministry of Construction administers large public works projects; and the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry is charged with partial oversight of the water engineering equipment sector. The close functional relationship between these ministries and other institutions provides them with a similar interest—promotion and expansion of their activities.

Policy decisions regarding major projects remain highly autarkic, under the control of a small number of Party elites, whose professional and ideological backgrounds are rooted in near-religious faith in big engineering approaches to water development. In fact, since the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party, leadership has been dominated by individuals with technical engineering backgrounds. Although the generation of influential hongse zhuanjia (“red specialists,” or party leaders trained in the former Soviet Union as engineers) like Li Peng are retiring, the nature of internal Party politics ensures assumption of leadership by cadres with similar ideological and professional backgrounds.

In Novemeber 2002, there was a major power shift in Chinese leadership, from the “third generation leaders” to the “fourth generation leaders.” The “fourth generation leaders” who assumed power, although considered fresh and least dogmatic in their outlook, share with their predecessors a professional background and ideological approach to development. Jiang Zemin and his team of six other outgoing members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making authority in China, were engineers by training. And interestingly enough, all the nine new members of the Committee headed by its new leader Hu Jintao are engineers by training. Technocratic dominance is likely to continue in the next Chinese government. Engineers also dominate China’s provincial leadership, which is considered “the training ground for national leadership.” As of September, 2001, 62.9% of Chinese provincial leaders had engineering degrees, followed by economics, physics and Chinese with 6.5, 4.8 and 4.8%, respectively.

An important Party policy regarding the tenure of its top leaders is a professional revolving door system by which top provincial leaders are frequently reshuffled to avoid a situation of cadres accumulating excessive influence and power in a region. Owing to the common engineering background shared by most Chinese leaders, the practice of this professional revolving door system results in certain technocratic bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Machine Building, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Energy becoming influential bases for these leaders to climb the Party’s bureaucratic ladder. Arguably this practice feeds the influence of China’s Water Industrial Complex: the technocratic bureaucracies become politically more powerful with the association of the party elites. The flip side of this is something students of bureaucratic politics would observe; the party leaders would have a professional bureaucratic bias toward these government agencies.

Party leaders are both decision makers and issue framers. The dominance of technocrats in China’s leadership, their bureaucratic bias toward construction-related bureaucracies, and the fact that important decisions are made behind closed doors combine to bias government water policies in favor of structural solutions. These reasons provide an explanation for the fact that People's Republic of China is building more than one large dam per day since its inception in 1949 and continues to expand its dam building industry around the world.

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