Managing Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra): new article

The Third Pole website recently published an article I wrote: A new course for the Brahmaputra, pairing it with another piece by Prof. Ben Crow and Prof. Nirvikar Singh of University of California at Santa Cruz.

These two articles present elaborations on previous discussions on managing the Brahmaputra. Earlier, Crow and Singh wrote a compelling piece calling for a new multilateral regulatory authority for the river. The article was published by the East Asia Forum. In response, I wrote that a common development plan for the river should be based on human development principles. My response piece was published in the Asia Pacific Memo.

In brief, Crow and Singh argue that all the countries sharing the Brahmaputra river must come together under a common framework for development. They suggest that the Mekong River Commission and the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development offer a good starting point for discussion on possible institutional design of a new regulatory authority.

My piece highlights the fact that India and China, the two main riparian countries, are simply not interested in a common development plan for the river because of strategic or political reasons. Any discussion of joint management of the river ought to be mindful of the fact that the region is heavily militarized to maintain "social order" and border security. These factors are far more important to China and India than a common development for the river, which is also why existing models of joint management of transboundary rivers, including the Mekong River Commission, will not work. One possible and desirable way of breaking the deadlock, I suggest, is to put the needs of people and ecosystems before national strategic goals. You can read the full article here.

Thanks for your interest.

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"Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau"

The University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research is publishing a series of four memos on water security, policies, and practices related to the Tibetan Plateau. This special series of Asia Pacific Memos titled Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau is guest edited edited by Tashi Tsering and Prof. Jack Hayes of Norwich University. Contributors, other than the two guest editors, include Prof. Kelly Alley of Auburn University and Prof. Darrin Magee of Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Discourse on the implications of China's plans to divert Tibet's waters tends to portray a strategic issue of concern for downstream countries and/or the local Tibetans. The first memo on the series, which was published last week, China’s Plans to Divert Water on the Tibetan Plateau, makes a different argument: it is the Chinese people who will be adversely affected.

You can read this and the forthcoming memos on the series Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau here.

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Times of India: Response from Chinese official

The Times of India has published an article in response to the recent article by the Guardian about hydropower projects in Tibet. The Guardian's article is based on my last blog post. The Times of India has interviewed a Chinese official, Ma Jiali, with the goverment-run Institute of Contemporary International Relations to respond to a claim (which I also made) that China is likely to build a massive 38 gigawatt hydropower project at the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river.



It is a privilege to have one's work discussed in major newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India and the Hindustan Times! Thanks to the reporters who did the stories to bring much needed attention to this important matter.

I wanted to write directly to Times of India with a response to Mr. Ma Jiali's comments but surprisingly I couldn't find a "Contact" link/info on their website! So here is a blog post instead.

Mr. Jiali's response: "There are some people in China including hydrological engineers and retired military officers pushing the government to build a major water project on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. But the Chinese government has no such plans. [...] Some people including retired military officers have been advocating such a project for a long time. But I can tell you there is no such plans in the government."

Yes, we knew that. However, it must be clarified that there are two components to the "major water project" discussed here: one is hydro-power project and the other is a connected water diversion project to China. My claim is that the hydropower project is likely to be built but the water diversion project is not very likely. Read my last blog post for more details.

Mr. Jiali continues: "All that the government wants to do is establish small hydro-electricity projects in a way that there is no environmental damage. It will be bad for China as well because such a project can cause serious damage to environment in the sensitive mountain areas. Also, where is the market for generating so much electricity in Tibet?" And Times of India adds, "A major project would not be economically viable."

Now this is not true and is very misleading. The Tibetan Plateau blog has identified at least 16 hydro-electricity projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo and its tributaries that can generate more power than the largest hydropower project currently operating in Tibet Autonomous Region, the 100 MWZhikong project near Meldro Gungkar (མལ་གྲོ་གུང་དཀར་).

Certainly there is no domestic demand for so much energy, except to power government's extensive plans to develop the region and to extract gold, copper and other minerals. The greatest demand for energy actually comes from Chinese cities. A senior researcher like Mr. Jiali cannot be ignorant of China's "West to East Power Transmission Project." Here is the State Grid map again, which shows Metog (Motuo) hydropower project connected to ultra-high voltage power transmission lines of China.


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Damming Tibet's Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra and other South Asian rivers

The Tibetan Plateau blog presents a preliminary map of hydropower projects on the upper reaches of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra (ཡར་ཀླུངས་གཙང་པོ༑) River in Tibet. It is hoped that this map will contribute new information to recent international discussions and clarify some of the misunderstandings about Chinese water control projects on the river.


Click on images for full size view


The map also shows hydropower projects (HPP) on the upper reaches of several other international rivers in South Asia, namely the Indus (Senge Khabab), Sutlej (Langchen Khabab), Karnali (Mabcha Khaba), Arun (Bumchu) and Subansiri (Loro Chu/ལོ་རོ་ཆུ་, alternative name: Jya Chu/བྱ་ཆུ་) rivers. This is the final map in a series that shows hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau.** Previous maps include those on the upper reaches of the Salween, Mekong and Yangtze rivers; the Yellow River; the Nyagchu or Yalong River; as well as the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau. As always, corrections as well as additions to any of these maps are most appreciated.

The status of dams on the upper reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra shows that there are 10 dams completed, three under construction, seven under active consideration and eight more proposed. There is one hydropower project completed, each, on the Senge Khabab (Indus), Langchen Khabab (Sutlej) and Mabcha Khabab (Karnali) rivers. Five large dams are proposed on the Bumchu (Arun) River and another large dam proposed on Loro Chu (Subansiri).

While the larger hydropower projects and a few of the smaller projects have been indicated, there are many small hydropower projects in the region, disconnected from any large power grids. Many Tibetans have until recently lived without electricity, and many still do. There is a pattern by which dams and power transmission lines are built on the Tibetan Plateau -- smaller and middle sized dams are built first, to provide a basis for the construction of larger ones to follow. The current push to provide Tibetans with electrical power seems primarily motivated by the need for larger HPPs to power resource extraction, infrastructure development, and ultimately for supply to coastal Chinese cities where demands are the highest.

A note on Tibetan and Chinese names on the maps: The maps show Tibetan names of places, rivers, mountains and lakes. However, HPPs are indicated with their Chinese names unless they are not known. The Chinese names are used mainly because these are Chinese projects better known with their own project names and also because it is easier to locate (less confusing) for researchers.

YARLUNG TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA
The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra is a major international river shared between Tibet/China, India and Bangladesh. On the Tibetan Plateau, the river flows west to east, across Southern Tibet, from its sources near the sacred Mt. Kailash (གངས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ༑) all the way to the Great Bend, where the river turns north to take a sharp U-turn to flow south into India and then to Bangladesh. Hydrologically, this river is connected to the larger Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin.

Until recently, the Yarlung Tsangpo was considered as an undammed river. China has officially announced plans to build five dams on the middle section of the river, including the Zangmu project currently under construction, which has caused much concern in India. The absence in these debates of the voices of Tibetans who live in the valley and are traditional users of its waters in these debates is deplorable, especially given their historical, religious and economic connections to the river.

The Yarlung Tsangpo River is intimately linked to the history of Tibetan civilization, indigenous religious beliefs and practices, and ultimately to the Tibetan identity. As the River Nile is to Egypt, Yarlung Tsangpo can be considered the cradle of Tibetan civilization. The Yarlung Valley is the home of the earliest Tibetan kings known as the Yarlung Dynasty. From its sources near the sacred Mt. Kailash, the Yarlung Tsangpo valley is dotted with pilgrimage sites and power-places such as meditation caves of past masters and beyul (་"hidden valleys") for spiritual practices. The river is also shown in paintings of the famous imagery of Tibet as a supine demoness (སྲིན་མོ་གན་རྐྱལ༑).



THE TSANGPO GORGE: THE SACRED LAND OF PEMA KOE
The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, also known as the Tsangpo Gorge, has attracted significant international attention as the "Last Secret Place on Earth" and for having the greatest hydropower potential of any site in the world. Through the 19th century, cartographers were not certain whether the Yarlung Tsangpo emerged from the other side of the Gorge as the Brahmaputra, the Irrawaddy, or some other river. Just downstream of Lungpe (ལུང་དཔེ་), the Yarlung Tsangpo enters one of the world's deepest and largest gorges, starting from a 4,900-meter cleft between two of the highest mountains in Eastern Himalaya: 7756 meters high Namchak Barwa and 7294 meters tall Gyala Pelri. As the river drops nearly 2500 meters in altitude through the length of the bend, the gorge is considered ideal for hydropower generation. Speculation about the construction of the world's most powerful dam and a major water diversion project at this site (discussed below) has been a major cause of concern in downstream countries.

The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo River is also known as one of the most bio-diverse regions in the world in terms of plant species. Although it is hard to imagine how botanists studied and added up the numbers of different plant species in this hard-to-travel corner, this official site boasts the existence of 3,700 plant species and emphasizes "the primordial nature of the plants" in the region. The ecological integrity of the Great Bend area is critical for the conservation of the Himalayas as one the world's richest but at greatest-risk areas for biodiversity (hotspot).

To the Tibetans, the Great Bend region is known as Pema Koe, the most sacred beyul blessed by Guru Rinpoche, Padmasambhava, the Indian Buddhist yogin credited with firmly establishing Buddhism in Tibet. Generations of visionary Tibetan Buddhist masters have revealed "hidden treasures" (གཏེར་མ་) and made journeys through the different layers of spiritual doors of beyul Pema Koe. Tibetans also consider the region as the home of the Goddess Dorje Phakmo (Vajra Yogini).

Similar to the Tibet map depicted as a demoness lying on her back, this local trekking group describes the sacred geography of the Pema Koe region as mapped onto the body of the goddess Dorje Phakmo herself: "Her head is the Kangri Kangpo [White Snow Mountain], her two breasts [are] Namche Barwa and Gyala Peri [mountains] respectively. The lower part of her body lies in Yangsang or the innermost Pemako which is the upper Siang region of Arunachal Pradesh. In the confluence of Siang (Tsangpo) and Yangsang is the sacred tri[a]ngle Kila Yangzom the vulva of Goddess Dorje Phagmo." These beliefs and pilgrimage practices have religious and cultural significance for millions of Buddhists around the world.


The Great Bend of the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. Photo courtesy of Christoph Hormann of www.imagico.de

HYDROPOWER PLANS AT THE GREAT BEND OF THE YARLUNG TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA
The map shows two different proposals to harness the hydroelectric potential of the Great Bend: Motuo and Daduqia. The tunnels for Motuo project starts at Lungpe and ends at Metog (མེ་ཏོག༑). Daduqia starts near Pe (ཕད་) and ends at Digdong (སྡིག་གདོང་) near the Indian border. Of these two projects, China is likely to build the 38,000 MW hydropower station near Metog called Motuo in Chinese. This project is feasible from an economic and engineering perspective, although there will be major environmental and seismic issues involved due to the size of the reservoir if the Chinese government decides to build a large dam at the lower end of the tunnels. The status of the project shown as under active consideration is based on informed assessments and evidence. The project is likely to be built after related infrastructure of nearby dams to supply power for its construction and ultra-high voltage power transmission lines are completed. Although the July 2003 Xinhua reports of preliminary studies conducted in the region are not available online anymore, there are several evidences online including discussions of the project on official, academic and other professional websites. The following annotated map of the State Grid Corporation of China envisions the Motuo project connected to ultra high voltage lines of China.



Any tunnels associated with hydropower projects would be approximately 15 - 25 km long, of similar length to those currently being constructed for the Jinping II project on the Nyagchu. These proposed tunnels would likely be attached to large pipes on the downstream side to convey the water through a number of generators before reaching the lower leg of the bend. At this point it is likely that there would also be a large dam (Motuo) in the Grand Canyon of the bend. An alternative proposal, shown on the map as "Daduqia", avoids large dams altogether and takes full advantage of the 2400m drop in altitude, but it is near the border with India and would be highly exposed if there were another conflict. The details of the tunnel routes as presented on the map are inferred but are presented with high confidence based on the assumption that China's engineers have sought to optimize the return on the project.

The greatest risk to a large dam at the Great Bend comes from seismic activity. The Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau were formed by the collision of techtonic plates. As such, earthquakes are not uncommon in Tibet. Metog County, where Motuo reservoir is likely to be built, had a "moderate" earthquake in 2008 before the disastrous Sichuan Earthquake that killed over 90,000 people. The recent earthquake in Yushu and the cracking of Thrangu dam is a nerve-wracking example for people living downstream in India and Bangladesh, given the proximity of the Great Bend to India. Chinese government seismologist Fan Xiao has suggested that man-made activity such as the weight of a large artificial lake near fault-lines can trigger earthquakes.

WATER DIVERSION FROM THE TSANGPO-BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER
Several ideas have been proposed to divert water from a giant dam at the Great Bend, through hundreds of kilometers of long canals, to the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, or even the Gobi Desert. Two individuals are key sources of these ideas: Guo Kai, a retired Chinese People's Liberation Army general, whose ideas were published in a book titled "How Tibet's Water Can Save China" by Li Ling (published December 2005), and the late Mr. Masaki Nakajima, "founder and special advisor to the Mitsubishi Research Institute of Japan," who first proposed a $500 billion project to the Global Environmental Fund in 1977 (See, Verghese in "Waters of Hope", 1990, pp. 188-189). These proposals are not shown on the map because there is no evidence of government interest and also because these ideas do not make practical or economic sense.

While Masaki Nakajima and Guo Kai were the two main sources of speculation, there are actually many different proposals for diverting water from the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra. The only project that had "official" interest at one time envisioned diverting water from near Tsethang, in the mid-reaches of the river at about 3500m, and directing it through a tunnel into the Nyang valley, and from there eventually to the Yellow River. It would rely on both gravity and power generated by a HPP on the Great Bend to move the water to the intended location. This project has been officially dismissed. There are other "unofficial" proposals, including connecting different rivers of Tibet as if these were streets that can run in all directions.

Close study of the terrain around the Great Bend area and possible canal routes on Google Earth show that the laws of physics will not allow water diversion from the Great Bend as suggested. For example, a reservoir like Motuo (850 m altitude) which is ideal for taking advantage of the drop in the Great Bend altitude would have lost 2000 meters of height that must be transferred over corrugated mountain ranges--through canals that are hundreds of kilometers long. Some may stubbornly argue that it is possible to divert the water with the combined power supplied by the dams at Motuo and Yiwong-Parlung rivers and with "peaceful nuclear explosions" to bore tunnels in the mountains. Even if these were possible, the immense costs do not make sense given the fact that water can be diverted from other rivers more easily and the key attraction for power generation at the Great Bend is economic development, not pumping water. Another major issue is the climate of the Tibetan Plateau, where it is below freezing point during winters and during early spring when water demand is highest in North China.

The Mid-Reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo
This is where major development is currently taking place. The 510MW Zangmu (རྫམ་ or Zam) is under construction and three other projects, Lengda (གླིང་མདའ་ or Lingda), Zhongda (སྒྲོམ་མདའ་ or Zhomda), and Langzhen have begun site preparation. Construction could begin within a few years. Development of Jiacha (རྒྱ་ཚ་ or Gyatsa) is also expected soon. It appears Jiexu will be developed last. As this is the upstream dam in this cascade of six projects, and the last to be developed, this may have a large reservoir to assure a constant flow for the downstream dams.

Here is an annotated high-resolution image of Zangmu project under progress from GeoEye that is annotated by one of Tibetan Plateau blog's consultants. Tibetan Plateau blog is responsible for the annotation.



The Yiwong and Parlung Rivers
Site planning is currently under way on these tributaries of the Yarlung Tsangpo. Completion of projects on these rivers is likely required for development of the Motuo HPP. The sites indicated are based on a map on Hydrochina's website. As the characters of the names of most of the projects shown were unintelligibly small and vague on the Hydrochina map they have been assigned the Tibetan names of nearby towns, which are approximate sites of future developments.




**The Tibetan Plateau blog is grateful to many individuals and organizations for their support and guidance in making this series of maps possible for publication. Organizations include International Rivers, Probe International and the University of British Columbia. People include friends and experts living/working in Tibet and China, Kevin Li, Bruce Lee, James Trevor, Stone Routes, Dorothy Berger and most of all to M, who did most of the laborious work behind these maps. Thank you all!

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India poorly informed about Chinese dam project

In recent days, Indian media has been running a story that China has "admitted" that it is building a dam (Zangmu) project on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River). It is strange that this "news" is presented as some some shocking new information. There is a lot of misinformation being spread around in the media.

China acknowledging that it is building the Zangmu hydropower project should not be "news" because the project has long been openly advertised on official Chinese websites. There should not be any question of admission about things that are open public knowledge. Tibetan Plateau blog reported on the construction of Zangmu dam more than a year ago, in English!

New reports say that India came to know about construction of Zangmu project after its "intelligence agencies" received satellite images of construction work going on for the Zangmu project last fall. This was widely (mis)reported in Indian media late October 2009. I suppose the Indian External Affairs Minister, the person who brought the "news" from his Chinese counterpart, raised Indian concerns about the Zangmu project based on these satellite images. Indian reliance on vague satellite images as some kind of evidence is embarrassing because chinese official websites have been carrying clear photos of Zangmu construction work (see below) and models of completed project for a long time.





Then there is the issue of serious misinformation. In my previous post on misinformation about Zangmu project, I identified confusions about Zangmu project's location and use as a water diversion project. The same confusion continues, here and here are a couple of examples.

Indian media and online writers cannot be blamed too harshly for treating this as "news" and being confused about location of the project, even Hong Kong based South China Morning Post is in the same boat. Zangmu project is located in the middle reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo on the Tibetan Plateau in dZam (རྫམ་) township of Lhokha (Shannan) Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region, about 140 km southeast from Lhasa, between Zangs-Ri (Sangri) and rGya-Tsha (Jiacha) counties.

Here is a high resolution image of Zangmu project under progress from GeoEye that is annotated by one of Tibetan Plateau blog's consultants. Tibetan Plateau blog is responsible for the annotation.


Tibetan Plateau blog will soon be posting a map of planned hydropower projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo river. There are more than the five projects "admitted" by China that are planned on the river. Stay tuned.

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Using Tibetan nomads for border claims

A couple of days ago, Press Trust of India reported about China pushing Tibetan nomads towards Ladakh region of India to strengthen territorial claims over disputed border areas. PTI had quoted an Indian Bhartiya Janata Party delegation visiting Ladakh about the phenomenon. Since the PTI report is a very brief, I quote here in full:

China pushing nomads into Ladakh region: BJP
STAFF WRITER 19:19 HRS IST

Leh, Apr 4 (PTI) Accusing China of pushing its nomads and grazers into Ladakh, a BJP delegation which visited the region today demanded that Government open the area to tourism to defeat the "Chinese design of grabbing the land by inches".

"We have come here to ascertain reports about the Chinese incursion and what we have found is shocking...," said party spokesperson Rajeev Pratap Rudy, who was part of the five-member delegation that visited Ladakh and bordering areas of Nyoma and Demchok, 300 kilometres from southeast of this Himalayan town.

This is the first national-level political delegation to visit the far flung areas of the Himalayan town. The team included former Uttrakhand Chief Minister Bhagat Singh Koshiyari and former J and K unit chief Nirmal Singh.

I asked around for more information on this. My Ladakhi friend, Tashi Morup, who is also a local journalist, told me that this phenomenon has been happening for a long time.

Here are some pictures of Tashi Morup and I visiting this part of Indo-Tibetan border.

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Denmark's anticipatory sale of Tibet bears no fruit

Did you know that Denmark has 'sold' Tibet's historical status as a sovereign state and the Tibetan people's right to struggle for freedom from Chinese rule at the beginning of the COP 15 meetings (on December 9) to appease China? This, according to media sources, is done hoping that China will then behave like a responsible superpower. [Denmark is not the only country that has 'sold' Tibet's historical legal status. Last year England did something similar in a statement.]

So how did China respond during the COP 15 negotiations?

An insider at a crucial meeting of two dozen heads of states, Mark Lynas, blames China for the failure of the COP 15 summit:

"It was China's representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. "Why can't we even mention our own targets?" demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia's prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil's representative too pointed out the illogicality of China's position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point."

Accoring to Mr. Lynas, "China wants to weaken the climate regulation regime now 'in order to avoid the risk that it might be called on to be more ambitious in a few years' time'."

I have been to several international environmental conferences, including IUCN 2000, IUCN 2004 and WSSD 2002, and I have seen with my own eyes how these negotiations work, especially at the UN level. At these meetings, world politics is more influential than global or international politics. By world politics, I mean that states quickly get grouped into the politics of "developed countries" versus "developing countries" or the First World versus the Third World countries. Issues of global politics, such as human rights, poverty reduction, environmental protection and women's empowerment will get hijacked under international (between key states) and world politics.

What is interesting is the level of world politics that operates at these conferences. The developed versus developing countries politics, one would imagine, is very old and outdated. It isn't. It still dominates these meetings. While I came across deeper undercurrents of world politics, such as the aspirations of the 53-member African states and the Muslim bloc, these do not come up as forcefully in the proceedings. These undercurrents, somehow, get subsumed under the larger 'developing versus developed countries' politics. The African and Muslim blocs, for example, are generally happy to vote "No" to anything that the developed countries, usually headed by the U.S., put forward. And China, as a leader of developing countries bloc, takes advantage of this condition efficiently and effectively.

What is even more interesting is how the vastly different developing countries, from major powers like India and Brazil to climate-vulnerable states like Maldives and Bangladesh, allow China, which is far more powerful and has completely different sets of interests, take the lead in these negotiations. This raises a question: will China advocate for the interest of countries like Maldives? Read an observation by Mr. Lynas:

"With the deal gutted, the heads of state session concluded with a final battle as the Chinese delegate insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas. President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number. "How can you ask my country to go extinct?" demanded Nasheed. The Chinese delegate feigned great offence – and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless. The deed was done."
So there. Denmark has sacrificed Tibet on the altar of a global environmental issue to no avail. With the lessons learned, does Denmark have the integrity to acknowledge its mistakes and retract the statement?

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Do you know the name of this flower?

Yes, can you please tell me the English or botanical name of this flower? Apparently this flower is quite popular among Tibetans. Its Tibetan name is Dolma Metok (སྒྲོལ་མ་མེ་ཏོག༑).



I like how these flowers are planted in used paper packets and old rusty tins, something financially poor elder Tibetans commonly do. This white Dolma Metok is planted in a Amul milk packet. Amul dairy products are a favorite of Tibetan refugees in India. [Amul, by the way, has an interesting story behind its inception as a farmers' cooperative society in the Indian state of Gujarat.] This photo was taken at Mussoorie's Tibetan Buddhist temple and these flowers belong to an older monk, whose name I don't know. Tibetans are quite ingenious about their flower pots. My mother has a couple of begonia (Chuzin Metok) plants in broken Chinese thermos cases. My friend Tsering Chophel's parents, who live in Clementown Dhondupling Tibetan refugee settlement, have cut several 2-litre soft drink (Coke, 7up) plastic bottles in halves and made two flower pots, one with the lid on, from each bottle!

Gen Tamding-la, a teacher at Mussoorie Tibetan Homes School, told me how they used to take great care of Dolma Metok. Apparently this is a perennial flower. Winters in Tibet are cold, so they keep the flowers indoor during night and they take it outside in the morning sun. Dolma metok, Gen Tamding-la said, is a special "ornament" of Losar (Tibetan new year) decoration. The white flowers have a nice subtle scent, which the red ones seem to lack. Dolma metok also comes in yellow and other colours.



Here (above) is a close-up photo of Dolma Metok. Even the red ones on the back is Dolma Metok.




The older lama's flower collection overlooking the Himalayas. He has many kinds of geranium (Trung Trung Metok) and marigolds (Serchen Metok). 




This (above) daisy-like flower is actually chrysanthemum. Now, there are many Tibetan names for chrysanthemum such as Khenpa (འཁན་པ་), Lugmig (ལུག་མིག་) and Drangsong (དྲང་སྲོང་). Khenpa is the most commonly used name. I think Lugmig is the name used in Tibetan medicine -- I should consult an expert on Tibetan medicinal plant names about this. Drangsong means old sage or ascetic in Tibetan. Drangsong Metok is a specific kind of chrysanthemum: these have fluffier blossoms with longer petals, see below.



If you wish to learn Tibetan flower names, see this post. I would love to hear from readers about flower names. Please share.

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Indian media and misinformation on Chinese dam on the Brahmaputra

The Indian media has been discussing Tibet for the last two weeks. The visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tawang, a culturally Tibetan region disputed between India and China, is a major news story these days. The subject of this blog, however, is different. On 4th November 2009, India's Zee TV News reported that China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. Satellite images from India's National Remote Sensing Agency were reported as being shocking evidence of dam construction activity.

Readers of the Tibetan Plateau Blog know that China's building of dam on the Brahmaputra (or Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet) is old news. The construction of Zangmu Hydropower Project is openly reported in Chinese media for a long time. I blogged about this development as early as March 5, 2009. The Zee News report did not talk about the four other dam projects, which are planned on the Brahmaputra, just near the Zangmu project.

An important point worth noting here is that Indian media reports these days repeatedly confuse Zangmu project with the controversial mega-hydropower project that may get built at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra, which is located further downstream near the point where the river enters Indian controlled territory. Much of the Indian and Bangladesh's expressed concerns over Chinese dams on the Brahmputra revolve around rumours of this latter mega-project.

Indian media confusion between the two projects is further obscured by this image from the Great Bend area, as shown in the Zee TV News report. Print news materials are even worse. For example, this article completely confuses the two different projects as one.

To read my views about about the proposed mega project on the Great Bend, and a disturbing Indian view that India should quickly build some dams on the Brahmaputra to establish prior use claims over China, see this post.

Here is the youtube video of the Zee News story, followed by my quick and rough English translation of the Hindi audio report:



Despite all the opposition from India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra river. India has found clear evidence that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra River. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river. Trucks moving about 3 to 4 kilometers near the construction site have also been observed. NRSA has alerted the Indian government about these findings. This matter has been raised with China, according to India.

Zee News correspondent, Dilip Tiwari, is here with us with more information on this. It is clear again that China's intentions are not good, Dilip. Dilip, can you hear us? OK, we will speak with Dilip [if/when we can reach each other]. Let's report to you again that despite all the opposition expressed by India, China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra. Clear evidence has been found that a dam is being built on the Brahmaputra. As evident in satellite images released by National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), a dam is being built on the river.

And at this time, we have former Foreign "Sachiv" (representative?), Mr. Kamal Sabbal. Welcome to Zee News, Sabbal-ji, now that it is clear from the satellite images that China is building a dam on the Brahmaputra in full swing, what steps should India take? And how serious is this situation from the Indian point of view?

[Mr. Kamal Sabbal speaks over the phone:] "Right now, it may not be a serious issue as the Indian Prime Minister has said that this is a 'run-off-river' project, which does not have storage [water reservoir] and there will not be decrease in supply of water. However, this can get serious in the future since China has many major plans. One of their plans is to divert water from Brahmaputra to Northern China. If they undertake such a plan, then the consequences will be very serious. The thing is that, projects like this, develop slowly overtime. China has just started the work. If we don't speak to them properly, fail to ask for explanations, or fail to express our concerns, then these [projects] will develop further. So we should find out what their plans are. What are their short and medium term plans? And what effects will these have on us [India]? We should also realize that these projects will have tremendous impacts in Bangladesh. So we should also try to see if India and Bangladesh can jointly put pressure on China.

[News anchor:] How can India lay its concerns in front of China? What immediate steps should India take?

[Mr. Kamal Sabbal:] One, there should be [a joint] experts committee from both the countries to share data and to assess the impacts of the plans and projects. [You] see, if the projects don't have serious downstream impact, we cannot stop them. If water supply is indeed likely to decrease, and then there is the case of global warming and everyone is afraid that water supply will be reduced for everyone, from that perspective, it will become a very serious issue. So data-sharing is a very important point. And the third thing that we should do, with full force, is to undertake the [dam] projects on our [the Indian] side ... because if we keep talking, that these [Chinese] dams will impact us, and if we don't have any downstream projects of our own, our protests will not have much strength. However, if we have downstream projects, these [projects] will have impact over them (Chinese plans and projects), then our protests will also have more weight in international law and to the international community.

[News anchor:] Yes. It is necessary that the issue is taken up seriously by the Indian government. Thank you, Sibbal-ji, for talking to Zee News.

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India and China starts a Dams Race on the Brahmaputra River

Worried that China might build a very big dam on the Brahmaputra River near its borders, India has recently approved two big dams of their own, "in principle", on the same river downstream in its state of Arunachal Pradesh. What is interesting, and disturbing at the same time, is that India is building these dams to pre-empt China by establishing a prior use claim.

A key member of India's Planning Council, Dr. Kirit Parikh, is reportedly pushing for this idea as "a broad strategic vision". I disagree with Dr. Parikh because China is not known for respecting riparian rights on international rivers. On the contrary, I think his words would only give more excuse for China to push ahead with their plans.


What follows is an editorial I wrote in 2004 in response to the news that India expressed concerns about Chinese plans then:

Let the Brahmaputra Flow
Tashi Tsering
Trin-Gyi-Pho-Nya: Tibet's Environment and Development Digest. January 12, 2004, Issue 4.

India finally expressed concern over Chinaís plans to divert the Brahmaputra River. In November 2003, several Indian news reports carried a story that the Indian state of Assamís Union Ministry of Water Resources asked their foreign affairs counterparts ìto seek factual detailsî about the project. Indiaís concerns became real after Chinaís official news agency, Xinhua, confirmed Chinaís intentions. According to Xinhua, preliminary studies of the water diversion project were conducted at the proposed construction site in mid-2003, followed by another round of feasibility studies in October. It would not be surprising if China denies having such plans, as did Tibet Autonomous Regionís Chairman, Xiang Ba Ping Cuo, at a press conference last August.

Construction of this mammoth multi-purpose project is tentatively scheduled to start in 2009. The main structures are planned in Tibetan areas of Pema Koe, near Indiaís northeastern border. The area is also known as the ìGreat Bendî of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Tibetan name for Brahmaputra) where the river takes a sharp U-turn to enter into India. At the Great Bend, the Tsangpo River descends over 3,000 meters in approximately 200 km, constituting one of the greatest hydropower potentials anywhere in the world. China hopes to build a hydroelectric plant there that would generate twice the electricity produced by the Three Gorges Dam, currently the worldís largest dam. Plans also include diverting the waters thousands of kilometers across the Tibetan Plateau to the ìthirstyî northwestern parts of China, into the provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu.

If undertaken, the project is bound to raise some serious transboundary issues. Claude Arpi, a Tibet-China-India analyst, called the project ìa declaration of warî by China. "When it comes to a transboundary question, where the boundary is not even agreed upon, it seems practically impossible to find a workable understanding," Arpi said. In addition to border disputes, the project would make India and Bangladesh dependent on China for release of water during the dry season, and for protection from floods during the wet season. Not to mention the adverse impacts on the millions of people living downstream when nutrient rich sediments and fish will be blocked by the dam. Arpi believes the most serious issue to be the fact that the Great Bend area is located in a highly earthquake prone area. "A huge reservoir and a few PNEs [Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, as proposed by Chinese scientists to make tunnels through the Himalayas for the project] could provoke new earthquakes even more devastating than in August 1950 when thousands died."

Such massive water control projects are clearly a state (central government) undertaking--without the economic and political support of the state, these projects cannot proceed. Unfortunately, and often ironically, national leaders prefer to marvel at their engineering accomplishments in controlling nature to serve economic development rather than addressing issues of transboundary and socio-environmental responsibilities. In fact, Chinaís plan to divert the Brahmaputra would impair India's own plan to link approximately thirty of its own rivers, a project that is bound to affect the downstream riparian state of Bangladesh.

Such international transboundary river development projects raise many important issues--from the comparative importance of national economic development to issues of social justice, from the primacy of territorial sovereignty to the merits of international cooperation. As important as these intractable topics of debate are, policy makers ought not to forget the real issue--the concern expressed by the affected people. After all, states exist to provide material and physical security to the people. The goal of development policies should be to benefit the people first, not powerful interest groups like corrupt bureaucracies and businesses.

While the Brahmaputra Diversion Plan will bring sizeable benefits to China in the form of construction jobs, electricity, and water for the "thirsty north," the price that the affected people and the environment must pay is clearly unacceptable. For the local Tibetans, the project is an imposition on their land and their birthright by the occupying Chinese government. The beneficiaries of the project are foreigners while "locals" are made to bear its price. If China is genuinely committed to human rights and sustainable development as it claims to be, then the Brahmaputra Diversion Plan should not be undertaken.
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Photo of dam on Indus (Senge Tsangpo)

A friend just sent me a link which has a photo of "The Sengye Tsangpo Hydropower Station." Upon comparing the photo with the dam on Ngari I found on Google Earth last week, it's clear that these are the same dam. According to the text on the photo, the Sengye Tsangpo Hydropower Station has an installed capacity of 6,400 Kilowatts and is now operational. Read more on this article...

Himalaya, the "Mountains of Concrete": a review

Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the Himalayas. International Rivers. 2008.  

Mountains of Concrete by Shripad Dharmadhikary is a fine new report that looks at dam building trends in the Himalayan regions of Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bhutan. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first critical report of its scope and focus, definitely an important contribution to the debates over dam building issues in the region. However, the exclusion of Tibetan Himalayan rivers renders this otherwise comprehensive regional study still incomplete, especially since the Tibetan sections of these rivers are the critical headwaters. The report explains that the omission is due to lack of information and resources. This is personally very disappointing as I believe the information and resources are out there, if only the author and the publisher had dug more deeply to find them.

The report, however, does dedicate a full-page story (Box #4, page 20): “China ‘Goes Out’ to Build Himalayan Dams.” It provides a brief overview of Chinese dam-building expertise and the politico-economic context under which it is ‘going out’ to build “hundreds of dams” in South Asia, Africa, South America, Central Asia and other regions of the world. In South Asia, the report says that “Chinese companies have built or are building at least 13 projects in Nepal and nine in Pakistan.” There is a quick mention of Chinese plans to build a dam on Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), an idea that is alarming to the downstream countries of India and Bangladesh. Since Tibet is the headwaters to many of the major rivers discussed in the report and there are innumerable dams built and planned on the Tibetan Plateau, we can only hope that International Rivers will take up this incomplete project and produce a sequel report about Chinese dam projects in Tibet. Readers interested in getting a glimpse of Chinese dam-building trends on the Tibetan Plateau are encouraged to read this paper.

That said, I want to share some of the many excellent points that are discussed in the report and point out certain important topics that could have been been included. This 48-page report is neatly divided into different topical sections. The first half of the report presents an informative country-by-country discussion of dam-building trends, funding issues and the key players. I found the discussions about Nepal and Bhutan most informative since not much is known about dam issues in these two countries. I did not realize until today, and it is not very surprising as one comes to think of it, that hydropower development represents the biggest source of income for Nepal and Bhutan. According to the report, about half of Bhutan’s national income comes from hydropower development. Bhutan has an installed capacity of 1,448 MW and plans to increase it to 15,693 MW. Nepal is more ambitious, it plans to install a total capacity of 26,324 MW from its current installed capacity of 545 MW. India’s goal is 93,615 MW from 15,208 MW. And for Pakistan, it is 33,769 MW from the existing capacity of 6,385 MW.

The drivers of hydropower in Pakistan and India are different. Pakistan wants big dams for irrigation and agriculture. In India, there is much higher demand for electricity and regional development. Needless to mention, the Indian power companies' rush to earn huge profits is also a major factor. A look at sources of funds is also interesting. The involvement of international financial institutions (IFI) such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are common throughout the region. For Bhutan, the main source of funds is India. Nepal has a more diverse source of income, including domestic sources, private-public partnerships, India as well as China. China is also an important funder for Pakistan. Other sources of funds for Pakistan include internal government sources, foreign private banks and income from sale of power. India’s main funders are its government, domestic banks and financial institutions.

Funding is the biggest challenge to the developers in this mostly rural region. Even if all the available funds are added up, the report estimates that 40% of the funds still remain unsecured. Power sector reforms to raise necessary funds are essentially geared towards privatization. The availability of funding is largely dependent on the ability of the power sector to recover investments, which to me is doubtful because of factors such as climate change, poor performance track record of big dams in general, and the South Asian context of corruption and unstable local/regional politics. However, I imagine the greatest funding problem right now is the global economic crisis as energy demands and investments in many parts of the world are declining. 

The main argument of the first section is the lack of morality in the economics of big dams in the region. Who are the ultimate winners and who are the losers? While the report does not question the role of state in hydropower development in the tradition of political ecology or post-structuralist critics, it raises issues of equity and the plight of the poor and affected people. The prospective winners are the banks and bureaucracies whose interests are directly proportional to the size of investment and prospective profits. The losers are the affected people, many of which are the many unique indigenous peoples (Adivasis, jan jatis), and the environment. In fact, the report is ultimately a warning that the Himalayas themselves and the whole region would face grave consequences if its people and decision-makers fail to act as its custodians.

The second half of the Concrete Mountains report is dedicated to the social and environmental issues. There are a lot of topics covered in this section (downstream impacts, loss of resource base, direct submergence, cultural impacts, ecological impacts, seismicity and sedimentation, climate change, etc.) that could have benefited from focus in terms of a specific target audience that ideally is also relevant to the debate. This section also provides a brief discussion on the response from affected people. I have always been most impressed with the various anti-dam movements in India. The national policy debates raised by the Narmada Bachao Andolan, and the mobilization of affected people’s resistance not only on the Narmada campaign but also other projects such as Teesta in the Northeast are inspiring examples for other dam-affected people. [TEAM has translated the Citizens’ Guide to World Commission on Dams, an activist organizational tool kit for people affected by dams, into Tibetan. We have sent a few copies to Teesta activists and are happy to send more copies for free to anyone who places an order.]

I am pleased that the report rightly situates the debate within the context of climate change. I believe climate change provides an important, pertinent and powerful critique of dam development in the region. If the glaciers and snows that feed the Himalayas are disappearing, why build such large, expensive and inhumane concrete structures? Some experts argue that big dams will be useful for storage purposes if climate change results in changes to water flow patterns. We can use the dams to store water when there is excess and release when supply is scarce. This report rejects this argument. Current dam projects, including those in the ‘pipeline,’ will not be able to deliver the designed benefits since flows are expected to decline significantly in the long run. Big dams in the Himalayas also increase other risks that are more common to the region such as glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) and seismicity.

Another important point that I was delightfully surprised to see emphasized in this report is the issue of cumulative impact of these dams. What will be the long term added incremental impact of all these dams to the region’s environment and economy? No one has the answer to this question. Perhaps we will never know the answer to this question beforehand but this is an important conceptual question for people and policy makers concerned about the future of the region’s cultural and ecological heritage. A step in the right direction toward understanding cumulative impact is to include cumulative impact assessments in project environmental impact assessment measures.

While such important points are raised in the report, there is no discussion of certain other relevant and important concepts such as minimum in-stream flows, ecosystem services (of headwaters and free flowing river, for example), and human rights impact assessment. I think all of these concepts should be made relevant to any discussion of dam project planning to minimize environmental and social costs. It would have been very fitting for the report to include these concepts as a part of its recommendations to governments and funders, a section that is also missing in the report. I would have either expanded the final one-page discussion on “Alternative Approaches” or included a set of recommendations for different target audiences, such as governments, IFIs, affected local people groups such as the Affected Citizens of Teesta.

It is unfair to expect a report to cover all relevant topics under the sun. For what it has set out to do, I think the report has achieved its purpose barring the unfortunate exclusion of Tibet and China. I wish to congratulate Shripad Sharmadhikary and the International Rivers for releasing this informative critical report.

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