Hydropower Projects on Drichu (Yangtze), Zachu (Mekong) and Gyalmo Ngulchu (Salween)

Tibetans proudly sing of their land as "the Land of Snows, the source of great rivers." Indeed, Tibet is widely regarded as “Asia’s Water Tower.” This blog post highlights hydropower projects (HPPs) on three of the major rivers that flow from Tibet: the Yangtze, the Salween and the Mekong. The Yangtze River originates in Tibet as “Drichu” and flows into China, supporting one of the most densely populated watersheds in the world. The Salween River, known as “Gyalmo Ngulchu” in Tibet, supports one of the most biodiverse watersheds of South Asia, mainly in Yunnan Province, Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. And the Mekong River, known as Zachu in Tibet, flows from Tibet through six countries: China, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. What goes on in the sources of these great rivers should concern not only Tibetans but also all citizens of the world.

The map below highlights 81 HPPs on the upper reaches of Yangtze, Mekong and Salween rivers. There are many more, especially smaller projects on the many tributaries of these rivers, which are not included in the map. We have only indicated HPPs that are relatively large, on the main stream and confirmed by two or more reliable sources. Unlike HPPs on the Yellow River and in the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau, most of the HPPs on these three rivers have not reached power generation stage yet. The completed projects are mostly smaller HPPs. The larger projects are either under construction (Gangtuo, Boluo, and Lawa) or in the construction ‘pipeline’ as “Under Active Consideration” or “Proposed.” It makes sense to build smaller ones first, which can help supply energy and infrastructure for construction of bigger projects.

Click on image below for enlarged view and download


Why is China building so many dams on these rivers? To answer this question, it is important to ask who makes the decision and benefits, and what are the larger (political, economic and historical) contexts under which these water development projects are being implemented. An important slice of this puzzle concerns China's Water Industrial Complex. Other contextual answers include China’s project of promoting rapid economic development in Tibet under the Go West! or Western Development Campaign. Energy needed for major mining, infra-structure construction and urban development projects under the Western Development Campaign will be supplied by these HPPs. Many of these HPPs will eventually be connected to larger (“Ultra-high voltage”) power transmission lines to supply energy to prosperous Chinese cities in the East.

China also plans to divert Tibet’s rivers. The Western Route of the South to North Water Transfer Project , which is slated to begin construction in 2010, is one such project. A detailed report published by the Ministry of Water Resources in 1995 reveals plans to build at least three very large dams on the upper reaches of Yangtze River. We have indicated one of these three dams, the 302 meter tall Tongjia dam, with a separate color for three reasons: details may have changed since 1995; the dam is not a HPP; and to keep the project under public scrutiny.

Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Drichu (Upper Yangtze)


Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Zachu (Upper Mekong)


Click below to view technical details of HPPs on Gyalmo Ngulchu (Upper Salween)


Since these HPPs are Chinese projects, we have used their Chinese names. Although a lot of work has gone into this map, including feedback from various experts, it is not final. The data shown in the map should be seen as our current knowledge, arrived at after research and consulting others, what the current situation is. We will be improving on this, so we seek your feedback, to produce a better and more formal report publication in the future. Meanwhile, those interested in using this map are free to do so.

Sources and Methods
The information shared in this series of maps on hydropower projects on the Tibetan Plateau has been obtained from a variety of sources. These include: Probe International, International Rivers, HYDROCHINA, news reports from both inside and outside of China, Chinese government and state owned corporation websites, Google Earth, JPRS China technical reports, and a number of scholars and experts who reviewed our maps.

The map is a collaborative project, as have been the others in this series. While I take full responsibility for inaccuracies, the real credit of this amazing work goes to my research assistant and map maker, who must remain anonymous for good reasons. I would also like to thank the many experts who have made valuable contributions to these maps. Your contributions have resulted in a much better map than would have been produced otherwise.

Hydropower Project: Definition and Categories
A Hydropower Project consists of an electrical hydropower station and associated dams, tunnels, ancillary buildings, roads, and modifications to the surrounding environment.

For the purposes of this map, a hydropower project's status has four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. These categories are fuzzy in the sense there is some overlap and each category can cover a wide range of examples.

The term 'Built/Operational' includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, those complete and operational, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. The first report of a generator becoming operational is sufficient for a project to be assigned this status.

'Under Construction' indicates that work is proceeding on the ground though not necessarily that the river has been blocked or diverted. Ideally we would be able to have a 'Site Preparation' Status which would indicate that preparatory work is occurring at the site, but this is not possible without more detailed information than is typically available to us.

'Under Active Consideration' indicates that according to current data the project is being considered for construction, which may include exploratory work at the site, but is mainly intended to include design and other work not necessarily involving modifications of the site.

'Proposed' includes those HPPs which have been discussed but for which we have no information suggesting that they are currently under consideration.

'On Hold' indicates either that a project is being reviewed by Beijing, or that it has been reviewed and the government has decided not to allow it to go ahead.

Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to assure their accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources.

The positions of the HPPs shown on the map are approximate. A professional map should be used for accurate geographic information.

This map is the third in the series of maps of HPPs on the Tibetan Plateau. See here and in the here for HPPs on northern and eastern parts of the Tibetan Plateau and stay tuned for HPPs on the Brahmaputra River.
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Wildlife of Tibet posters

Tesi Environmental Awareness Movement has published some splendid posters on Tibet's wildlife. Thanks to generous funding from Care for the Wild International, UK, which has allowed us to produce large color posters for free distribution. If you can read Tibetan, you will find a wealth of information by clicking on the images. Please feel free to download these images and to use them for educational purposes. Visit TEAM's website for more information.

























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China's Water Industrial Complex

Why is China building so many large dams?

Peoples Republic of China has built 22,000+ large dams since it came into existence in 1949. If we do the math, we can say that PRC has been building more than one large dam per day. And if we probe into the politics of dam building in China, i.e., who makes decisions, how decisions are made, what kinds of people, institutions and organizations are benefited, etc., there are striking structural similarities between the phenomenon of Military Industrial Complex ("described as an all-too friendly relationship that may develop between defense contractors and government forces, where both sides receive what they are perceivably looking for: a successful military engagement for warplanners and financial profit for those manning the corporate boardrooms") and what goes on in China's water construction industry. Check out the following chart:

China's Water Industrial Complex compared with America's Military Industrial Complex

	America’s Military Industrial Complex	China’s Water Industrial Complex
Ideology	· Realism · Anarchic international system · American Primacy · “City on the Hill,” “uphold freedom and democracy”	· Marxist-Leninist-materialism · “Man over nature” · Powerful China · Greatness of socialism, “Socialist re-construction”
Elite involvement	· Corporate and other private sector executives · Defense services, Pentagon leaders · Family business involvement · "Revolving door system" of professional and political roles	· Engineers, “Red Specialists,” “Tsinghua Clique” · Party leaders · Family business involvement · “Revolving door system” of professional and political roles
Decision making	· Crisis management small groups · Closed door system	· Crisis management small groups · Closed door system
Mode of public support	· Propaganda through mainly corporate owned media · “Communist threat,” “rogue states,” “terrorist” groups · Rally behind the flag, “national interest,” patriotism, etc.	· Propaganda through govt. owned and controlled media · Natural threats like flood and draught, “Thirsty North” · Rally behind the flag, “national interest,” patriotism, etc.
Size of Complex	· World’s largest in terms of monetary value of production · Over $ 305 billion in military expense	· World’s largest in terms of project sizes and numbers · 22,000 of the world's 45,000 large dams
Interests served	· Economic interest of military-industrial firms · Departmental bureaucratic interest in expansion of size and power	· Economic interest of water-industrial firms · Dep'tal bureaucratic interest in expansion of size and power
Influence on gov't policy	· Perpetuation of military related production · Development of the most advanced and deadly weapons	· Perpetuation of water related construction · Construction of the largest water control projects

Source: Tsering, T. (2003). China’s Water Politics: In Whose Interest? Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science at the Portland State University.

By China's Water Industrial Complex, I mean the professional and ideological alliance of technocratic Communist Party elites with water-related bureaucracies and businesses that influence government policy. In this context, the WIC has three principle features: dominance of hardline technocratic elites in decision-making; their professional, ideological and economic alliance with the economic and bureaucratic interests of water industry and bureaucracies (water sector entities); and this alliance’s major influence on government policy to further water-related construction. Within this framework, it appears that decisions regarding major water control projects are being made to serve the bureaucratic and commercial interests of China’s WIC, and not necessarily its people.

The immediate purpose of introducing the concept of a Chinese water-industrial complex is to highlight the power alliances (formal and informal, as well as professional and ideological) and the structure of interests that shape water policy in China. My underlying objective is to contribute to social justice debates in Chinese water policy.

Since 1950, the PRC has achieved an astounding 12% annual growth rate in its hydropower production. China's water construction industry is continues to grow as significant sources of China’s hydropower, especially on the Tibetan Plateau, are still untapped and the demand for energy is high in the fastest-growing electric power industry in the world.

By law, the Ministry of Water Resources is the main agency responsible for water management in China. Analysts have long identified the Ministry’s bureaucratic self-interest (and corruption prospects) in large-scale projects. In reality, the management of China’s water industry is split among three ministries—the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry—and municipal and provincial government water-resource bureaus. The responsibilities of these three ministries match their names: the Ministry of Water Resources plans for reservoirs and river projects, and allocates water to industry and cities; the Ministry of Construction administers large public works projects; and the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry is charged with partial oversight of the water engineering equipment sector. The close functional relationship between these ministries and other institutions provides them with a similar interest—promotion and expansion of their activities.

Policy decisions regarding major projects remain highly autarkic, under the control of a small number of Party elites, whose professional and ideological backgrounds are rooted in near-religious faith in big engineering approaches to water development. In fact, since the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party, leadership has been dominated by individuals with technical engineering backgrounds. Although the generation of influential hongse zhuanjia (“red specialists,” or party leaders trained in the former Soviet Union as engineers) like Li Peng are retiring, the nature of internal Party politics ensures assumption of leadership by cadres with similar ideological and professional backgrounds.

In Novemeber 2002, there was a major power shift in Chinese leadership, from the “third generation leaders” to the “fourth generation leaders.” The “fourth generation leaders” who assumed power, although considered fresh and least dogmatic in their outlook, share with their predecessors a professional background and ideological approach to development. Jiang Zemin and his team of six other outgoing members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-making authority in China, were engineers by training. And interestingly enough, all the nine new members of the Committee headed by its new leader Hu Jintao are engineers by training. Technocratic dominance is likely to continue in the next Chinese government. Engineers also dominate China’s provincial leadership, which is considered “the training ground for national leadership.” As of September, 2001, 62.9% of Chinese provincial leaders had engineering degrees, followed by economics, physics and Chinese with 6.5, 4.8 and 4.8%, respectively.

An important Party policy regarding the tenure of its top leaders is a professional revolving door system by which top provincial leaders are frequently reshuffled to avoid a situation of cadres accumulating excessive influence and power in a region. Owing to the common engineering background shared by most Chinese leaders, the practice of this professional revolving door system results in certain technocratic bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Machine Building, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Energy becoming influential bases for these leaders to climb the Party’s bureaucratic ladder. Arguably this practice feeds the influence of China’s Water Industrial Complex: the technocratic bureaucracies become politically more powerful with the association of the party elites. The flip side of this is something students of bureaucratic politics would observe; the party leaders would have a professional bureaucratic bias toward these government agencies.

Party leaders are both decision makers and issue framers. The dominance of technocrats in China’s leadership, their bureaucratic bias toward construction-related bureaucracies, and the fact that important decisions are made behind closed doors combine to bias government water policies in favor of structural solutions. These reasons provide an explanation for the fact that People's Republic of China is building more than one large dam per day since its inception in 1949 and continues to expand its dam building industry around the world.

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Tawu dam protest: a reader contributes information

In May 2009, it was reported that six Tibetan women were wounded by gunshots after Chinese security forces opened fire at protestors venting their opposition to a hydroelectric dam near Tawu County in Karze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of China’s Sichuan Province. There were no reports after this incident. The Tibetan Plateau Blog provided some information about the region and made an astute speculation that the dam must be Lianghekou. We also provided additional, updated map of hydropower development in the region.

One of the readers of this blog, James, who has travelled to the dam sites, wants to contribute new information about the dam and the protest. He sent us three photographs with captions (see below) that he will use to share information. Please look for James' comments (below) on this post.


View of the Chaba valley about 25 kilometers upriver from the dam. This place will be under water soon.



A view of Lianghekou. On the left side the Yalong river goes up to Nyarong (Xinlong) and on the top right side the Chaba valley leads up to Tawu (Daofu).



Map of the dam

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Avatar, despite criticisms, is a welcome movie

Criticisms of Avatar, the movie, is getting a bit too much. There are all these reviews online, most of them describing the movie's story as unimaginative and cliched. And now the Vatican news agencies have joined the bandwagon calling the movie "simplistic" and promoting nature worship as a substitute for religion. Avatar's story, despite all its "simplistic" and "racist" overtones, raises thought-provoking and philosophical questions that are good for our capitalistic society. Avatar is a welcome story, as far as I am concerned.



As for the Vatican's dismissal of nature worship, I think the comment operates at a disturbingly deeper level of racism than Avatar showing a white man as the rescuer of the natives. Religious leaders, please stop saying this or that religious practice is bad or "primitive." That doesn't make you look any better. Don't hate, appreciate. Avatar has done a great service to the environmental movement and the cause of indigenous peoples of the world. I don't think a single film or educational material on these topics has ever reached (and touched) so many people in such a short period of time. People now have some ideas about aspects of Native American, African, Maori and other wisdom cultures of the world. Our world. It's unfortunate that many people today continue to see indigenous cultures, just like the human invaders of the movie, as "tree hugger crap" or in the words of Vatican media, "nature worship."

One of my favorite books is Ian Baker's Heart of the World: Journey to the Last Secret Place on Earth. In the book, Baker describes how Tibetan tribals of the Eastern Himalayan region of Pema Koe hunt Takin, an endemic animal, and offer ritual prayers believed to liberate the soul of the animals into a blissful heavenly realm. This story resonated when Neytiri, the Na'vi girl who saves Jake, the protaganist, from a wild dog-like animal and prays after killing the animal. Praying for a deceased soul is not nature worship. Perhaps the Na'vi people doing their ritual around the sacred tree is more along the lines of what the Vatican doesn't appreciate. See this clip from the movie Baraka, I think the sacred tree ritual is inspired by the Balinese Kecak ritual:



Yes, there is more than one way to critique Avatar: a Rousseauian depiction of indigenous society, a white man-goes-native story, white male as rescuer story, etc. I still think James Cameron has made a great film. His genius is using the spectacular visuals to tell a story that will sell at the blockbuster, a love story of course, but one that is also deeply thought provoking and pertinent to the capitalistic world we live in. The destruction of sacred ancestral lands of indigenous people for natural resources happens all the time today. Based on this realist premise, Avatar also raises fundamental moral and philosophical questions facing humanity and science. How alienated are postmodern humans from nature and spirituality? Can scientific technology ever grok the interconnectedness of nature? Towards what ends are the best of scientific knowledge and technology used? Why do wars happen in today's world? Who and what suffers in war?

Some critics don't like the story's resemblance to the American invasion of Iraq, especially the colonel saying that they will "shock and awe" the Na'vi people by bombing them into submission. That was not very subtle, all right, but that is precisely what makes it good. Don't tell me you are too intelligent and you want some subtlety. Certain things are best told directly. Isn't it great that an American film (although the director is a Canadian) can be so openly critical of its government's imperialistic policies and actions? Can you imagine a mainland Chinese film criticizing China's invasion of Tibet?

Speaking of China and Tibet. It is interesting to read about Chinese reactions to the movie. Chinese viewers sympathize with the Na'vi people because the destruction of the Na'vi Treehome reminds them of local Chinese government using violence to forcefully evict residents from their homes for redevelopment, such as construction of Olympic stadiums or dams. As an analyst of Tibetan environment and development issues, I cannot help but compare the Na'vi's to the plight of Tibetan nomads and farmers. It is almost like the story is inspired by the Khampa farmers who fought against a Chinese mining company and armed security forces to save their sacred mountain, Ser Ngul Lo, from being mined for gold.

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Efficiency vs Effectiveness: South-North Water Diversion Project

The China Beat blog has published a response article by Prof. Ken Pomeranz to a Financial Times (FT) article on China's South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). Although I appreciate the scholarly tradition of being critical of simplistic and extreme viewpoints, I think Pomeranz's criticism of the FT article is based on questionable grounds.

In brief: China is undertaking the largest water control project known in world history. The project is known as SNWDP and is designed to solve water scarcity and pollution issues in northern China, mainly the cities of Beijing and Tianjin. As most informed people can imagine, the project has enormous social and environmental costs that are largely externalized. And so the debate goes whether this is justifiable or not. I recommend you read the FT article online. In order to avoid filling FT subscription forms, etc., do a Google search on "china blast from past" and read it from there. The FT link also has a good video story.

Pomeranz's arguments are summed up in the conclusion of his response:

"So while the water diversion scheme carries enormous risks, and is certainly very far from the optimal solution, it may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come. It’s not, I think, that people in the government don’t realize that controlling demand (and pollution) may be more promising than increasing supply, or that they aren’t trying to do those things, or that those who support the water diversion scheme are indulging in nostalgia for Maoist gigantism. The real point is that its not at all clear that efficiency gains can be realized fast enough to keep North China, which has about 6 percent of the global average per capita water supply, from facing a devastating water crunch – especially if its people are to see their living standards improve. (Remember, for instance, that even a small increase in the amount of meat people consume increases water demand very sharply.) The project may well be too much of an environmental gamble to undertake, at least in its full-blown form; I lean towards that position myself. But it is a response to very real dilemmas: when the Financial Times article calls it a 'pharoanic gesture,' and treats it simply as an anachronistic and brutal act of a government completely heedless of its people, it distorts a much more complicated reality."

There are a couple of things with Pomeranz's thinking or what is expressed in his response that bothered me. To say that the project "may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come" is thinking along evolutionary ideas of development. This line of thinking tends to gloss over issues of politics. What happens in the name of development is a direct result of decisions imposed by certain people, not because of certain evolutionary concept such as "time." Yes, Prof. Pomeranz does not mean it that way, but I think it is important to point that out.

The rationale behind Prof. Pomeranz's argument is that China's leaders must deal with some real and very serious (water) problems that the SNWDP, even though it is "very far from the optimal solution", "may" just have become the most efficient solution. What is not clear is if the "very real dilemmas" faced by China's leaders include, most importantly, the need for ever increasing action/profit for China's water-industrial complex. Judging from the text of the response, it seems that the dilemmas are mainly management issues of alleviating water supply/demand/quality problems. While I disagree with such an assumption, I am also skeptical of the more specific argument that the project is necessary to save North China from a "devastating water crunch." The project can be sold as an efficient short-term solution to deal with the problem, like the American invasion of Iraq, but will it be effective?
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Happy 2010: SpitiValley.org Website Launch

May 2010 be a great year for you all!

Taking the new year as an auspicious start, I am excited to release a in-progress-wwwsite of a project I am supporting in Spiti Valley, Himachal Pradesh, India.

The Kachen Dugyal Memorial Welfare Society is an amazing spiritual project. Please visit their wwwsite to enjoy some inspiring stories and pictures.

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Denmark's anticipatory sale of Tibet bears no fruit

Did you know that Denmark has 'sold' Tibet's historical status as a sovereign state and the Tibetan people's right to struggle for freedom from Chinese rule at the beginning of the COP 15 meetings (on December 9) to appease China? This, according to media sources, is done hoping that China will then behave like a responsible superpower. [Denmark is not the only country that has 'sold' Tibet's historical legal status. Last year England did something similar in a statement.]

So how did China respond during the COP 15 negotiations?

An insider at a crucial meeting of two dozen heads of states, Mark Lynas, blames China for the failure of the COP 15 summit:

"It was China's representative who insisted that industrialised country targets, previously agreed as an 80% cut by 2050, be taken out of the deal. "Why can't we even mention our own targets?" demanded a furious Angela Merkel. Australia's prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil's representative too pointed out the illogicality of China's position. Why should rich countries not announce even this unilateral cut? The Chinese delegate said no, and I watched, aghast, as Merkel threw up her hands in despair and conceded the point."

Accoring to Mr. Lynas, "China wants to weaken the climate regulation regime now 'in order to avoid the risk that it might be called on to be more ambitious in a few years' time'."

I have been to several international environmental conferences, including IUCN 2000, IUCN 2004 and WSSD 2002, and I have seen with my own eyes how these negotiations work, especially at the UN level. At these meetings, world politics is more influential than global or international politics. By world politics, I mean that states quickly get grouped into the politics of "developed countries" versus "developing countries" or the First World versus the Third World countries. Issues of global politics, such as human rights, poverty reduction, environmental protection and women's empowerment will get hijacked under international (between key states) and world politics.

What is interesting is the level of world politics that operates at these conferences. The developed versus developing countries politics, one would imagine, is very old and outdated. It isn't. It still dominates these meetings. While I came across deeper undercurrents of world politics, such as the aspirations of the 53-member African states and the Muslim bloc, these do not come up as forcefully in the proceedings. These undercurrents, somehow, get subsumed under the larger 'developing versus developed countries' politics. The African and Muslim blocs, for example, are generally happy to vote "No" to anything that the developed countries, usually headed by the U.S., put forward. And China, as a leader of developing countries bloc, takes advantage of this condition efficiently and effectively.

What is even more interesting is how the vastly different developing countries, from major powers like India and Brazil to climate-vulnerable states like Maldives and Bangladesh, allow China, which is far more powerful and has completely different sets of interests, take the lead in these negotiations. This raises a question: will China advocate for the interest of countries like Maldives? Read an observation by Mr. Lynas:

"With the deal gutted, the heads of state session concluded with a final battle as the Chinese delegate insisted on removing the 1.5C target so beloved of the small island states and low-lying nations who have most to lose from rising seas. President Nasheed of the Maldives, supported by Brown, fought valiantly to save this crucial number. "How can you ask my country to go extinct?" demanded Nasheed. The Chinese delegate feigned great offence – and the number stayed, but surrounded by language which makes it all but meaningless. The deed was done."
So there. Denmark has sacrificed Tibet on the altar of a global environmental issue to no avail. With the lessons learned, does Denmark have the integrity to acknowledge its mistakes and retract the statement?

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Do you know the name of this flower?

Yes, can you please tell me the English or botanical name of this flower? Apparently this flower is quite popular among Tibetans. Its Tibetan name is Dolma Metok (སྒྲོལ་མ་མེ་ཏོག༑).



I like how these flowers are planted in used paper packets and old rusty tins, something financially poor elder Tibetans commonly do. This white Dolma Metok is planted in a Amul milk packet. Amul dairy products are a favorite of Tibetan refugees in India. [Amul, by the way, has an interesting story behind its inception as a farmers' cooperative society in the Indian state of Gujarat.] This photo was taken at Mussoorie's Tibetan Buddhist temple and these flowers belong to an older monk, whose name I don't know. Tibetans are quite ingenious about their flower pots. My mother has a couple of begonia (Chuzin Metok) plants in broken Chinese thermos cases. My friend Tsering Chophel's parents, who live in Clementown Dhondupling Tibetan refugee settlement, have cut several 2-litre soft drink (Coke, 7up) plastic bottles in halves and made two flower pots, one with the lid on, from each bottle!

Gen Tamding-la, a teacher at Mussoorie Tibetan Homes School, told me how they used to take great care of Dolma Metok. Apparently this is a perennial flower. Winters in Tibet are cold, so they keep the flowers indoor during night and they take it outside in the morning sun. Dolma metok, Gen Tamding-la said, is a special "ornament" of Losar (Tibetan new year) decoration. The white flowers have a nice subtle scent, which the red ones seem to lack. Dolma metok also comes in yellow and other colours.



Here (above) is a close-up photo of Dolma Metok. Even the red ones on the back is Dolma Metok.




The older lama's flower collection overlooking the Himalayas. He has many kinds of geranium (Trung Trung Metok) and marigolds (Serchen Metok). 




This (above) daisy-like flower is actually chrysanthemum. Now, there are many Tibetan names for chrysanthemum such as Khenpa (འཁན་པ་), Lugmig (ལུག་མིག་) and Drangsong (དྲང་སྲོང་). Khenpa is the most commonly used name. I think Lugmig is the name used in Tibetan medicine -- I should consult an expert on Tibetan medicinal plant names about this. Drangsong means old sage or ascetic in Tibetan. Drangsong Metok is a specific kind of chrysanthemum: these have fluffier blossoms with longer petals, see below.



If you wish to learn Tibetan flower names, see this post. I would love to hear from readers about flower names. Please share.

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Woser's article on "Tibet's Water Pollution and China's 'Global Warming'" on HPPE

There is a really good Chinese language article on pollution of Lhasa River and problems associated with mining at Gyama village of Meldro Gungkar county by Woser, the premier Tibetan blogger. You can read an English translation of the article by High Peaks Pure Earth. Check out the striking photographic evidences of the problems with water pollution and mining in the region.

The Gyama mine is now owned by a Canadian company named Jinshan. I have written about human rights implications and Canada's involvement in these projects. See: Canada and Crime Against the Tibetan People

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Dams on Machu/Yellow River/Huanghe (Northeast Tibetan Plateau)

I am pleased to publish this map of hydropower projects on the upper Yellow River, also known as Machu (᪵ᨋᩛᨋ) [རྨ་ཆུ་] in Tibetan and Huanghe in Chinese. Many thanks to my amazing map maker and to all the readers who have provided us information and feedback. If you find the following map of dams in Northeast Tibetan Plateau of interest, check out related maps of dams on the eastern edges of the Tibetan Plateau. We are working on more maps, so please stay tuned.





For the sake of simplicity and accuracy, a project's Status is shown under four possible values: Built/Operational, Under Construction, Under Active Consideration, and Proposed. 

The term "Built" includes HPPs that have started generating power but are not complete, as well as those that have been operational but are currently non-functional. 

"Under Construction" indicates that work is proceeding on the ground and does not necessary entail that the river has been blocked or diverted. 

"Under Active Consideration" includes projects in which the design, environmental issues, financing etc. are being developed as well as those that have been discussed but have never made it to the drawing board in any serious way. 

"Cancelled" includes only those projects for which there is widespread agreement that the government has decided that the proposed projects will not go ahead. This does not mean that a similar project may not be in the works to get around of the cancellation of the original project.

Capacity is given in Megawatts. This should be understood to be the planned maximum rated power generation capacity of the generators of a HPP when it is completed. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, these figures are often given somewhat different values in different sources. Power generation capacity of hydropower generators is developing quickly so they may change.

Information shared here are obtained from the Northwest Hydro Consulting Engineers, CHECC, a Qinghai government website, and a number of other web based resources. Chinese and non-Chinese maps of the area have been used for geographical information.

The maps are only approximately to scale. The positions of the hydropower projects are approximate. A professional map should be used for more accurate geographic information.

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