"Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau"

The University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research is publishing a series of four memos on water security, policies, and practices related to the Tibetan Plateau. This special series of Asia Pacific Memos titled Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau is guest edited edited by Tashi Tsering and Prof. Jack Hayes of Norwich University. Contributors, other than the two guest editors, include Prof. Kelly Alley of Auburn University and Prof. Darrin Magee of Hobart and William Smith Colleges.

Discourse on the implications of China's plans to divert Tibet's waters tends to portray a strategic issue of concern for downstream countries and/or the local Tibetans. The first memo on the series, which was published last week, China’s Plans to Divert Water on the Tibetan Plateau, makes a different argument: it is the Chinese people who will be adversely affected.

You can read this and the forthcoming memos on the series Water, Scarcity, and the Frontiers on the Tibetan Plateau here.

Read more on this article...

Times of India: Response from Chinese official

The Times of India has published an article in response to the recent article by the Guardian about hydropower projects in Tibet. The Guardian's article is based on my last blog post. The Times of India has interviewed a Chinese official, Ma Jiali, with the goverment-run Institute of Contemporary International Relations to respond to a claim (which I also made) that China is likely to build a massive 38 gigawatt hydropower project at the Great Bend of Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river.



It is a privilege to have one's work discussed in major newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India and the Hindustan Times! Thanks to the reporters who did the stories to bring much needed attention to this important matter.

I wanted to write directly to Times of India with a response to Mr. Ma Jiali's comments but surprisingly I couldn't find a "Contact" link/info on their website! So here is a blog post instead.

Mr. Jiali's response: "There are some people in China including hydrological engineers and retired military officers pushing the government to build a major water project on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. But the Chinese government has no such plans. [...] Some people including retired military officers have been advocating such a project for a long time. But I can tell you there is no such plans in the government."

Yes, we knew that. However, it must be clarified that there are two components to the "major water project" discussed here: one is hydro-power project and the other is a connected water diversion project to China. My claim is that the hydropower project is likely to be built but the water diversion project is not very likely. Read my last blog post for more details.

Mr. Jiali continues: "All that the government wants to do is establish small hydro-electricity projects in a way that there is no environmental damage. It will be bad for China as well because such a project can cause serious damage to environment in the sensitive mountain areas. Also, where is the market for generating so much electricity in Tibet?" And Times of India adds, "A major project would not be economically viable."

Now this is not true and is very misleading. The Tibetan Plateau blog has identified at least 16 hydro-electricity projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo and its tributaries that can generate more power than the largest hydropower project currently operating in Tibet Autonomous Region, the 100 MWZhikong project near Meldro Gungkar (མལ་གྲོ་གུང་དཀར་).

Certainly there is no domestic demand for so much energy, except to power government's extensive plans to develop the region and to extract gold, copper and other minerals. The greatest demand for energy actually comes from Chinese cities. A senior researcher like Mr. Jiali cannot be ignorant of China's "West to East Power Transmission Project." Here is the State Grid map again, which shows Metog (Motuo) hydropower project connected to ultra-high voltage power transmission lines of China.


Read more on this article...

Hydropower Projects on Drichu (Yangtze), Zachu (Mekong) and Gyalmo Ngulchu (Salween)

Tibetans proudly sing of their land as "the Land of Snows, the source of great rivers." Indeed, Tibet is widely regarded as “Asia’s Water Tower.” This blog post highlights hydropower projects (HPPs) on three of the major rivers that flow from Tibet: the Yangtze, the Salween and the Mekong. The Yangtze River originates in Tibet as “Drichu” and flows into China, supporting one of the most densely populated watersheds in the world. The Salween River, known as “Gyalmo Ngulchu” in Tibet, supports one of the most biodiverse watersheds of South Asia, mainly in Yunnan Province, Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. And the Mekong River, known as Zachu in Tibet, flows from Tibet through six countries: China, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. What goes on in the sources of these great rivers should concern not only Tibetans but also all citizens of the world.

The map below highlights 81 HPPs on the upper reaches of Yangtze, Mekong and Salween rivers. There are many more, especially smaller projects on the many tributaries of these rivers, which are not included in the map. We have only indicated HPPs that are relatively large, on the main stream and confirmed by two or more reliable sources. Unlike HPPs on the Yellow River and in the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau, most of the HPPs on these three rivers have not reached power generation stage yet. The completed projects are mostly smaller HPPs. The larger projects are either under construction (Gangtuo, Boluo, and Lawa) or in the construction ‘pipeline’ as “Under Active Consideration” or “Proposed.” It makes sense to build smaller ones first, which can help supply energy and infrastructure for construction of bigger projects.

Click on image below for enlarged view and download


Why is China building so many dams on these rivers? To answer this question, it is important to ask who makes the decision and benefits, and what are the larger (political, economic and historical) contexts under which these water development projects are being implemented. An important slice of this puzzle concerns China's Water Industrial Complex. Other contextual answers include China’s project of promoting rapid economic development in Tibet under the Go West! or Western Development Campaign. Energy needed for major mining, infra-structure construction and urban development projects under the Western Development Campaign will be supplied by these HPPs. Many of these HPPs will eventually be connected to larger (“Ultra-high voltage”) power transmission lines to supply energy to prosperous Chinese cities in the East.

China also plans to divert Tibet’s rivers. The Western Route of the South to North Water Transfer Project , which is slated to begin construction in 2010, is one such project. A detailed report published by the Ministry of Water Resources in 1995 reveals plans to build at least three very large dams on the upper reaches of Yangtze River. We have indicated one of these three dams, the 302 meter tall Tongjia dam, with a separate color for three reasons: details may have changed since 1995; the dam is not a HPP; and to keep the project under public scrutiny.

Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Drichu (Upper Yangtze)


Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Zachu (Upper Mekong)


Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Gyalmo Ngulchu (Upper Salween)


Since these HPPs are Chinese projects, we have used their Chinese names. Although a lot of work has gone into this map, including feedback from various experts, it is not final. The data shown in the map should be seen as our current knowledge, arrived at after research and consulting others, what the current situation is. We will be improving on this, so we seek your feedback, to produce a better and more formal report publication in the future. Meanwhile, those interested in using this map are free to do so.

Sources and Methods
The information shared in this series of maps on hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau has been obtained from a variety of sources. These include: Probe International, International Rivers, HYDROCHINA, news reports from both inside and outside of China, Chinese government and state owned corporation websites, Google Earth, JPRS China technical reports, and a number of scholars and experts who reviewed our maps.

The map is a collaborative project, as have been the others in this series. While I take full responsibility for inaccuracies, the real credit of this amazing work goes to my research assistant and map maker, who must remain anonymous for good reasons. I would also like to thank the many experts who have made valuable contributions to these maps. Your contributions have resulted in a much better map than would have been produced otherwise.

Hydropower Project: Definition and Categories
A Hydropower Project consists of an electrical hydropower station and associated dams, tunnels, ancillary buildings, roads, and modifications to the surrounding environment.

For the purposes of this map, a hydropower project's status has four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. These categories are fuzzy in the sense there is some overlap and each category can cover a wide range of examples.

The term 'Built/Operational' includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, those complete and operational, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. The first report of a generator becoming operational is sufficient for a project to be assigned this status.

'Under Construction' indicates that work is proceeding on the ground though not necessarily that the river has been blocked or diverted. Ideally we would be able to have a 'Site Preparation' Status which would indicate that preparatory work is occurring at the site, but this is not possible without more detailed information than is typically available to us.

'Under Active Consideration' indicates that according to current data the project is being considered for construction, which may include exploratory work at the site, but is mainly intended to include design and other work not necessarily involving modifications of the site.

'Proposed' includes those HPPs which have been discussed but for which we have no information suggesting that they are currently under consideration.

'On Hold' indicates either that a project is being reviewed by Beijing, or that it has been reviewed and the government has decided not to allow it to go ahead.

Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources.

The positions of the HPPs shown on the map are approximate. A professional map should be used for accurate geographic information.

This map is the third in the series of maps of HPPs on the Tibetan Plateau. See here and in the here for HPPs on northern and eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau and stay tuned for HPPs on the Brahmaputra River.
Read more on this article...

Efficiency vs Effectiveness: South-North Water Diversion Project

The China Beat blog has published a response article by Prof. Ken Pomeranz to a Financial Times (FT) article on China's South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). Although I appreciate the scholarly tradition of being critical of simplistic and extreme viewpoints, I think Pomeranz's criticism of the FT article is based on questionable grounds.

In brief: China is undertaking the largest water control project known in world history. The project is known as SNWDP and is designed to solve water scarcity and pollution issues in northern China, mainly the cities of Beijing and Tianjin. As most informed people can imagine, the project has enormous social and environmental costs that are largely externalized. And so the debate goes whether this is justifiable or not. I recommend you read the FT article online. In order to avoid filling FT subscription forms, etc., do a Google search on "china blast from past" and read it from there. The FT link also has a good video story.

Pomeranz's arguments are summed up in the conclusion of his response:

"So while the water diversion scheme carries enormous risks, and is certainly very far from the optimal solution, it may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come. It’s not, I think, that people in the government don’t realize that controlling demand (and pollution) may be more promising than increasing supply, or that they aren’t trying to do those things, or that those who support the water diversion scheme are indulging in nostalgia for Maoist gigantism. The real point is that its not at all clear that efficiency gains can be realized fast enough to keep North China, which has about 6 percent of the global average per capita water supply, from facing a devastating water crunch – especially if its people are to see their living standards improve. (Remember, for instance, that even a small increase in the amount of meat people consume increases water demand very sharply.) The project may well be too much of an environmental gamble to undertake, at least in its full-blown form; I lean towards that position myself. But it is a response to very real dilemmas: when the Financial Times article calls it a 'pharoanic gesture,' and treats it simply as an anachronistic and brutal act of a government completely heedless of its people, it distorts a much more complicated reality."

There are a couple of things with Pomeranz's thinking or what is expressed in his response that bothered me. To say that the project "may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come" is thinking along evolutionary ideas of development. This line of thinking tends to gloss over issues of politics. What happens in the name of development is a direct result of decisions imposed by certain people, not because of certain evolutionary concept such as "time." Yes, Prof. Pomeranz does not mean it that way, but I think it is important to point that out.

The rationale behind Prof. Pomeranz's argument is that China's leaders must deal with some real and very serious (water) problems that the SNWDP, even though it is "very far from the optimal solution", "may" just have become the most efficient solution. What is not clear is if the "very real dilemmas" faced by China's leaders include, most importantly, the need for ever increasing action/profit for China's water-industrial complex. Judging from the text of the response, it seems that the dilemmas are mainly management issues of alleviating water supply/demand/quality problems. While I disagree with such an assumption, I am also skeptical of the more specific argument that the project is necessary to save North China from a "devastating water crunch." The project can be sold as an efficient short-term solution to deal with the problem, like the American invasion of Iraq, but will it be effective?
Read more on this article...

Soldiers open fire "indiscriminately" at Tibetan dam protestors

The Tibetan Government in Exile has reported at least 6 identified Tibetan women have sustained serious gunshot wounds for protesting against dam projects near their home. I have copy/pasted the entire story below. For some reason I didn't see the news until this afternoon. Here are some more information and photos about/from the region that might help contextualize the story.

Here is photo of Tawu County (རྟའུ་རྫོང༑) called Daofu Xian administrative seat. The two photos shared here are from Marshall and Cooke's landmark study, Tibet Outside TAR. I recommend reading a description of Tawu County by the same authors. The River Xianshui flows West to East on the South of Tawu county seat, after which it takes a sharp turn South to join Ngyagchu (ཉག་ཆུ༑) or Yalong River, near Nyagchuka (Ch: Yajiang) county. The thousands of protesters reported here are from areas situated between these two county seats: Tawu and Nyagchuka.


Here is an aerial (satellite) shot of the same area from Google Earth. Date photo taken and longtitude/latitude coordinates are visible if you click on the photos.


Here is a photo of Nyagchuka's Tibetan town, on the East side of the river. Again, this photo is from Marshall and Cooke's study, Tibet Outside TAR.


Since I first located the Indus River (Senge Tsangpo) dam on Google Earth, a friend and I have been searching other areas of the Tibetan Plateau for noticeable images. We found a lot of interesting stuff, including many dams and mining sites. And guess what, two of the dams we had marked are from this length of river where the dam is being built! Unfortunately the resolution of much of the region is not clear except for one patch (of image) which was taken nearly two years ago. These two dams are from that patch of image. If any of the readers have paid subscription to Google Earth and can help find other interesting stuff, that'd be much appreciated.

Note that the dams identified here are (most likely) not the one people are protesting. As the images show, these are relatively small run-off-river dams with no reservoirs. It is possible that of these are being submerged by the reservoir against which people are protesting. Notice that much of the surrounding area are forests and agricultural lands.





Also, I wonder why there were so many protestors against one dam. It must be a very big dam, with a huge reservoir that requires inundation of vast areas of land.

Yalong, or Nyagchu, is also the site for a planned 175-meter high dam, which will be connected with a 131 km long water diversion tunnel for the Western Route of the South-North Water Transfer Project.

OK, here's the news article from the Tibetan Government-in-Exile:

6 Tibetans Seriously Wounded in Protests Against China's Hydroelectric Dam Project

Tuesday, 26 May 2009, 10:00 a.m.
Dharamshala: At least 6 Tibetan women have sustained serious gunshot wounds after Chinese security forces opened fire at a group of Tibetans in Tawu County, who were venting their anger against China's forceful relocation of tens of thousands of local Tibetans, sources reported Monday.

The Public Security Bureau officials and People's Armed Police indiscriminately fired at Tibetan residents of Tawu and Nyagchu County in Karze Tibet Autonomous Prefecture, at around 11 a.m. (local time) on Sunday, 24 May.

The sources attributed the incident to China's construction of a major hydroelectric dam between Nyagchu and Tawu County, which is resulting in a large-scale displacement of local Tibetans. The government coerced local residents of Tawu County to sign a document as it begin to plan the construction work in early 2008.

This year the Chinese authorities again reinforce their relocation plan, which was vehemently opposed by the Tibetans who refused to leave their ancestral lands and houses.

Subsequently, on 5 May 2009, the Chinese government dispatched a large number of armed police to the region and destroyed homes of some families, including those of Ati Gyatso Tsang and Chego Pezi Tsang.

Earlier, the authorities convened a meeting and erected a stone pillar in their plan to relocate the residents of Wara Mato town to another place. Expressing strong opposition to the forced relocation policy, the angry residents led by an old woman named Lhamo, who is believed to be aged above 70, refused to move saying they are owner of the land and destroyed the pillar.

Consequently, as residents from Tawu and Nyagchu districts gathered in the region to protest the arrival of large number of troops on the morning of 24 May, the army fired shots leaving six Tibetan women seriously wounded.

Those wounded have been identified as Tsering Lhamo, Rigzin Lhamo, Dolma, Kelsang, Dolkar and Khaying.

But sources could not tell whether those injured are dead or alive as they were forcibly taken away after the firing incident. Read more on this article...

20 more dams on the sources of Yangtze (Drichu) River

About 400 Chinese water managers and bureaucrats have gathered in Shanghai for the 3rd Yangtze Forum, which began yesterday, to discuss about the condition and plans for development of the Yangtze River. The Associated Press reported today that an official said that at least 20 dams will be build on its headwater tributary rivers: Yalong (Nyachu), Dadu (Gyarong Ngulchu) and Wujiang rivers. China Daily quotes Cai Qihua, director of Yangtze Water Resources Committee, that currently only 36% of Yangtze hydropower potential is exploited. Plans are to increase its exploitation to 50% by 2020, and then to 60% by 2030 (as given in the graphic figure below). I suspect these plans do not consider the complex implications of climate change on future water availability in these rivers seriously enough.



My guess is that these twenty dams include those slated for the Western Route of the South-North Water Transfer Project. The size of these dams is staggering: 175 meters high dam on Nyachu (Yalong River) connected with 131 kilometer long tunnel, and a 296 meter high dam on Gyarong Ngulchu (Dadu River) connected by a nearly-30 kilometers long tunnel, and much more.

The only people who can stop China from undertaking these projects are the Chinese people. Chinese environmentalists, officials, academics, journalists, and citizens, should speak out to stop these projects before it is too late. Demand for proper environmental impact assessment of these projects is a good way to start discussion.
Read more on this article...

Update on SNNR map and related China Beat Blog article

Update: SNNR subarea #7 Zhaling-Eling Hu (མཚོ་སྐྱ་རིང་སྔོ་རིང་)་extends into Dulan County, Haixi Mongolian & Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. This news wasn't too surprising as mentioned in SNNR Map Description that SNNR subarea boundaries cross administrative borders. Map in previous blog entry has been updated. We are working on further improvements.

An excellent article related to SNNR on The China Beat blog by Ken Pomeranz . Here's an excerpt focusing on Tibet's water:

[The] state has chosen a massive three-pronged effort to move water from South to North China – by far the biggest construction project in history, if it is completed. Part of the Eastern section began operating this year, and the Central section is also underway (though the December 31Wall Street Journal reported a delay due to environmental concerns). The big story in the long run, however is the Western line [in SNNR], which will tap the enormous water resources of China’s far Southwest – Tibet alone has over 30 percent of China’s fresh water supply, most of it coming from the annual run-off of some water from Himalayan glaciers. (This is an aspect of the Tibet question one rarely hears about, but rest assured that all the engineers in China’s leadership, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, are very much aware of it. Tibetans, meanwhile, not only see a precious resource going elsewhere when their water is tapped: they regard many of the lakes and rivers to be dammed as sacred.) The engineering challenges in this mountainous region are enormous, but so are the potential rewards, both in water supply and in hydropower – the electricity water can generate is directly proportional to how far it falls into the turbines, and the Yangzi, for instance, completes 90 percent of its drop to the sea before it even enters China proper. The risks, as our two stories make clear, are social and political as well as environmental…

Call the two news stories the “double glacier shock.” On December 9, Asia Times Online reported that China was planning to go ahead with a major hydroelectric dam and water diversion scheme on the great bend of the Yarlong Tsangpo River in Tibet. The hydro project is planned to generate 40,000 megawatts – almost twice as much as Three Gorges. But the water which this dam would impound and turn northwards currently flows south into Assam to form the Brahmaputra, which in turn joins the Ganges to form the world’s largest river delta, supplying much of the water to a basin with over 300 million inhabitants. While South Asians have worried for some time that China might divert this river, the Chinese government had denied any such intentions, reportedly doing so again when Hu Jintao visited New Delhi in 2006. But when Indian Prime Minister Singh raised the issue again during his January, 2008 visit to Beijing, the tone had changed, with Wen Jiabao supposedly replying that water scarcity is a threat to the “very survival of the Chinese nation,” and providing no assurances. And so it is – not only for China, but for its neighbors. Most of Asia’s major rivers – the Yellow, the Yangzi, the Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy, Brahmaputra, Ganges, Sutlej, and Indus – draw on the glaciers of the Himalayas, and all of these except the Ganges have their source on the Chinese side of the border. Forty-seven percent of the world’s people, from Karachi to Tianjin, draw on those rivers.
Read more on this article...

Mapping Three Rivers Headwaters Nature Reserve (Updated)

In May 2000, China declared the establishment of its largest nature reserve on the Tibetan Plateau: the San Jiang Yuan (Three Rivers Headwaters) National Nature Reserve (SNNR). Since then, China’s plans to protect the headwaters of the Yangtze (Drichu), Yellow (Machu) and Mekong (Zachu) rivers have received a lot of media attention. This recent BBC story, for example, highlights the relocation of '100,000 nomadic Tibetans.' However, there is very little information about the specifics of the plan in all of the published sources that I have come across. There isn't a single definitive map of SNNR. So I collaborated with some colleagues, who wish to remain anonymous, and prepared a new map of SNNR area using information compiled over the last few months. I am pleased to release the map here.

[Click on the image to view/download this (updated: Feb 20, 09) copyright free map]

This map is the most accurate and informative publicly available document of its kind on SNNR to date. It throws new light to the debates about SNNR and other nature reserves on the Tibetan Plateau. We have taken every possible step to ensure its accuracy, including crosschecks between different maps, reviews by experts who work in the region, and consultations with people from this region. Information we are currently doubtful are mentioned in a detailed description that should be used alongside with the map. There are no copyrights to the map, so please feel free to use it for educational purposes. We hope to produce better maps and reports on SNNR both in English and Tibetan languages in the future.

[Counties covered under the Three Rivers Headwaters Region. Maps are copyright free.]

To me, the establishment of SNNR and other nature reserve parks in Tibet raises many questions. According to a Chinese white paper on the environment of Tibet [Autonomous Region (TAR)], the government has established 70 nature reserve parks in the region between 1980 and 2003. The white paper states that 33.4% of TAR’s total land area is covered by nature reserves and that the government will increase the number and size of nature reserves in the region. So the first set of questions, leaving aside the rhetoric of conservation, pertains to the underlying economic and strategic purpose of establishing nature reserves in Tibet. What are the political and economic goals of establishing so many parks in Tibet?

The second set of questions concerns the politics behind scientific discourses of conservation and the relevance of "protected" parks in Tibet. Protection of mountains and grasslands from the nomads and their yaks? The ideas behind nature reserve parks that are applied in Tibet are based on Western ideas and approaches. How appropriate are these in Tibet? Why do governments and scientists continue to treat indigenous perspectives as irrelevant and unsophisticated into the 21st century? After all, these nomads and pastoralists have a proven capacity in maintaining the integrity of their local ecosystem. Their livelihoods depend on it and they have been living there for thousands of years!

I have pointed out elsewhere that the current top-down management approach of exclusion is unfit for nature reserve management in Tibet and developing countries in general. As Dr. Andreas Schild, the Director General of the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development has said in a recent interview that “Mountains without mountain people will be not sustainable.” Surely enough, Tibetan nomads and pastoralists who have been uprooted from their ancestral lands and made to live in concrete houses (see photos below) are facing serious economic and social problems that many have chosen to return to their traditional lifestyle.

[San Jiang Yuan resettlement housing blocks]

My final set of questions is about China’s commitment to environmental protection in relation to its development goals. Does the creation of nature reserves with new laws and regulations lead to environmental protection? How strong are China’s environmental laws? It appears that these laws exist mostly on paper and very little in practice. 

The Government has allowed several mining companies to operate in the "protected" area, including a Canadian company in one of the SNNR wetland conservation subarea of Chumarleb (Chu dMar Leb) county. The Three Rivers Headwaters area is also the site for a major river diversion project which involves construction of least three large dams (wall height of the dams are 175 meters, 295m, and 305m!) on the headwaters of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers, connected by a series of several hundred kilometres long tunnels through a mountain range that separate the two rivers.

Read more on this article...